---
title: 'Red Cross WW2 Report 1939-1947 Vol 3'
url: 'https://samisdat.in/en/books/1948%20-%20red%20cross%20ww2%20report%201939-1947%20vols%201-3'
markdown: 'https://samisdat.in/en/books/1948%20-%20red%20cross%20ww2%20report%201939-1947%20vols%201-3.md'
lang: eng
date: '1948-05-05'
description: 'VOLUME III GENEVA May 1948 VOLUME III GENEVA May 1948 No. 3 A INTRODUCTION Not many years after the foundation of the ICRC in 1863-1864, during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, an Information Bureau for Prisoners of War was opened at Basle, with the object of assembling information on men…'
---

# Red Cross WW2 Report 1939-1947 Vol 3

VOLUME III

![](https://samisdat.in/user/pages/03.books/1948%20-%20Red%20Cross%20WW2%20Report%201939-1947%20Vols%201-3/_page_0_Picture_6.jpeg?g-3fa34440)

GENEVA May 1948

![](https://samisdat.in/user/pages/03.books/1948%20-%20Red%20Cross%20WW2%20Report%201939-1947%20Vols%201-3/_page_2_Picture_0.jpeg?g-3fa34440)

![](https://samisdat.in/user/pages/03.books/1948%20-%20Red%20Cross%20WW2%20Report%201939-1947%20Vols%201-3/_page_3_Picture_0.jpeg?g-3fa34440)

**VOLUME III**

GENEVA May 1948

No. 3 A

![](https://samisdat.in/user/pages/03.books/1948%20-%20Red%20Cross%20WW2%20Report%201939-1947%20Vols%201-3/_page_5_Picture_0.jpeg?g-3fa34440)

### INTRODUCTION

Not many years after the foundation of the ICRC in 1863-1864, during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, an Information Bureau for Prisoners of War was opened at Basle, with the object of assembling information on men reported missing. This office, which in a way anticipated the future Central Prisoners of War Agency at Geneva was, it is not surprising, called upon to send on not only news but also medicaments, dressings and even a few food parcels and packages of books made up in Switzerland. As the Franco-Prussian war lasted only a few months and was moreover fought over a limited area, these early relief schemes set afoot by the ICRC were very limited in extent.

Contrary to the general impression, relief schemes were still on a reduced scale in the first World War. The conflict, it is true, lasted for much longer than in 1870: it also affected many more countries and caused far greater slaughter. The number of prisoners taken, however, cannot be compared with the vast number of men and women captured or arrested for various reasons during the Second World War. In 1914-1918, too, the relative stability of the fronts enabled belligerents to maintain intact most of their railway and postal systems. Thus, National Red Cross Societies and other humanitarian organizations

could themselves undertake to aid both the wounded and sick, and the prisoners of war. The help of the ICRC was not required in this field, as relief supplies arrived at their destination direct by the normal channels. In Switzerland, too, it was the shipping agencies that undertook the despatch by rail of relief supplies to the belligerent countries. The ICRC merely entrusted to them the transport of 1,813 wagons of collective gifts. The Committee further organized, by arrangement with the Swiss Postal Service, the despatch by mail of 1,884,914 individual parcels. This was a straightforward job and did not even require a separate department to deal with it.

No comparison, however, can be drawn between the operations, limited in scope, to which reference has just been made, and the vast work of relief undertaken by the ICRC between 1939 and 1947 in behalf of unprecedented numbers of prisoners of war and internees of every category, as well as of the civil population in many countries. This work immediately took on almost alarming proportions for those on whom it devolved. When it reached its peak between 1943 and 1944, with 2,000 wagons coming and going each month, the ICRC had become the biggest relief distribution centre on the continent. (4) Large consignments to civilian victims of the war, particularly those supplies despatched by the ICRC in co-operation with the League of Red Cross Societies through the Joint Relief Commission. The recipients were either specified categories of persons (children, women, the aged, the sick and disabled), or inhabitants of areas that had particularly suffered as a result of military operations: such were the Channel Islands, the French Atlantic coast after the Allied invasion in 1944, and the western provinces of Holland at the beginning of 1945. Relief was also sent to Pruzskow Camp, which held a large proportion of the Warsaw population, to the children of Paris in 1940, to those of Berlin and of Vienna from 1945 to 1947, and to other victims of the war. The principal relief scheme in behalf of civilians was certainly that carried out in Greece, when all normal supply routes by the Mediterranean were cut off after the campaign of 1940-1941. The first phase of the hostilities which opened on September 1, 1939, with the lightning campaign against Poland, entailed the capture of over half a million men in twenty-two days. At the end of only a few weeks, the ICRC and the National Red Cross Societies found themselves faced with an unprecedented task. It immediately became clear that this mass of Polish prisoners would need relief supplies, despite the provisions of Article 11 of the 1929 Convention relating to the treatment of PW 1. In order to give them practical help, their identity, number and places of internment had to be known. Without waiting for information on these points, the ICRC sent trial consignments for the first three or four months. Front, along the Franco-German boundary line from Basle to the Belgian frontier; (2) civilians of enemy nationality interned in belligerent countries, whose status, under bilateral agreements made in 1939 and 1940, was equivalent to that of PW 1; (3) sick and wounded combatants. It was also necessary to collect, despatch and distribute gifts for civil populations, and to seek and co-ordinate the support of National Red Cross Societies in neutral countries. The rapid march of events called for prompt measures. The ICRC was, as a rule, obliged to improvise relief schemes which could only later be organized on the juridical basis of the 1929 Convention, or of common law. There was no question as yet of averting starvation for masses of people whom the Detaining Power could no longer feed as required by the Conventions. The International Committee was simply giving individual help to prisoners who looked for some alleviation of their lot. The first camp visits carried out in October 1939 showed, however, that a very large number of PW who had lost their belongings at the time of capture were extremely short of underwear. They also needed medicaments and pharmaceutical supplies. Most of them also asked for extra food and tobacco. <sup>1 See Vol. I, p. 573. In accordance with the Cairo Postal Convention of 1935, the Swiss Post Office carried free of charge all parcels originating in, or in transit through Switzerland, which were intended for PW in Germany, France and the British Commonwealth. Individual parcels could be sent in two ways: (1) they could be forwarded direct by post. The Swiss Postal administration states that as early as the year 1939, 388 parcels were posted in Switzerland and 3,478 passed in transit 1. (2) Parcels could also be sent through the ICRC. The Committee stated at the outbreak of war that it was prepared to accept parcels from prisoners' families bearing only the address "ICRC, Geneva", and to forward them after checking, completing or correcting the postal addresses of the recipients. The Postal Transit Section set up by the ICRC forwarded 47 parcels in October 1939, 377 in November (an increase due to Christmas parcels), and 99 in December. These figures include parcels from Switzerland and abroad. In 1940, the work of the Section grew steadily but continued to be on a very small scale (34 parcels despatched in January and 1,295 in December 1940). In succeeding years, figures for monthly despatches varied considerably, for reasons which will be examined below 2, but between 1941 and 1945 an average of 1,000 was maintained. | 1940 | | 1,224,614 parcels | |------|--|-------------------| | 1941 | | 8,110,756 ,, | | 1942 | | 14,690,625 ,, | | 1943 | | 13,823,295 | | 1944 | | 5,719,956 ,, | | 1945 | | 555,101 ,, | This shows that the number of parcels increased considerably between 1940 and 1942, remained at a very high level in 1943 and subsequently declined. During 1944, the individual parcels sent from France decreased in number and then stopped entirely after the Allied landings in France. Generally speaking, there was an increase in collective parcels as against those addressed to individuals, which were exposed to greater risks. The sharp decrease in 1945 was due to the dislocation of railway transport, and, above all, to the ending of the war in Europe in May. Parcels up to five, and, in exceptional cases, twenty kilos in weight were accepted for transit through Switzerland for PW and civilian internees. In Great Britain 5 kilos was the maximum weight allowed; in France it was at first two kilos and later increased to five kilos. The German military authorities who wished to fix the maximum weight at 20 kilos, reduced it to 5 kilos also. This standard of 5 kilos established by common consent, was successfully maintained throughout the war. At the beginning of 1942, however, it was somewhat relaxed in order to enable heavy articles to be sent, such as winter clothing, greatcoats, books in several volumes; parcels of this kind were thenceforth allowed up to 10 kilos. Coins and bank-notes. Duplicators, carbon paper and tracing paper. Compasses, maps, cameras, field glasses, magnifying glasses, electric torches, telephone apparatus. Books and newspapers of a political or military character, or of suspect contents. - (3) Tin openers, at first classified as edged and therefore banned tools, were finally allowed in collective parcels. The ICRC observed that these objections were often well-founded. After consultation with the Detaining Powers, the donors and certain neutral experts, the Committee proposed to belligerents that they should forbid the direct despatch of medicaments in individual parcels and, above all, in those sent by next of kin. This was, in a sense, a restriction of the right given to PW under Art. 37 of the Geneva Convention, but the men were not in fact the losers thereby. Though parcels of this kind had to be addressed to the senior medical officer, the camp leader or the representative of a Red Cross Society, they could also bear the name of the real addressee. Furthermore, this rule did not prevent many PW from receiving throughout their captivity boxes labelled, for example, "Cough Lozenges", or bottles of supposed "Anti-flu" which actually contained some kind of alcohol. These articles were distributed or confiscated according to the strictness of the camp censorship. While consignments from Red Cross Societies and other relief organizations were in general carefully packed, the same could not be said of family parcels. Damage and loss due solely to defective packing were therefore heavy. Foodstuffs and clothing were too often mixed up together, and the state in which these parcels arrived after a long journey, which included several trans-shipments, can easily be imagined. Thus losses were as much as 20 per cent for the parcels containing uniforms, honey and salami sausage, sent by Italian families to their men in India, and carried in the hold through tropical waters. Such misfortunes were not wholly due to negligence or inexperience on the part of the senders; after 1942, they had increasing difficulty in obtaining packing materials, especially in the countries occupied by Germany and Italy. Greece. The French Red Cross preferred an intermediary system described in Chapter 2. While all belligerents vouchsafed the postal address, i.e. the exact place of detention, of civilian internees, the location of PW camps was kept secret. In Germany and Great Britain, collective and individual parcels for PW had therefore to be addressed to camps described merely by numbers. Thus, the first German camps heard of outside that country, and to which parcels were sent, were "Oflags" (Offizierslager) X A and XI A, and "Stalags" (Mannschafts-Stammlager) III and IV A, where on October 19, 1939, there were 4,545 Polish PW in all 1. This relatively small number was due to the fact that, at this period, very large numbers of men were still temporarily held in the territory at that time called the "General-Government of Poland". It can legitimately be argued that PW are entitled to receive an unlimited number of individual parcels, since Art. 37 of the Convention says nothing to the contrary. There were, however, such vast numbers of Polish prisoners after the capitulation of their army that the German High Command, in order to avoid congestion in the post offices and censorship, as it stated, placed an arbitrary limit on the number of individual parcels sent from occupied Poland to PW transferred to Germany. All parcels therefore had to bear labels previously issued to each PW and sent by him to his relatives. This system was soon known outside Poland, but when the ICRC questioned the German During the first weeks of the war individual consignments from private donors greatly exceeded other types. It soon became obvious to the ICRC, to National Red Cross Societies and several other organizations, that it was essential to supplement these by collective relief. Of the Polish PW in Germany at the beginning of December 1939, some 250,000 could expect no help whatever from their relatives, since these either had lost their lives or were themselves destitute. It also seemed likely that a high proportion of the 150,000 Poles captured by the Soviet forces were no better off. During the trial period of consignments, no clear distinction was made between individual and collective relief. The ICRC realized at the outset, however, that the despatch of thousands of individual parcels in lots, and of tens of thousands of collective parcels, besides goods in bulk, required the most careful preparation and involved not only technical, but also economic and political considerations. Before even studying means of transport, the ICRC had to know to what extent the countries concerned would find it compatible with their war economy to export large quantitites of foodstuffs and clothing, for humanitarian purposes. first place to the British Women's Wartime Work in Geneva that the ICRC was able to assist British prisoners, and the same applied to German prisoners, thanks to the German Consulate-General in Geneva. The Brazilian Red Cross was the first overseas donor. In February 1940, this Society sent the ICRC thirty tons of sugar, of which fifteen were for Polish prisoners and fifteen for hospitals in Poland. In March 1940, eighteen tons of coffee followed, half for sick and wounded PW still in Poland and half for the civilian population of that country. These first donors requested the ICRC to send either lots of individual parcels, or collective shipments addressed to camp leaders. Thus, at the request of the German Consulate-General, on December 21, 1939, 40 Christmas parcels of a total weight of 47 kilos and 160 parcels weighing 187 kilos were sent to Camps No. 1 and No. 2 in Great Britain, whilst 100 parcels of a total weight of 117 kilos were sent to the Postal Centre for Prisoners of War in Paris, which had charge of their distribution in France. The next day, December 22, 100 parcels, of a total weight of 249 kilos, were despatched; they were sent by the Polish Consulate-General to the camp leader of the Polish PW in Stalag XVIIB in Germany. Finally on December 23, 4,000 parcels provided by the Ukraino-Swiss Committee and Working Centre were sent to the camp leader of the Polish PW in Oflag XB in Germany. All these shipments were made by transport firms and arrived safely. In October and November, the ICRC satisfied itself that a camp leader had been appointed in each camp and that he was authorized to receive and distribute collective consignments, under Art. 43 of the 1929 PW Convention. The ICRC Delegation in London forwarded the receipts from German PW to Geneva at the beginning of 1940; the Poles acknowledged receipt direct on January 8 and 16. These consignments are quoted as an instance and were followed up by others no less successful. The first collective parcels contained mainly foodstuffs and toilet articles. The ICRC also transmitted, from 1939 onwards, books and games supplied by the World Alliance of YMCA. Consignments of clothing soon followed. One of the first requests for relief came from the German commandant of Oflag II D, who reported on September 18, 1939, that a thousand French officers in that camp needed uniforms and expected them either in individual parcels from their relatives or in collective parcels from the French Government. It should be remembered in this connection that although Art. 12 of the 1929 PW Convention lays on Detaining Powers the obligation to supply PW with clothing, it makes no mention of spare underclothing, nor of regulation uniforms. However, Germany on the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, always agreed tacitly that prisoners could receive these articles individually or collectively from their home country. Thus it may be said that, four months after the outbreak of hostilities, the steps taken and the initial practical experience gained by the ICRC had already determined the general shape of future relief schemes. The individual and collective relief consignments provided for in the 1929 PW Convention had the consent of all belligerents. The French, British and German Authorities and Red Cross Societies were aware that it was their responsibility to send uniforms, underwear, foodstuffs, tobacco, medicaments, toilet articles, books and games to their own nationals in PW or internment camps. They also knew that the ICRC was able to forward all these items, either by individual postal packages or by collective parcels, and in all cases post free. - I shirt - 2 pairs of socks - 1 pullover - ı face towel - t cake of soap The note in question contained the following recommendations to donors: remove all manufacturer's labels or other indications from clothing; prepare collective shipments according to camps; send linen according to kind in cases or bales showing the number of articles; limit the weight of parcels to 50 kilos. Those who did not wish to send parcels through the ICRC were asked to inform the Committee of the number, nature and date of their consignments, so that gifts from different sources might be shared out as fairly as possible. The note finally stated that, under Art. 43 of the Convention, the camp leaders appointed had the right to receive and distribute collective relief consignments and that, in particular, the clothing issued by them became the absolute property of the recipients. The latest list of camp strengths transmitted by the German military authorities was attached; this recorded that 19,102 Polish officers and 370,164 NCOs and men were detained in Germany. It should be remembered that reciprocity always carried great weight in negotiations on assistance to PW and civilian internees. It was effective in the case of German prisoners and civilian internees in France and the British Commonwealth, and vice-versa. It was, however, absent from the outset as regards Polish prisoners, and the task of aiding them was, in consequence, far more difficult. However, this disadvantage only became apparent after some time, and especially after 1941. ## Chapter 2 During the first winter of the War, the ICRC had already launched its relief schemes. Those chiefly benefited at that time were the Poles captured in September 1939. The events of 1940 and 1941, such as the invasion of Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and France by the German forces, Italy's entry into the War, and the campaigns in the Balkans and Africa, soon made the Committee's work far more complex and onerous. The number of prisoners taken rose to about 1,700,000 French, 30,000 British and several hundred thousand Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians and Jugoslavs. Very early, even before the need became urgent, it had been decided in all parts of the world to supply PW from outside, since it was to be presumed that neither Italy nor Germany would carry out in full the obligations laid upon Detaining Powers by Article 12 of the Geneva Convention. By the summer of 1940, however, it was manifest that the governments of these countries could not supply adequate food and clothing over an indefinite period to the two million men who had fallen into their hands, and whose pressing needs were apparent both from the reports by the Committee's delegates, and from countless appeals for help. and perils of cold and starvation. Their work, supported by donor groups in every continent, was of course not everywhere pursued along identical lines. One very important feature, however, was common to all schemes; the fact that the ICRC and its delegates in belligerent countries were almost invariably entrusted with the task of taking delivery of relief supplies in Europe, of warehousing them on neutral soil, and of their distribution. This distribution, one should add, really involved only two channels of supply, since all Allied prisoners were in the hands either of Germany or of Italy. This situation led to difficulties which will be described below. In the first place, without compromising in any way its work for PW recognized as such, the ICRC claimed the right to give similar assistance to those who did not enjoy PW status, or who had been deprived of it by various expedients, such as so-called "release", followed by internment as civilians, or "conversion" into civilian workers. fiscation. Finally, camp leaders were refused many facilities which, although not stipulated in the Conventions, were nevertheless accorded to British and American spokesmen. These included the right to witness the arrival of consignments at railway stations, to check stocks, to be in touch with their colleagues in labour detachments and hospitals attached to their own camp, and to confer direct with the ICRC and the donors. Conditions varied greatly from one camp to another, according to the strictness of the commandants and censorship officials. But it may be said that, on the whole, Allied prisoners, who should all have received equal treatment, were in fact divided into the following categories: - (4) Belgian and Dutch PW, whose status was practically the same as that of the French; - (5) Greeks, Jugoslavs, Poles, and Jewish prisoners not of British or American nationality. These could not count on any reciprocity, and were moreover exposed to every kind of victimization, on grounds of racial policy. The Allied authorities made no discrimination as between German and Italian PW, or between civilian internees of different nationalities, but they also on occasion resorted to vexatious measures. They held prisoners, for example, for an indefinite period in transit camps, thus preventing them from giving a permanent camp address to their next of kin; they also sent PW to isolated regions, such as Morocco or East Africa, where they were cut off from any postal or other means of communication with the ICRC and its representatives, so that the camp leaders were unable to carry out their duties and the normal distribution of relief supplies was stopped. These questions were the following: - (3) Role of the ICRC as a trustee and neutral intermediary for the forwarding and distributing of funds and relief supplies. This role involved: - (b) The receipt of consignments; <sup>1 See pp. 281 et seq. - (5) Supervision of distribution. The Vichy Government and the French Red Cross at first sent relief to their prisoners, numbering over a million, in very large bulk consignments. The Committee thus received entire wagonloads of foodstuffs in cases, some with homogeneous, others with assorted contents, and consignments of clothing which was simply stacked in the wagons. Gradually, the local branches of the French Red Cross organized the packing of standard or semi-standard parcels 1. Although the contents of these parcels varied according to the state of the market, they nearly all included wartime bread, cigarettes, tinned meat and fish and a few other articles such as sugar, concentrated fruit juice, dried fruit and vegetables. It will have been seen from the previous chapter that the British Red Cross had, in 1939, begun the distribution of collective or communal standard parcels. In 1940 and 1941, it decided that all British Commonwealth prisoners should receive one standard parcel a week, and that complete outfits of clothing should be sent regularly to the camps, according to recommendations made by the camp leaders. It also instituted a whole series of special standard parcels, such as "Invalid Comfort Parcels" and "Medical Parcels", of two different types, one for camps and one for hospitals, the needs and sick roll of which were known; parcels for Indian PW, for airmen and seamen; and parcels for civilian internees, the contents of which varied according to the sex and age of the recipients. The system adopted by the American Red Cross differed only in detail from the British. The Argentine Red Cross preferred standard bulk consignments and shipped foodstuffs according to kind in cases of 35 kilos, and clothing packed according to garment. Smaller donors used methods identical or similar to those described. For instance, the Brazilian Red Cross, and welfare organizations in Africa, the Near and Middle East long continued to send consignments on French lines, whilst the British Dominions and Colonies used precisely the same methods as the British and American Red Cross 1. The term "economic warfare" describes all measures taken by a belligerent to prevent the enemy from acquiring supplies from abroad which may contribute directly or indirectly to its military resources. Accordingly, from 1939 onwards, Great Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other reduced and supervised the international movement of goods. Unless accompanied by a "navicert" or "landcert" issued by the Ministry of Economic Warfare, in London, acting for the Allied Governments, no goods could pass from Allied to enemy territory, or even into neutral countries, the imports of which were thus fixed by quota. Relief supplies, whether sent from Allied or neutral territory, were of course subject to the same regulations; these need not, however, be described in detail here 1, since consignments for PW and civilian internees, with which this chapter alone deals, were always looked on with favour and even held to be necessary by the Allied Governments. It will therefore suffice to record the difficulties that arose between the blockade authorities and the ICRC, in applying a principle which in itself was not disputed: the Allies claimed that shipments should be limited to categories of prisoners and goods likely to give rise to least abuse, whilst the Committee refused to take these restrictions as final. export permits off the quota for goods to be re-exported from Switzerland for PW. The Committee had no difficulty in obtaining permits for individual parcels addressed by name. In a letter dated August 29, 1940, the Ministry of Economic Warfare also authorized collective consignments of standard parcels or bulk supplies addressed to camp leaders of specific camps, on condition that the ICRC should supervise their distribution. The letter referred to camp visits by the delegates of the ICRC, without however at this stage making such visits an indispensable condition. In this way, the ICRC had little difficulty in forwarding the first gift supplies from the Brazilian Red Cross and the relief consignments from the British Commonwealth as a whole, directed during the winter of 1940-41 to British PW and civilian internees, of whom there were about 40,000 in Germany and some thousands in Italy. The ICRC also sent some smaller consignments from Switzerland itself. The Ministry of Economic Warfare, however, were opposed to the unrestricted dispatch of such large quantities of goods to Germany, especially in view of the unstable political situation in France after the armistice. They also objected in principle to bulk shipments, the supervision of which they considered more difficult than that of standard parcels, and they authorized the distribution of goods from overseas only to camps visited by the Committee's delegates. They had, moreover, already shown an inclination to prohibit all consignments not exclusively intended for base camps. The ICRC was thus in each case obliged to re-open long and troublesome negotiations in order to secure "navicerts" or "landcerts" for specified purchases by the French Red Cross or by some French Government agency, and for goods which it bought itself with the funds Discussions on this point led to no positive result, but the ICRC was more successful concerning bulk consignments. It was able to prove to the blockade authorities, by several examples, that it was neither practical nor even possible to convey in parcel form the large quantities of goods intended for hundreds of thousands of French PW, and that, moreover, foodstuffs packed in cases of 30 to 60 kilos could be inspected just as efficiently as standard parcels. With certain provisos, the Ministry of Economic Warfare then authorized shipments in bulk and, in 1941 and 1942, granted "navicerts" and "landcerts" for which, however, the ICRC had to make application as and when they were required. The ICRC had also to procure the necessary permits for sending supplies to Belgian prisoners, whom the Belgian Congo was making increasing efforts to assist. Dutch, Greek, Norwegian, Polish and Jugoslav prisoners were assisted by their own Governments and Red Cross Societies set up in London; these sent standard parcels under the terms of arrangements made direct with the British and United States authorities. These measures simplified the formalities, but the donors had some difficulty in finding goods in adequate quantities within the British Commonwealth and the American hemisphere. During 1942, the United States also instituted a strict control over their exports 1, and, generally speaking, economic warfare was intensified. The German authorities continued the regular recruiting of additional civilian workers in occupied countries, and ever greater numbers of PW were "converted" into civilian workers. The British and American blockade authorities, who were aware that a large proportion of the relief supplies entrusted to the ICRC passed on from PW base camps to labour detachments, feared that these groups might not be clearly distinguished from the groups of civilian workers; they were also afraid that supervision by the camp leaders and the ICRC delegates might not be sufficiently strict, and finally, that the enemy might not rigidly conform to Art. 31 of the 1929 Convention, which stipulates that the work of PW shall in no way be directly connected with the war effort. To provide against With regard to the first point, a representative of the ICRC was sent to London to discuss the position. He pointed out that the very great number of British and American PW scattered amongst the labour detachments would also suffer severely under the proposed restrictions. He made it clear to the blockade authorities that the distribution and supervision procedure provided all guarantees that could be desired, since PW who had been "converted" into civilian workers were struck off the lists by the camp leaders, so that no confusion was possible. As a result, "navicerts" were granted in August 1943 for 600 tons of tunny fish and 300 tons of jam, with the option of distributing these foodstuffs also among the labour detachments. This success was, unfortunately, but short-lived. The ICRC also finally gained its point on the question of bulk shipments; the British and American authorities had to recognize that relief work could not admit of any discrimination in nationality, and that by impeding this mutual aid, they would inevitably harm their own men. Since British and American PW received relief supplies in bulk from Latin America and the Near East, other Allied PW ought to have the same facilities, especially as their supplies were not in any case equal in quantity to those of the PW from the British Commonwealth and the United States. Polish and Jugoslav prisoners, for instance, received aid only in proportion to the funds and foodstuffs available; the number of French prisoners was so great that available transport did not allow more than a monthly average of 10 kilos per man to be sent. For these reasons, the Ministry of Economic Warfare agreed, providing certain additional measures of supervision were taken, to allow "navicerts" for goods from North Africa in particular, which were urgently required for some 40,000 French Colonial prisoners held in "Front Stalags" in occupied France. The same applied to cocoa-beans and sugar sent in bulk from South America In 1943, the blockade authorities decided to withdraw the right the ICRC had frequently used, to purchase goods on behalf of the donors or to make application for "navicerts" and "landcerts". This decision unfortunately caused great loss of time, for when donors failed in getting the authority required, their final resort was to request the ICRC to intervene in London or Washington. The Committee was thus apprised of some urgent matters that had been held up for three or four months, and still further time was required before any settlement could be reached. The financial agreement for the release of frozen funds, which the provisional Free French Government in Algiers had made with the United States and the American Red Cross at the end of 1943, caused a further change in the conditions governing the feeding of French prisoners. Thenceforth, French PW who were in labour detachments had the right to receive American standard parcels in the same way as their comrades in the base camps, and like the Greeks, Poles, Jugoslavs and others, provided there was no infringement in this respect of Art. 31 of the Convention. At the same time, the ICRC had at last obtained authority to increase the number of its delegates in Germany, and since these men were able to visit not only base camps, but several of the labour detachments attached to them, effective supervision was ensured. The regulations concerning PW also applied to civilian internees. Almost insuperable difficulties arose, however, in applying the measures of inspection required by the blockade authorities not only to internees in fenced camps, but also to those who were interned alone (isolati), or simply confined to their homes (confinati). This applied in particular to the Allied isolati, mainly British, who were to be found scattered all over Italy. These persons had been given the status of civilian internee by the Italians, who allowed them, although dispersed, to receive aid by the same procedure as that applying to PW. The British Red Cross were also anxious to help these people as it did the civilian internees of the big camps in Germany and occupied France. The ICRC, however, when asked whether it could guarantee the meticulous supervision of distribution, had to reply that this was out of the question, if only because its delegates in Rome were too few in number, and because military operations made travel increasingly difficult. However, after discussions which lasted for several months, the British Red Cross persuaded the Ministry of Economic Warfare to make an exception to the blockade regulations, and regular consignments of provisions and clothing were thus sent to British and American isolati through the care of the Committee. In respect of the isolati of other nationalities, promising replies had been received, but before the ICRC could be duly authorized to distribute relief from overseas, the events of the summer of 1943 and the Italian armistice put a stop for the time being to all relief work in Italy. rista, sor. sor. sor. sor. sor. sor. sor. sor. ## Role of the ICRC as a trustee and neutral intermediary in the forwarding and distribution of funds and goods for relief. The ICRC accepted all funds and supplies entrusted to it for transmission to third parties, and in so doing assumed by implication the role of a trustee. At the end of the war in Europe, the value of the goods it had handled amounted to some three thousand million Swiss francs. The above function was not, however, and could never be made subject to a contract in law. The Committee confined its action to informing those concerned of the regulations in force, both in the belligerent countries and in Switzerland. The donors who entrusted the funds or the goods to its care accepted, by so doing, the risks of the operation involved. They were free to provide against these risks, and especially against war risks, by insurance of all kinds. This precaution was only taken as a rule in respect of gifts from private sources, for when relief goods were supplied by Governments, compensation was only nominal, since it consisted merely of an adjustment of book entries as between two Ministries. Moreover, it was not within the power of the ICRC to avoid losses incidental to the war, or confiscations and misuses of all kinds. It did, however, require a protective guarantee that all goods forwarded through it would be accepted by the Detaining Powers. As shown in the preceding chapter, agreements in this respect had been concluded at the outbreak of hostilities, and others were made, as and when required by new relief schemes. By far the greater part of the relief entrusted to the ICRC was intended for a certain nationality or category of war victims, sometimes even for one particular camp. In such cases, the donors retained full ownership rights in respect of these goods or funds, and the Committee had to follow their instructions. If these could not be carried out, it had to ask for others. Since this right held good from first to last, the function of trustee passed from the ICRC to one of its delegates in belligerent countries, or to a camp leader. In point of fact, only the final recipient (that is, the prisoner for whom the joint relief action was undertaken) could become owner of the gift. In consequence, the camp leader himself was bound strictly to observe the instructions given by the donors, which he usually received from the ICRC, or in exceptional cases, direct. the warm weather were placed in camp stocks. By a wide interpretation of Art. 43 of the Geneva Convention, camp leaders should have had the sole right to dispose of these stocks, in accordance with the donors' instructions. Since the rights of trusteeship in this matter were, however, from the outset claimed by the German authorities, camp leaders retained mere supervisory rights, which depended for their effective use upon the perspicacity of the camp leader and the goodwill of the commandant. As a mutual guarantee, the storehouses were in principle provided with two separate locks. In addition, the marking of clothing either by the donors, or at least at their expense, or by the Detaining Power, prevented any later claims that stocks given by the ICRC had been supplied by the Detaining Power, or belonged to it as booty. Various special measures were taken which also impaired ownership rights: for instance, the military authorities only issued new clothing to the men in exchange for used garments, without troubling to enquire if the used clothing had been drawn from their own stocks or from collective consignments sent by the ICRC. In order to provide against escapes, the men were not allowed to have two garments of the same kind (for instance, two pairs of trousers, two pairs of shoes, etc.). Here too, surplus garments were withdrawn from use, whatever their origin. Finally, the principle generally enforced in Germany, to distribute clothes where most urgently required, was not easily reconcilable with the instructions from donors, who wished their gifts to be reserved for men of their own nationality. The ICRC never refused its good offices when a dispute arose between the Detaining Power and camp leaders. The camp leaders did, however, sometimes have differences with the prisoners themselves, over proposed steps for reducing waste, the fixing of dates for the distribution of winter clothing or the recovery of reserve clothing that had already been issued, for redistribution to newcomers. In such cases, the Committee refrained from taking action, even when asked to do so by those concerned or by the Detaining Power: it simply passed on complaints to the donors, who took whatever steps they wished. A most delicate question was that of communal camp furnishings. This covers all articles used in the equipment of a camp or hospital, such as bedding, crockery, kitchen utensils, and stoves; lorries and petrol for taking supplies to labour detachments; tools and gear used by gardeners, cobblers, tailors and barbers, as well as musical instruments, books, games, sports gear and so on. The camp leaders, as trustees, had the custody of all this material, which remained in theory the property of the donors. For several reasons, however, and especially because of frequent transfers of camps, no effective check was possible. When camp material had passed through several hands, neither the ICRC nor the camp leaders knew exactly where it was to be found, and they could then rely only upon the willingness and good faith of the German authorities. Lastly, blankets were the cause of frequent controversy in camps in Germany. When received in family parcels or in individual consignments from Governments or Red Cross Societies, they were the men's own property. When sent in collective consignments, however, blankets remained in charge of the camp leaders as communal stores, and when supplied by the Detaining Power they were considered to be its property. In the absence of any general system of distinctive markings, it was almost inevitable that blankets from different sources should be confused; prisoners were moreover unwilling to give up their own blankets when changing camp. From this sprang a host of claims which it would be tedious to describe in detail. It is enough to say that the ICRC did its best to settle these differences, and that some of the donors so far lost patience that they gave up sending blankets, even when asked to do so by the men themselves. A firm of specialists examined the condition of the goods on arrival, and its reports were forwarded to the Red Cross Societies concerned, with the exception of the British Red Cross, which checked its own shipments. Damaged parcels were repacked sufficiently to allow transport to Geneva. Damage which occurred after despatch from Lisbon was recorded either at Marseilles, Genoa, in Switzerland, or on arrival of the supplies at the camps. Thus, the donors often received several reports in succession concerning a particular consignment, especially in case of damage. All documents relating to the cargo passed through the delegation in Lisbon (postal way-bills showing the number of mail-bags, bills of lading and accompanying documents, and so on). - (3) At Marseilles, the chief port of arrival, a permanent ICRC delegation was set up during the winter of 1940-1941. Assisted by forwarding agents, it looked after the discharge of cargoes and the loading, on the same vessels, of relief supplies intended for German and Italian PW in countries overseas. The delegation staff superintended the warehousing of goods which were held up owing to the shortage of wagons. Lastly, they took the necessary steps, in agreement with Geneva, to obtain rolling stock, and supervised the loading of the wagons. ຝ Red Cross Societies sent overseas, and 70 to 80 per cent of which went by the ordinary postal service, were addressed to the ICRC delegations in the countries where the prisoners were held, — for instance to Montreal for Canada, and to Simla and New Delhi for India. Nearly all were addressed to the camp leaders as the ultimate consignees. (c) Warehousing in Switzerland. — After the Franco-German armistice, which abolished any Western Front in Europe between 1940 and 1944, relief supplies intended for French PW were almost all kept in stock in the unoccupied zone of France, until November 1942. At the same time, it became imperative to build up stocks in Switzerland, on behalf first of the British Red Cross, then of the Allied Red Cross Societies which had been re-formed in London, and finally, of the American Red Cross, when the United States came into the war. This was, in fact, the only means of ensuring an uninterrupted flow of supplies for the prisoners, in view of the fact that shipments arrived at irregular intervals. Most of the National Red Cross Societies had representatives in Switzerland; these made regular visits to the warehouses and settled all technical matters with the ICRC. The goods remained on an average for three months in Switzerland; it sometimes occurred, however, that they were held up for a far longer period, in which case the Committee had to take all necessary precautions to prevent the deterioration of foodstuffs and perishable medicaments, and to provide against destruction by insects and rodents. (d) Warehousing in belligerent countries. — The delegations of the ICRC, too, had to have stocks, which were more or less considerable. The delegations overseas, who looked after German and Italian PW and civilian internees, usually kept only sufficient stocks to meet emergencies, as the German and Italian Red Cross Societies generally supplied them with funds rather than goods. This allowed purchases to be made locally in order to meet the demands of PW or their camp leaders, as and when they were made. <sup>l See pp. 90-94. <sup>2 Building and Labour Battalions. were flying squads of skilled workmen, usually roofers and glaziers, and mostly composed of French prisoners. Some of these BAB were constantly being shifted, and were thus attached to several camps in succession, a fact which had to be taken into account in allocating supplies. Other BAB were not attached to any camp, or could not be supplied from the main camp because of distance, or lack of transport: in such cases supplies had either to be sent direct, or by way of the nearest camp, even if the BAB concerned did not form part of its administration. As a rule, the ICRC was kept informed of these details by the camp leaders, but was sometimes at a loss, through lack of precise data on the nearest railway station, means of discharging and storing supplies, and so on. As far as possible, supplies were sent to main camps and their annexes by full wagon-loads 1. It was the duty of the camp leaders to receive and check the goods, to send receipts for them to Geneva and to distribute them. This last was no small task, since some camps had as many as 1,400 labour detachments. Moreover, the camp leaders had frequent difficulties in the matter of transport; when appealed to for help, the ICRC made application to the camp commandants, either in writing or through their visiting delegates. The French Government also sent lorries to Germany for use by the principal camp leaders. The other Allied donors held the view that it fell to the Detaining Power alone to supply the vehicles required, and prompted the ICRC to intervene to this end. Some camps in Italy, for instance those in the Apennines, lay in regions which had no regular transport service of any kind. Here the camp leaders were obliged to employ private lorries, carts and even mules. Transport by such chance means was not only uncertain, but, contrary to the usual practice, was not free. <sup>2 For distribution by nationality, see pp. 251-257 The question only became acute when the proportion of such indirect recipients became very large, as it did in the case of Russian PW, and towards the end of the War, in the case of interned Italian military personnel, of whom there were thousands in nearly all the camps. Out of charity for these unfortunate men, several camp leaders decided, with the consent of their comrades, to share part of their own supplies with them. This practice applied as a rule only to food and cigarettes. Clothing was very rarely shared, either because it was barely sufficient for the recipients themselves, or because the donors' instructions were especially strict concerning this form of relief. ### 5. Supervision of distribution Whilst adjusting the machinery for relief during the winter of 1941-42, the ICRC, after various trials, adopted the system of a receipt form in triplicate 1. One part of this was kept by the camp leader and the others were sent back duly signed to Geneva. The ICRC was thus able to hand one receipt to the donors with the monthly statements. The receipts showed the number of articles or parcels, their total weight, and any shortages noted by the camp leader in the goods on arrival. Receipts also bore a number and various references to enable statistics to be made by the Hollerith machines system. As the numbers of the receipts appeared on the monthly statements of shipments, the donors had no difficulty in checking periodically the receipts received and those which were still outstanding. Generally, it took from fifteen to sixty days for receipts to be returned to Geneva. If, at the end of two months' time, the ICRC had received neither the receipt, nor a letter or report from the camp leader in lieu thereof (should it have gone astray with the other documents accompanying the consignment: way-bill, customs permit etc.), a copy and a claim were sent to the camp leader. If this copy was not returned, consignments of slight value were considered as lost. For more valuable shipments, the ICRC asked the camp commandant for an explanation, sent a copy of its letter to the delegate and requested the railway authorities to open an enquiry. These steps usually made it possible to reconstruct events. See facsimile in the volume of Annexes. ## Chapter 3 Equally serious obstacles were offered by the confused situation created by the German occupation, or by the installation of satellite governments. Communications were frequently cut by the resistance movements. Thanks to the goodwill generally shown in these countries to the Red Cross, shipments which did not reach their destination were almost always sent back to the ICRC representative in one of the intermediate countries. For example, the delegation in Jugoslavia had to accept and distribute relief supplies which normally should have gone to PW in Greece; the delegation in Rumania did the same with goods bound for, or coming from the Near East, and which could not be sent in transit through Turkey, as had been planned. Before speaking of the Balkan countries proper, reference should be made to \*Hungary\*. When, in 1941, that country entered the war against Jugoslavia, and in consequence against Great Britain also, the British Embassy in Budapest had to abandon the relief schemes it had been carrying out during the preceding winter. On the other hand, the Embassy maintained by the Vichy Government until 1944 gave aid to French PW who had escaped from Germany and who arrived in Hungary by way of Austria or Czechoslovakia. It also looked after French citizens who were isolated or in small groups in the various Balkan countries. The Hungarian Red Cross gave help direct to Hungarians who had remained in Jugoslavia after the declaration of war, whilst Jugoslavs in Hungary received family parcels from their own country. Since there was sufficient food available in both these producing countries, it was unnecessary for the ICRC to take any action in behalf of this group of internees. Until 1944, that is, before Hungary put herself entirely under German domination, the ICRC was not called upon to look after Allied nationals in that country. Thenceforth, the Committee did its best to give those in Hungary the same help as it gave to those in other occupied territories. and detainees, were also able to assist these PW, in co-operation with the National Red Cross Societies, by means of stocks which were periodically replenished from Geneva. Matters were very different in Greece, Albania and Jugoslavia. When Greece was entirely occupied, the German forces captured a large number of British troops whom they intended to evacuate without delay. The ICRC immediately provided their delegations in Athens, Salonika and Belgrade with stores to enable them to supply provisions for the journey, clothing and toilet articles for the thousands of men who were due for transfer to Germany, either by trainloads or in single wagons. A number of them, who were more or less seriously wounded, remained behind in Greek, or even in Jugoslav hospitals. Moreover, a great many of the British troops who had joined the Greek partisans were taken prisoner, either singly or in small groups, for months and even years to come. These men were also removed to the north, in so far as their condition allowed or means of transport were available. Greek PW were transferred either to Italy or Germany, according to whichever Power had captured them. This subject will be more fully dealt with in the chapter on political detainees and deportees 2. It is, however, touched <sup>1 See pp. 53-60 and Vol. I, pp. 404-436. <sup>2 See pp. 73 et seq. on here, in reference to relief to PW, because the distinction between the various types of detainees, such as Allied PW, partisans and civilians, was less clearly defined in Greece than, for example, in Germany. Consequently, it was possible on the one hand to supply Greek concentration camps with foodstuffs more rapidly than elsewhere, and on the other, some of the Greeks confined in prisons benefited by relief to which they normally would not have been entitled, because they were together with Allied, in particular British PW. In Jugoslavia, as in Greece, the partisans took up arms against the Axis troops and the forces which supported them. The ICRC delegation in Belgrade, like those in Athens and Salonika, were provided with 50 or 60 tons of relief stocks, and could thus deal with the situation during the frequent breakdown of railway transport. The delegation had to look after Greek and British PW transferred from Greece to Germany through Jugoslavia, and in particular to care for the sick and wounded sent to hospital in that country. Among these there were small groups of American airmen, towards the end of the war. The delegations in Belgrade and Zagreb also provided relief for Jugoslav nationals. After the campaigns of 1941, the German authorities made known that they would keep only the Serbs in captivity, whilst Croats, Slovenes, Istrians and others would be released. However, the ICRC soon established the fact that all camps contained an indiscriminate mixture of Serb (or alleged Serb), Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin, Dalmatian and other PW. These differences were not taken into account when appealing for relief supplies. Fortunately, the gifts received from London, Washington, Buenos Aires and Cairo were intended for Jugoslav PW in general. A large number of these men were "converted" into civilian workers and kept back in Germany, where they shared the same conditions as French, Polish and other foreign workers. The ICRC was thus unable to do anything for them with regard to relief supplies. Some Jugoslav civilians arrested after the occupation were taken to the big concentration camps and treated like the other political detainees. Others, however, were able to receive individual relief parcels, in so far as they were in localities to which the delegations had access. Occasionally, the delegations were able to carry out the distribution of supplies on the spot. They also made every endeavour to promote the despatch of family parcels to Hungary, Italy and Germany. Lastly, the delegation in Belgrade was extremely active in behalf of Jugoslav PW repatriated from Germany in such a bad condition that they had to be taken to hospitals in Belgrade and the neighbourhood. As these unfortunate men were still in units and wearing uniform, it was possible to give them the clothing and medicaments they so urgently needed. ## Chapter 4 During the first phase of the war, relief work for PW was recognized, approved and assisted by all belligerents; thus this work rapidly developed far beyond the scope required by treaty stipulations, and even by the traditional principles of humanity. Unfortunately, that was not the case in Eastern Europe, after the USSR had been attacked by Germany on June 22, 1941. Despite all its efforts, the ICRC was unable to help any of the German, Finnish, Hungarian, Italian, Slovak and Rumanian PW in Russia, or any of the Soviet PW detained by Germany and her Allies, with the sole exception of those who had fallen into Finnish hands. A few minor and isolated distributions of relief supplies did take place, but on the whole, the hundreds of thousands of men captured on the Eastern Front received no collective relief shipments of any kind. Such aid would only have been possible on a reciprocal basis and this was precluded by the mutual mistrust of the adversaries 1. <sup>1 For the problem as a whole and for relations between the ICRC and Soviet Russia, see Vol. I, pp. 404-436. On August 30 the German High Command informed the ICRC that not only would it allow, but in point of fact that it awaited the despatch of collective relief for Russian PW in German camps, and that such supplies would be entrusted to the camp commandants for distribution. The ICRC immediately made every endeavour to follow up this proposal. Encouraged by the favourable reception given by the Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Moscow to its offer of relief for the wounded and sick in Russia 1, the ICRC sent word to the Soviet authorities by telegram on October I, that it was ready to forward to Soviet PW in Germany supplies of underwear, footwear and tobacco, to supplement the rations provided by the Detaining Power. At the same time, the Committee sought to procure goods outside Europe, and in particular in Africa. The British blockade authorities, to whom application had to be made in this matter, replied that the Committee was free to transport relief for the above purpose on the vessels it had itself chartered, provided it accepted responsibility for the proper distribution of the supplies. When communicating the successful result of its negotiations to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the ICRC added, in their telegram of February 16, 1942, that it had the necessary means of transport, and that funds to cover the costs could be transmitted to it by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. <sup>1 See p. 61. The Soviet Government did not, however, display any eagerness to have relief sent to its nationals in enemy hands; at a time when its armies had, above all, to defend Moscow and Leningrad, it probably found it lacked the resources needed for such a purpose. The ICRC then approached the Allied countries and was able, by the end of February, to telegraph to Moscow that the Canadian Red Cross had offered 500,000 capsules of vitamins. The Committee made it clear, however, that the British authorities had strictly stipulated that the issue of these supplies should be supervised by delegates of the ICRC. It was further added that the German authorities would not allow this supervision to take place, unless the Soviet Government granted them reciprocity by accepting a delegate of the ICRC in Russia. No reply to this telegram was received; it was therefore impossible to go to the help of the Soviet PW, except in Finland where, as will be explained below, delegates of the ICRC had access to the camps. The obstacles created by the uncompromising attitude of both sides were all the more regrettable, since the material means were not wanting. In April 1942, the ICRC could have secured for Soviet PW in Germany 5,000 standard food parcels provided by the American Red Cross, whilst an enquiry had been received from Great Britain asking if the Committee was in a position to forward weekly parcels from the "Allied Packing Centre". Had the first distribution met with success, further gifts would doubtless have flowed in. In May 1942, the ICRC again approached the German military authorities, who seemed at first willing to accept collective relief, provided it was distributed by camp commandants, without any intervention whatsoever by the Committee's delegates. As this proviso could not be accepted by the blockade authorities and the donors, the gifts of the American Red Cross were sent on to Finland, as recorded later in this Report. The ICRC had expected, in point of fact, that the official reply, rather slow in coming, would be negative. Unfortunately, its fears were justified. On September 2, 1942, Germany, anxious concerning her men in Russian hands, about whom there was no information, stated that "she declined to make further concessions in behalf of an enemy who gave such clear proof of Circumstances were therefore to blame for the failure of the Committee's efforts. Matters remained as they were until the last weeks of the war in Europe, when the Committee introduced on its own responsibility a new method of distribution called the "pooling system". At this time, the general chaos in Germany made it impossible to allocate food supplies to PW according to nationality or unit, in obedience to the donors' instructions. The urgent need of the moment was to save human lives by issuing relief on all hands, in general assembly camps, on the roads thronged with the thousands of men who were being withdrawn towards the West. Russian PW then benefited in good measure by the help that the ICRC brought up by rail and by road for all PW in Germany, without distinction. Further, in May 1945, vaccine against exanthematic typhus was supplied to the Markt-Pongau Camp, where an epidemic had broken out among Soviet PW who had been released, but not yet repatriated. At an earlier date, Russian PW in German hands had received, in two exceptional instances, small shipments which should be mentioned. The first consisted of medicinal herbs, an allocation from a collection of several hundred kilos made in Switzerland by the Swiss Women's Auxiliary Service and set aside for Soviet PW in proportion to their numbers. It went through in April 1944, the German military authorities having agreed that they would accept it, despite their standing rule, if the camp commandants were notified in advance and agreed to undertake the distribution. | 200 | boxes of ovaltine | (90 | kilos) | |-------|-------------------|------|--------| | 1,400 | soup cubes | (40 | kilos) | | 109 | bottles of tonic | (7.5 | kilos) | <sup>1 See p. 87. This account would be incomplete without reference to the help given to Russian PW who had escaped from Germany and sought refuge in neutral countries, particularly in Switzerland, where the first Russians arrived in March 1943. As they were unable to return home, or join the Allied forces before the close of 1944, the Swiss authorities lodged them in camps. An ICRC delegate visited these camps regularly and was thus able to issue, up to December 31, 1944, some 6,000 kilos of clothing, underwear and boots, as well as 1,400 kilos of soap and toilet articles to Soviet escaped PW and refugees. These relief supplies were given by the American and British Red Cross Societies, and by various Swiss welfare organizations. According to the Finnish Red Cross, members of the Russian forces taken prisoner during the winter of 1941-1942 were already suffering, at the time of capture, from undernourishment and vitamin deficiency, and many died of exhaustion or disease. Finland herself, at war a second time since 1939, was at that time in great difficulties over her own food supply. Marshal Mannerheim, the President of the Finnish Red Cross, informed the ICRC on March 1, 1942, that food and medical stores were urgently required. He added that the Soviet PW in Finland had been granted the benefits of the 1929 Convention, though neither Finland, nor indeed the Soviet Union, were signatories, and that a delegate of the ICRC would be gladly accepted by the Finnish authorities and granted all facilities for carrying out his duties. The parcels left Switzerland in sealed wagons in May 1942, and went by way of Frankfort-on-Main, Berlin and Stockholm, reaching Helsinki in June, where the Finnish Red Cross took delivery. In co-operation with the Society, a delegate of the ICRC on a temporary mission to Finland issued these parcels in July to 10,000 prisoners, selected from amongst the most needy, the seriously wounded and the sick, in thirteen camps. The recipients, most of whom were of peasant origin, welcomed these products of America with joy and gratitude. In the words of their camp leader, this event was a "red letter day" for them, and the gifts "an unexpected message from God". Once the parcels were distributed, the delegate sent to Geneva the completed receipts and the letters of thanks to which, as is well known, donors attach great importance. Again, thanks to the American Red Cross, a second shipment of 3,653 standard food parcels was sent in December. The ICRC added fifty parcels containing the 500,000 capsules of vitamins (vitamins A, B, Br, C and nicotinic acids) provided by the Canadian Red Cross, and which it was impossible to send to Russian PW in Germany. The ICRC took this opportunity of forwarding eighty parcels containing copies of the New Testament to Finland, a gift from the World Council of Churches (Commission for Spiritual Aid to PW) in Geneva. The delegate had informed Geneva that, on the occasion of the first distribution of gifts, the Soviet prisoners had asked for Orthodox prayer books and Bibles in Russian for religious services in camps. All this relief was distributed under the supervision of an ICRC delegate, who stayed in Finland from December 23, 1942 to January 27, 1943. A fifth distribution took place in April 1944. This was carried out by delegates of the ICRC and of the Finnish Red Cross, and consisted of the following goods, sent from Sweden to the Finnish port of Abö: 4,852 standard food parcels, the gift of the American Red Cross (to which the Tolstoy Foundation in New York had largely contributed); 2,000 kilos of meat, vegetables, sugar, and soap, which the Argentine Red Cross had sent on behalf of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Buenos Aires; and 317 tons of pickled cabbage (Sauerkraut) from the Swedish Red Cross. Like the previous relief supplies, these too touched the Russian PW deeply, as they brought moral consolation as well as material aid. "This gift has convinced us", wrote one of these men, "that we had not been wholly forgotten, that we were not altogether friendless and forsaken" In the autumn of 1941 the ICRC made a first attempt to organize collective relief for these men, after having made a successful intervention in behalf of wounded and sick in Russia. In reply to the Committee's offer of August 12, the Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies had stated, on September 20, its willingness to accept medicaments, surgical instruments, dressings and other hospital stores, and that donors should send these consignments by arrangement with the commercial representatives of the USSR in their own countries. The ICRC informed the Alliance by telegram on October 1, that it had communicated its request to the Red Cross Societies concerned 1, and took the opportunity of expressing the hope that, in conformity with Art. 15 of the Fourth Hague Convention 2, it would be able to transmit parcels <sup>2 See Vol. I, p. 423. through the Alliance, both to Russian PW in Germany and to German PW in Russia. The Committee also asked the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to approve two delegates who, in co-operation with the Alliance, would have settled all outstanding questions. In March 1942, the ICRC again approached the Commissariat and sought permission to send parcels to German PW, since it had a small quantity of relief supplies for them, consisting of two cases of sweets and tobacco which the German Red Cross had handed over to serve as a trial consignment. Unfortunately, the Soviet authorities made no response to these proposals, and the ICRC never succeeded, despite repeated efforts, in accrediting a delegate to them, nor in sending anything whatsoever to Russia. Further, the complete absence of information on German and other servicemen captured by the Soviet army prevented these PW from receiving even the family parcels provided for in the 1907 Hague Convention, to which Russia as well as the States at war with her were signatory. Similarly, these States, with the exception of Finland, did not reveal the places of detention of Russian PW. Besides these direct approaches, the ICRC made others, through its delegates, to the Soviet representatives in Turkey, Iran and Great Britain. As the German, Finnish, Hungarian, Italian and Rumanian Red Cross Societies had asked the ICRC on various occasions to forward relief supplies and had even, in 1943 and 1944, handed over funds for the purchase of foodstuffs and medicaments, the Committee's delegate, who had been sent on a special mission to Iran, was instructed to consult with the representative of the Alliance on how these requests might be carried out. The delegate in Teheran could have procured flour and rice on the spot. All these plans, however, came to nothing 1. <sup>1 For the negotiations with Russia see Vol. I, pp. 404-436 ### The War in North Africa After the conclusion of the armistice between the Vichy Government and the Axis Powers, the Allied Consulates in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were still able, in spite of the increasingly uncertain political status of these three countries, to give direct assistance to their nationals who were in assigned places of residence, or were interned or lodged in camps and prisons. The total number of these persons in 1942 was estimated at roughly 10,000¹. Relief supplies were distributed for the most part by the American Consulates in Casablanca, Algiers and Tunis, to U.S. nationals, as well as to many British, Poles and others. As these direct distributions by the Consulates encountered ever greater difficulties, they were supplemented, from 1942 onwards, by those of the ICRC, whose delegates had permission to visit the camps and several other places of detention. A few months before the Allied landing in North Africa the situation deteriorated greatly, and the Allied consular staff was itself interned. Permission to visit these officials, who were now themselves civilian internees, was granted by an Italo-German Armistice Commission. During this period, the ICRC delegates in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia distributed in all 14,000 standard food and medical parcels and 46 tons of miscellaneous relief supplies to all the Allied nationals whose places of internment could be reached. Most of these internees were British seamen of the Merchant Service or sailors of the R.N. The Italian and German PW in French hands were less fortunate, as the French population in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia was itself short of necessary supplies. To make good this shortage, which was aggravated by the bad harvest in 1943, the ICRC set out to obtain relief supplies of food, medicaments and clothing for about 38,000 Italian and 40,000 German PW in the camps scattered over the three countries. Consignments from the German Red Cross unfortunately suffered loss and great delay due to transport difficulties in the Mediterranean and on African territory. The Italian PW were in a <sup>1 See pp. 160-161. The ICRC lent effective support to these various relief undertakings, although it was prevented by circumstances from giving them the impetus required. It was only with great difficulty that it secured a few gifts for these PW, who received little or nothing from their home countries. As normal communications between Europe and Africa had broken down, it sought to organize transport for this purpose only. However, despite prolonged negotiations with the Governments of Vichy and Algiers it did not succeed in getting a single ship allocated to it. The German authorities, for their part, only used their own transport facilities when they were no longer able to send relief supplies by post. The ICRC were, however, able to arrange five trips to ports in North Africa in 1944, for vessels chartered by the British Red Cross, and one voyage to Casablanca by one of the "Foundation" ships. Relief supplies from or to North Africa were also carried by its vessels between Marseilles and Lisbon, or Gibraltar. ## Chapter 6 - (e)—Resumption of relief distributions to Allied nationals in Italy, after the division of the country into a State fighting with the Allies and a Neo-Fascist Republic. The present chapter deals with points (c), (d) and (e). <sup>1 See p. 171. See pp. 355 et seq. A few weeks before the Italian armistice, the German authorities in Italy began the evacuation from the Peninsula of all prisoners of war taken by them in Africa, and of a number of civilian internees. In September, they did the same in respect of all Allied nationals whom they could arrest. Owing to the temporary closure of the Italo-Swiss frontier, the ICRC had at first no knowledge of the exact numbers transferred. They were, however, soon informed by the camp leaders and camp commandants in Germany of the arrival of thousands of men; these figures, together with the number of those who had escaped to Switzerland, gave approximation of the number of prisoners remaining in Italy. Many of these, estimated at about 30,000, went into the maquis and rejoined the Allied forces in their advance on Northern Italy. ## 2. Transfer of Italian anti-fascist nationals to Germany. (r)—The largest, that of the Italian military internees comprised the anti-fascist members of the forces who had been the continent. On the offer of a donation by the Papal Nuncio in Berne, the Committee lent its services for the purchase and transport of a wagon-load of foodstuffs, and its delegation in Berlin assisted the Nuncio in that town to distribute them. It also helped to obtain and despatch railway wagons required for the transport of family parcels from Italy, forwarded in particular by the Milan branch of the Italian Red Cross. The Committee were not, however, able to exercise any supervision over the allocation of these parcels, which the Neo-Fascist committees disposed of as they pleased. After the division of Italy by political and military events, plans for the relief of Allied nationals had to be laid. For the sake of greater efficiency, sub-delegations were formed in the larger towns and supplied with stocks allowing them to take prompt action, whenever necessary. In view of Allied demands, they were, however, instructed to reserve goods from overseas for PW and civilian internees in the camps, and for British and American isolati. Allied isolati of other nationalities — Jugoslav and French civilians in particular — could only be given aid from the slender stocks arriving from France and the Balkans, supplemented by British and American parcels recovered from railway wagons that were destroyed or looted during bombardments or riots. It had been agreed with the Allied authorities and Red Cross Societies that the delegates were empowered to make whatever use they thought fit of any supplies they might elicit or seize in railway sidings, or Sub-delegations were set up in Florence, Genoa and Turin; in the spring of 1944, the two last named towns were able once more to communicate direct with Switzerland. Another sub-delegation was established in Ponte San Pietro, near Bergamo, and became the centre for relief distributions throughout Northern Italy. Their work was of particular importance at that time, since the German military authorities had set up large transit camps in the plain of Lombardy for PW arriving from the Southern front, pending transfer to Germany. A great many sick and wounded remained in the camp hospitals for months, and the able-bodied themselves were evacuated very slowly, on account of transport difficulties. The delegation at Bergamo therefore made regular distributions of foodstuffs and medical supplies, with occasional issues of clothing, in these assembly centres, of which the most important were near Mantua and Modena. Since the train service had almost entirely ceased and road transport was unreliable on account of skirmishes between the partisans and Neo-Fascist troops, the delegates very often had to find lorries or caravans and take relief supplies themselves to the camps in turn. They so gained experience of a system which was afterwards adopted by the ICRC in Germany, towards the end of hostilities, when no other means of transport existed. Jugoslav civilians deported to Italy were exposed to particular hardship. In 1942 and 1943, thousands of men, women and children were gathered in large concentration camps where their treatment was ill-defined, about half-way between that of political deportees and civilian internees. Regular visits were an essential prerequisite to relief. Although the Italian authorities made no objection in principle to such visits, definite requests were, however, always refused on one pretext or another. The guarantees necessary before supplies could be obtained from overseas were therefore lacking, and the armistice came before the ICRC was able to act in behalf of these camps. Fortunately, a great many such camps in Southern Italy were taken over by the Allies fairly soon and provisioned by them. There were also a great many Jugoslavs in the Venice and Trieste areas. Although interned in camps they were, according to the Neo-Fascist authorities, ordinary civilians, and therefore entitled to relief on the same basis as the Jugoslav population. Finally, several thousand of these civilians were dispersed among the prisons of Northern Italy and treated as Allied isolati. They were given relief supplies either bought in Europe, or taken from "recovered" parcels from overseas. Many of these parcels came from an illicit store discovered in Milan by the German authorities: it was thought likely, but never confirmed, that this store represented the load of a railway wagon that had been stolen or looted after damage in a raid. ## Chapter 7 - (1)—Civilian internees in the true sense of the term, that is, civilians living in belligerent territory at the outbreak of war and interned because of their enemy nationality; The present chapter deals with the practical help given by the ICRC to civilians in the second category, who were confined in prisons, concentration camps or closed ghettos and for whom there was no explicit statutory safeguard. This form of relief work was not so wide in its scope as that for PW and for civilian internees with rights similar to those of PW under the 1929 Convention. It was however considerable, especially during the last two years of the War, and passed through several phases, corresponding to the series of concessions granted by the belligerents to detained and deported civilians in Germany, or in territories occupied by that country. <sup>1 See Vol. I, pp. 567 et seq In its general negotiations in behalf of civilians, the ICRC at all times advocated the principle that the same protection should be granted to all civilians, without distinction of race, nationality, religious belief or political opinion. In practice, however, the Detaining Power insisted on drawing certain distinctions, with which the ICRC perforce had to comply, in the absence of any treaty stipulations on which they could take a stand. The Tokyo Draft had, in fact, prescribed not only legal protection but the right to receive relief supplies, for civilians of all categories in enemy hands. This Draft was, against the wishes of the Committee, not adopted as a whole by the belligerents: thus only civilians of the first category could benefit by the terms, where applicable, of the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention. For detained and deported civilians therefore, special representations had to be made to each Government concerned. The German authorities however placed detained and deported civilians on the same footing as persons arrested and imprisoned under common law for security reasons. The majority were in fact not nationals of enemy countries, nor as a rule even aliens, but possessed or had possessed, before becoming stateless, either German nationality, or that of an annexed country. The measures applied to these people were, therefore, from the German point of view and that of the satellite States, strictly a matter of internal policy, with which the ICRC might not interfere. <sup>1 See Vol. I, page 569. In view of the weakness of its legal position the Committee was obliged to act with prudence. The worse the situation of the detained and deported civilians became, however, the more energetically the ICRC made its demands; and the more the Axis Powers suffered strategic or political reverses, the greater were the Committee's chances of success. The special representations in regard to prisons and concentration camps in Germany, as in the annexed or occupied countries, were usually made through the ICRC delegation in Berlin and the German Red Cross. Towards the end of the war, the President of the ICRC made personal contact with some of the German leaders who at that time had gained control of internal affairs. Bohemia and Moravia. — In the summer of 1942, the German Red Cross informed the ICRC that the occupying authorities in Prague had given permission for the despatch of medical supplies to Theresienstadt (Terezin), the largest camp for Jews in the country. A trial consignment of a few parcels was sent to the address given, Lagerkommando Theresienstadt, but no receipt was ever returned to Geneva. Theresienstadt, where there were about 40,000 Jews deported from various countries, was a relatively privileged ghetto, and the visit of a delegate of the ICRC in Berlin was permitted, in June 1944, as a special concession. Slovakia and Jugoslavia. — The attempts made by the ICRC to intervene in behalf of detained and deported civilians met with constant opposition from the German authorities in occupation. The ICRC delegates, who were supported by the Slovak and Serbian Red Cross Societies, were always debarred from visiting the Slovak camp at Sered, which held Jews awaiting deportation to Germany; the same applied to the camp at Zemun, near Belgrade. The delegate at Bratislava was however on two occasions, during November 1944, allowed to visit the camp at Marianka, where a few American Jews were interned. January 1944, that the 1929 PW Convention would be observed, where applicable, in respect of detained civilians. He had, however, to make repeated representations in order to get this decision put into practice. After permission had at last been given, in June 1944, for the despatch of relief consignments twice a month, the detainees received foodstuffs, clothing and medical supplies over a certain period. In July 1944, two months before the authorities in occupation abruptly intervened, the delegate was even able to visit the concentration camps at Jasenovac, Stara Gradiska and Gredjani-Salas. He did not fail to call the attention of the camp commandants to the reckoning they might have to meet, if they allowed the civilians who were detained and deported to be brutally ill-used. As a result of this warning, conditions in the camps were somewhat improved. Greece. — The main difficulties had already been overcome by the end of 1942. The Italian Red Cross informed the ICRC, on December 11, that the Committee's delegates in Athens had authority to visit camps and prisons in the territory occupied by the Italian forces, and to hand out relief supplies. The ICRC was thus able to organize relief consignments, and at once approached the Governments and Red Cross Societies of Great Britain and the United States to this end, with the support of the Greek Government in exile in London. In February 1943, the Italian authorities even authorized the Conditions in the concentration camps and prisons were appreciably better in Greece than in Germany. All detained civilians, except prisoners under common law, were allowed to receive parcels from home. In the spring of 1943, the Management Committee for Relief in Greece granted double daily rations to all civilian detainees held in seven concentration camps and 37 prisons in Athens and the provinces. During the summer of 1943, Swedish vessels brought 40,000 standard parcels from overseas, and the delegation of the ICRC, with the help of the Greek Red Cross, set up distribution centres in Athens and Salonika. The delegates pressed the German and Italian authorities to improve conditions in the camps they had visited. They were never allowed to enter the camp at Haidari, near Athens, which had the worst reputation, and were only admitted to the camp at Goudhi shortly before the release of detained and deported civilians in October 1944. The sub-delegation at Salonika managed to make regular distributions of foodstuffs in the camps of Pavlo Mela and Vassiliades from 1944 onwards. In May 1944, a Greek medical officer wrote: "Your parcels are meeting a dire need and becoming a vital source of strength to the exhausted civilian detainees." Germany. — As early as January 1941, the ICRC applied to the German Red Cross for permission to send food to detained and deported civilians in the camp at Oranienburg, but this was refused. Earlier a similar request made on May 20, 1940, concerning the camps at Drancy, Compiègne and in North Africa, had already been turned down by the German Foreign Office. In the summer of 1942, the ICRC was informed by this Ministry that parcels could not be sent to German citizens in concentration camps. A little later, however, in August, a fresh request was treated with more sympathy, and the delegate in Berlin was told that detained aliens, not only at Oranienburg but at Dachau also, could receive small food parcels from their relatives, on condition that the contents could be quickly consumed. Family parcels were thus at last authorized for detained and deported civilians of enemy nationality, and were forwarded through the ICRC. The ICRC declined, however, to limit its action merely to that of an intermediary between the detainees and their relatives. It claimed the right to send, itself, consignments of foodstuffs, clothing and medicaments, and to supervise their distribution in the camps. The Committee moreover insisted on ascertaining the situation within these camps and the number of occupants, by nationality. Its efforts were not entirely fruitless. In March 1943, the German Foreign Office informed the ICRC delegation in Berlin that the Committee and the National Red Cross Societies would henceforth be allowed to forward individual parcels to detained and deported aliens whose names and addresses were known to them. This privilege was, however, withheld from those accused of offences against the German State or the German forces. There was no limit to the number of parcels, but the amount of foodstuffs sent to any one detainee could not exceed his personal needs; any surplus would be distributed amongst fellow-detainees who received no parcels. The ICRC delegates were not allowed access to the concentration camps, and the German Red Cross and camp commandants were forbidden to communicate lists of occupants, or even camp strengths. The result of this experiment far exceeded expectations. Only a few weeks later the first receipts arrived in Geneval bearing the signature of the consignees. By August 1943, the ICRC had in this way collected receipts signed by Belgian, Dutch, French, Norwegian and Polish detained and deported civilians. Subsequently, a growing number of parcels became available for the concentration camps, and these were forwarded, as soon as new names became known, to Belgian, Czech, Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Spanish and Jugoslav detainees. The gratitude with which these parcels were received in the camps, where underfeeding was having disastrous effects, may well be imagined. The ICRC was therefore obliged to seek the necessary commodities within the blockaded zone. In spite of the general scarcity in almost the whole of Europe, the Committee managed to secure large quantities of tinned meat, biscuits, jam, sugar and other foodstuffs in the Balkan States, especially Rumania, Slovakia and Hungary, with the aid of the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross. These purchases were paid for with funds obtained by the Committee in Switzerland, through the representatives of Governments and Red Cross Societies, as well as various national and foreign relief organizations in that country. The goods were warehoused in bond at Geneva, where as many as 9,000 parcels were packed daily. From the autumn of 1943 until May 1945, about 1,112,000 parcels, with a total weight of 4,500 tons, were sent off to the concentration camps in Germany2. The ICRC was, of course, unable to verify that the whole of these relief goods were handed over to the consignees; in any case, this risk did not deter the senders. When parcels were confiscated in certain camps, the Committee soon had knowledge of the fact, and at once suspended the despatch of further supplies; this happened in the case of Mauthausen. In general, the relief scheme worked well and was occasionally even aided in some degree by the camp commandants. Information from escaped detainees and letters from the concentration camps provided very useful evidence. For instance, a detainee at Oranienburg notified the ICRC regularly of the exact number of parcels distributed, or stolen. There is, at any rate, no <sup>1 See pp. 28 et seq. For details, see pp. 335 et seq. In spite of the extensive card-index set up by the Committee, the effect of the individual parcel system was unfortunately to limit the number of persons benefited. In order to enlarge the circle and to reach even those deportees who were placed in the category "Nacht und Nebel", and whose names were never to be divulged, the Committee decided, during the summer of 1944, to send collective parcels to the concentration camps. This decision was in disregard of the conditions laid down by the Detaining Power, which however became rather less adamant after the Allied landing on the Continent and the liberation of the occupied countries. The scheme showed more chance of success than in the past, and it was incumbent on the ICRC to make the attempt, although the supervision of collective consignments appeared even more hazardous than that of individual parcels. The Committee was indeed urged by the Governments concerned to increase at all costs the volume of relief supplies sent to detained civilians. As European resources were steadily diminishing, some relaxation of the blockade regulations had to be obtained. Fortunately, through the energetic intervention of the War Refugee Board in Washington, set up in January 1944 by President Roosevelt, the Allied authorities yielded to the insistent requests of the ICRC. The American supplies granted to the Joint Commission for transmission to the concentration camps 1, which did not arrive in any considerable quantity until the end of 1944, provided relief for thousands of civilian detainees during the closing months of the war. 81 <sup>1 See Report of the Joint Relief Commission, Geneva, 1948, pp. 194 et seq. In the chaotic condition of Germany after the invasion during the final months of the war, the camps received no food supplies at all and starvation claimed an increasing number of victims. Itself alarmed by this situation, the German Government at last informed the ICRC on February 1, 1945, in reply to a request of October 2, 1944, that individual and collective relief parcels could be despatched to French and Belgian detainees. In March 1945, discussions between the President of the ICRC and General of the SS Kaltenbrunner gave even more decisive results. Relief could henceforth be distributed by the ICRC, and one delegate was authorized to stay in each camp, on condition that he undertook not to leave it before the end of the war. For the first time, therefore, the concentration camps were open to the Committee. <sup>2 See pp. 184 et seq. 272 tons for the French 110 tons for the Belgians 82 tons for various nationals (Czechs, Italians, Dutch, Jugoslavs and others). ## Chapter 8 ## The Final Phase of the War in Europe In the first place, after the Allied landings in Normandy and the South of France, the supply of parcels from overseas stopped altogether. The second of these landings and the fighting that followed moreover halted the despatch of relief from France direct to French PW in Germany. Fortunately, the ICRC was able to draw on the stocks it had providently built up in Switzerland. Once already, before the armistice between France and Germany in 1940, Geneva had acted as intermediary between the camps of French PW on the one hand, and France and her colonial empire on the other. Now a similar arrangement made it possible to keep up the supply of food for the French PW. Meanwhile the situation in Germany was steadily deteriorating. Even the regulation rations, long since inadequate, were now no longer guaranteed to PW. As the German armies lost ground in the East and West, a hasty evacuation of the camps near the frontiers followed. Camps in Central Germany became overcrowded, while thousands of men, on the march without a break towards new places of detention, reached the limit of their endurance. These constant and sudden transfers so thoroughly intermingled the personnel of the camps that Geneva had no reliable information on camp strengths and relative numbers by nationality, not to mention nominal lists. Further, the destruction of railways and rolling stock paralysed transport. Thus, relief work was at the same time urgently needed and seriously impeded. It was nevertheless carried on by new methods adapted to the circumstances. After persistent applications to the Allied, German, and Swiss Authorities, the ICRC received some French, Belgian and Swiss wagons, in addition to the German railway cars still at its disposal. It was thus able to continue its consignments to the camps still in being and accessible by rail, and even to increase these shipments by 25 to 30 per cent, in order to provide for the increased camp strengths due to the concentration of PW. The ICRC also sent considerable quantities of relief to the big assembly centres for PW, internees and deportees, and set up depots which enabled the delegates to convey supplies in trucks to neighbouring camps and columns on the march. A first block-train¹, composed of 50 cars of medicaments and medical equipment, left Switzerland on March 6, for Moosburg in Southern Germany, where a supply centre was set up. Other block-trains followed, each carrying between 500 and 600 tons of supplies. Many camps, however, could not, or could no longer, be reached by rail. The ICRC then used the numerous motor trucks which, after repeated requests, they had succeeded in obtaining from the Allies. A first group of trucks set off for the Eger, Carlsbad and Marienbad districts, across which the columns of PW evacuated from Poland and Upper Silesia were passing. A second group was sent to the North and remained attached to the Lübeck supply centre, which furnished relief supplies to neighbouring camps and to columns of PW from East Prussia 2. 1 Or "set-train" <sup>2 For technical details concerning block-trains and lorries, see below, pp. 166 et seq., and 184 et seq. Mention must be made of another feature of relief work during the last phase of hostilities. From February 1945, supplies could no longer be issued in the usual manner. Delegates with the convoys could have no idea of the nationality of PW they would meet on the way, and it is clear that when they came across men dying of hunger in a camp or on the road, they could have no justification for refusing to some what they gave to others. It was decided, therefore, to use the pooling system, so called because standard food parcels sent by the ICRC were, in each camp, pooled without regard to their origin (American, British, French, Belgian, etc.), and placed in the custody of camp leaders representing the various nationalities. These stocks were then issued equally to all Allied prisoners and civilian internees. The idea was, moreover, further developed. The ICRC sent telegrams on April 18, 1945, to the commandants of sixty-two camps, informing them that relief supplies should be shared out among all prisoners, without distinction. Thus Russian, Italian, Rumanian and other PW also received a share. Shortly afterwards, pooling was extended to include even civilian detainees and deportees. As the normal system of distribution by nationality or specified camp had to be abandoned immediately, the ICRC decided to act without first obtaining consent from the donors. The majority of the contributors, however, and in particular the American and British Red Cross Societies and the French and Belgian Governments, informed the Committee that they consented. Other Red Cross Societies gave their tacit approval. Moreover, in a Note sent on August 17, 1944, to all belligerent Powers, dealing with the food supply of PW, internees and civilians in Europe on the cessation of hostilities, the ICRC had already alluded to the possibility of pooling in the future and said: "Should the internal organization of the Detaining State break down at a time when it is urgently necessary to forward relief consignments, it would be, for humane as well | 75,850 | Americans | 87,100 | Italians | |---------|-----------|---------|-----------| | 65,700 | Belgians | 122,100 | Jugoslavs | | 199,500 | British | 69,300 | Poles | | 10,200 | Dutch | 784,300 | Russians | | 754,600 | French | | | As already mentioned, the retreat of the German Army led to the evacuation of the camps that were in danger of falling into the hands of the invading armies. American and British PW were mainly transferred to the East, and Polish and Russian PW to the West, in order to prevent escaping prisoners from joining up with their own forces. Later, the continuing advance of both the Allied and Russian forces obliged the German military authorities to take other measures: they assembled all PW in three main areas in the centre of the country, one in the north at Lübeck, another in the centre at Altengrabow, and a third at Moosburg in the south. Evacuation of the Eastern area began in January 1945. Earlier, in October 1944, there had been the surrender in Warsaw of the Polish underground army commanded by General Bor-Komorowski. Under the terms of the capitulation, the German authorities had granted the benefit of the 1929 PW Convention to all Polish combatants captured since the beginning of the rising, including women. For the first time, therefore, the ICRC was called upon to help some thousands of women PW and, in addition, children who had gone with their mothers into captivity. The Polish Red Cross and various Polish organizations abroad, for instance in the United States, made generous donations to the ICRC for this work. The relief for the Polish insurgents was the last provided in conformity with the rule of distribution by nationality. By February 1945, over a quarter of all Allied PW in Germany had been, or were being transferred, and the ICRC had quickly to assume the immense task of supplying the various assembly centres with food, despite the growing transport problem. For the Northern area, the Committee drew on parcels warehoused at Gothenburg and sent to Lübeck, where the delegation had built up a large stock of foodstuffs. From this depot, which also received goods from Switzerland by motor truck, distribution was made as far as possible by rail, but the arrival of shipments was extremely uncertain. Letters from camp leaders were often lost in transit. Some reached Geneva after considerable delay and showed that parcels had taken several weeks, or even months, to arrive at their destination. On the request of the German authorities and with the aid of information supplied by them, the delegation of the ICRC in Berlin immediately organized relief work on the roads followed by the PW and civilian internees. As many of these were in the neighbourhood of Neubrandenburg, the delegation set up a supply centre in that town. It was able to procure two lorries and asked the German railways for the use of 18 railway cars. On February 12, both lorries were loaded with foodstuffs at the Committee's warehouse at Lübeck and left for Neubrandenburg. They first went to the Rostock-Anklam district and, on the way, left goods at Demmin for various groups of PW who had already arrived there. When the railway cars became available, it was possible to convey large quantities of foodstuffs to Neubrandenburg. | Oflag 64 Neubrandenburg | 68o | parcels | |---------------------------------|-------|---------| | Luftlager IV Gross-Tychow | 6,500 | - ,, | | Oflag II D Gross-Born | 5,000 | ,, | | Oflag 65 Berkenbrügge | 1,500 | " | | Oflag II B Arnswalde | 2,300 | \*\* | | Group of American PW coming | | | | from Hammerstein | 485 | ,,, | | Group of British PW coming from | - | | | Stalag XX B | 1,000 | \*\* | | Wehrmacht Prison at Graudenz. | 1,000 | " | | PW just arrived at Stalag II A | | | | Neubrandenburg | 1,500 | ,, | The approach of the Western Allies and the Soviet Armies made this Central area almost inaccessible by rail or road. There had been a plan to organize a relief depot at Altengrabow, where Stalag XI A, now a large assembly camp, was situated. That scheme, however, had to be abandoned, because this town could be reached neither from Switzerland, nor from Lübeck. The PW therefore depended for food entirely on the parcels which Allied planes succeeded in dropping to them by parachute. They were, however, released earlier than those in the other areas. The Southern Area, being adjacent to Switzerland, fared better than the others in the matter of food. It was also allocated the relief shipments that could not be forwarded to the Central area. A representative of the ICRC met officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Army High Command and the SS at Uffing (Bavaria), and informed them that the ICRC wished to set up depots in this area. Although they acknowledged the necessity of such stocks, the Germans were at first very much against their being placed near PW camps. Finally, however, they agreed with the ICRC that it was not feasible to set them up anywhere but in Moosburg. This Bavarian village on the Isar, north of Munich, held Stalag VII A, which had become an assembly camp, and contained as many as 80,000, perhaps At Moosburg, all the warehouses were found to be occupied by civilians who had fled from Munich after the bombardments, and there was nowhere to store the relief supplies. However, with the help of the station master and the camp commandant, a barn and three other storehouses, as well as the station warehouse were finally made available. Under the delegate's directions, French and British PW unloaded the 93,312 parcels with all speed. The train left immediately and, on March 11, arrived at Buchs, on the Swiss frontier. The storehouses were guarded by six French, five British and five American NCOs, in their turn guarded by patrols of German soldiers. The ICRC followed the same procedure during the second fortnight in April at Landeck, near the Arlberg Pass in the Tyrol. It was learned that mass removals of PW from Upper Austria towards the Tyrol, from Lower Austria towards the country round Passau and Braunau were in progress. One of the delegates found some thousands of PW in Landeck Camp, which was attached to Stalag XVIII C at Markt-Pongau, where many columns were also arriving. Two block-trains were therefore unloaded at Landeck, but distribution could not be carried out on a large scale until after the surrender, because the roads were too congested to permit any traffic. ## Chapter 9 The American and British Red Cross Societies had given previous notice that when the fighting ceased, the Allied military authorities would themselves take care of the nationals of the United Nations who were found in the respective zones of occupation. Nevertheless, the task of the ICRC did not come to an end with the armistice in Europe. They were requested by the Inter-Allied Military High Command (SHAEF) 1, to give their services in helping them to supply relief to Allied PW, for whom no means of immediate repatriation were available. Without waiting for arrangements to be made with SHAEF, the ICRC began its relief work from May 8, 1945, as far as available transport allowed. The necessary information was supplied by its own delegates and the representatives of SHAEF. Large amounts of foodstuffs, medical supplies, tobacco, soap RAMP - Released Allied Military Personnel <sup>3 With regard to Displaced Persons, see pp. 118 et seq Conversations between the representatives of SHAEF and the ICRC took place at Kreuzlingen, on the German-Swiss frontier, on May 22 and 25, 1945, and in Paris during June. As a result of these talks the scheme for supplying nationals of the United Nations countries was brought into line with the repatriation procedure, and the stocks held by the ICRC in Switzerland and abroad were liquidated in the most rational way. These stocks were used to augment the rations supplied by the Allied military authorities to ex-PW and ex-civilian internees in Germany, until their repatriation. Under the new scheme, the ICRC drew on the General Pool of relief supplies built up in Switzerland with stocks of British and American origin, and despatched them at the formal request and on the instructions of SHAEF. The pooled stock warehoused in Switzerland represented about 30,000 tons of foodstuffs on June 1, 1945. Some relatively small relief stocks, which were the property of Allied Red Cross Societies and had not been placed in the General Pool, were distributed in accordance with the donors' wishes, in so far as the Committee had the means of transport. Other relief supplies which did not form part of the General Pool and were still lying in port at Lisbon and Toulon, were returned to the donors. By the use of air transport, the repatriation of ex-PW and of civilian internees from United Nations countries, was speedily carried out. The data supplied by SHAEF show that about 1,500 transport planes and bombers took part during May in this operation and that they carried up to 36,000 persons a day, when weather conditions were good. For these people, therefore, only a small proportion of the available stocks was drawn on, and it was decided by SHAEF and the French Ministry for PW, Deportees and Refugees that the stocks remaining should be issued to Displaced Persons who were ## Chapter 10 At least one of the countries concerned, namely Germany, no longer existed as a political body, and the status of PW was not in fact immediately granted to German combatants who had laid down their arms under the terms of surrender 1. The military authorities lost no time in distinguishing between war criminals, to whom the Geneva Conventions obviously did not apply, and all the other detainees from Axis countries, Germany in particular. Public opinion, however, and many minor officials were inclined to judge matters in a far more arbitrary way, especially in countries which had undergone great suffering during hostilities. <sup>1 See Vol. I, pp. 539 et seq. The ICRC was undoubtedly bound to act in the interest of the defeated, and its efforts from the end of 1945 were in fact centred on their welfare. In spite of appearances, no partisanship was involved in this policy, since the work of the Committee during any given conflict has to be considered as a whole. A rapid survey of the second World War and ensuing events will show that, from 1939 to 1943, considerable moral and material relief was given almost exclusively to nationals of the United Nations. In 1944 and part of 1945 the balance was still in their favour, and only in the post-war period was the position entirely reversed; then the intervention of the ICRC was only required for the combatants of defeated countries. The Western Powers, moreover, who had until then abundantly benefited by the Committee's assistance, readily authorized and in fact facilitated its activities, although circumstances made it impossible for these Powers to grant PW treatment strictly in accordance with the Red Cross Conventions and humanitarian principles. The ICRC therefore met with few difficulties of a diplomatic or administrative nature. As regards material relief, however, the extremely limited means at its disposal hampered its efforts. From 1945 to 1947, the only resources available were: (1) for German PW, the balance remaining from sums subscribed by the German Red Cross and the German Government; (2) for German and Austrian PW, the proceeds of collections taken in the United States amongst German PW who were still in relatively comfortable circumstances. For Italian PW, matters were slightly less difficult. The collections mentioned above had been organized during 1944 by the German PW themselves in some of the camps in the United States; the proceeds had been handed to the delegation of the ICRC in Washington, which kept them as funds for special grants, when required. Other camps followed suit, and funds amounting to \\$ 1,220 at the end of 1944 had reached over \\$ 12,000 by April 1945. Shortly afterwards, contributions from the German authorities and German Red Cross ceased altogether, and the ICRC requested their delegation to keep the above funds in reserve for general relief to German PW, and to encourage further collections. Gifts then arrived from all camps, raising the relief fund to \\$ 200,000 in August 1945, to \\$ 759,000 at the end of the year and to \\$ 1,900,834 in June 1946, at which date the remaining German and Austrian PW left the United States. The American authorities permitted these collections only on condition that the donors should not set any limitation to the use of the funds obtained, and that the ICRC should be entirely free to employ the money without distinction of nationality, race or religion. The camp leaders were, however, allowed to inform the ICRC delegation of the men's wishes; many camps were more particularly interested in victims of the concentration camps, others in the German and Austrian civilian populations, prisoners in particular need, the European children, and so forth. The methods employed naturally suffered by these restrictions. Instead of merely transmitting gifts for PW, as it had done during hostilities, the ICRC was obliged to take active steps to find donors — a task which, for the political and psychological reasons already quoted, proved thankless enough. Further, its inability to provide adequate relief from its own resources, reduced the Committee in the main to indirect assistance, such as appeals to the Detaining Powers for the treatment of PW in accordance with treaty stipulations and humanitarian principles. In the Western European countries in particular, where the release of PW was slower than overseas, war and occupation had left deep and painful wounds: ruin and destruction, impoverished economic conditions, and resentment against the invaders. The primary duty of the ICRC was to ensure that the prisoners should suffer as little as possible by these circumstances; the gradual improvement in their conditions was partly due to the Committee's efforts, and to the willing support which, it must be recorded, was increasingly afforded by the States concerned. The Committee's resources, both in money and in kind, were too small to allow of equal distribution among the PW; priority was therefore given to those in severe climates, or in countries which were unable to give them minimum maintenance. Thus, German PW in Poland and Jugoslavia often received proportionately more than their comrades in France and North Africa, whilst intellectual matter only was provided for camps in the Near East, Australia, the United States, Great Britain, and elsewhere. Merely limiting the number of recipients did not, however, entirely solve the question; the Committee was ultimately compelled to satisfy only the most pressing needs. It thus restricted its purchases to medicaments, small quantities of diet foods, hospital linen, underclothing, tailors' and shoemakers' materials and, whenever possible, footwear. It was considered advisable to abandon any attempt at giving food supplies; even by abandoning all other forms of relief, attempts in this field would have been insignificant. The Committee also found that, with regard to food, the Detaining Powers were able to follow up its suggestions more freely than hitherto. The question remained whether these deductions were justifiable, since the funds had been subscribed exclusively <sup>1 See page 270. for prisoners' needs. Some donors, it is true, relieved the ICRC of any anxiety on this point. The Committee had, in view of the humanitarian character of its work, received from the Swiss pharmaceutical manufacturers during the war a rebate of 30% on the wholesale rates for its purchases. From July 1, 1946, half this rebate, which until then had been entirely used for prisoners' needs, was placed in the reserve account. Added to the balance of the German subscriptions already mentioned, these funds were, with the donors' permission, used to meet overhead deficits. These could no longer be paid by the levy made on the reserve account, i.e. 2% in 1946, and 5% in 1947. Whereas during the war an average levy of less than 5 per thousand had been sufficient when the goods handled amounted to about 2 million francs a day, overhead expenses inevitably exceeded this low rate when the figure reached only 2 million per quarter, in spite of reductions in staff and administrative machinery. As the donors would not have approved of a deduction of more than 5 per cent (which was the limit set by the ICRC in 1947), recourse had to be made to the two reserve accounts mentioned above. Even then the ICRC was faced with financial difficulties, and at the beginning of 1947, it considered whether the purchase, packing and despatch of relief supplies could not be more economically undertaken by commercial agents, despite the remuneration such agents would require for their services. Self-management was however found less expensive, as the rebates which the suppliers, especially in Switzerland, granted the ICRC, would not have been available to third parties. No change in working methods was made during the first half of 1947; during the period July 1947-June 1948, a new but partial solution was found 1. During the war, the ICRC received a great many donations in kind, and purchases were relatively few. Furthermore, these were made on the Swiss market, where prices were statecontrolled. After the war, however, the ICRC was obliged to draw upon its main assets to purchase goods, in some cases job lots of uncertain value. The Committee was, moreover, not responsible to any donors for its transactions, the funds at its disposal having been contributed by German PW in the United States, or drawn from frozen funds in Switzerland belonging to the former German Government. It was then decided that the relief schemes should not be the sole concern of the Relief Department, or of the Pharmaceutical Section, and considered by the Central Management only, but that they should be further submitted for the approval of the President's office. Further, as from the end of 1946, commercial experts outside the ICRC and its management were appointed to supervise the purchase prices of commodities. Family parcels, which were the original form of Red Cross relief, played an important part during the War 1, especially in respect of French PW in Germany. The moral support they gave was not their least advantage. When hostilities ceased and the majority of the detaining States were quite unable to supply prisoners with the minimum rations laid down by the Conventions, the material and moral value of these parcels increased accordingly. It remained to be seen whether the next of kin could make the sacrifice involved, and whether they should be encouraged to do so by the ICRC, which was itself supplying relief to the German and Australian civilian populations, at first through the Joint Relief Commission and after the end of 1946, in conjunction with the League of Red Cross Societies, through the International Relief Centre for Civilian Populations, the International Union for Child Welfare, and other welfare associations. After careful study, the ICRC undertook this responsibility. The Committee was the prisoners' only support, while the civilian populations, however bad circumstances might be, were assisted by the occupying See pp. 10 ct seq. As early as 1946, the ICRC launched an appeal to German communities abroad, as there remained no German Government or National Red Cross to whom it could apply. In particular, it made an application to the Swiss authorities to sanction the use in favour of German PW, of private German funds impounded in Switzerland, within the limits of the agreements concluded between the chief Allied Powers and Switzerland. The ICRC also asked that certain sums deposited by the German Government, before the surrender, with the Swiss Government or the German Legation in Berne, should be released, at least partially, for the benefit of German PW in Germany. | \\$ | 650,000 | for arti | ificial limbs | |----|---------------------|----------|--------------------| | \\$ | 1,650,000 | ,, me | dical supplies | | \\$ | 785,000 | ,, foo | dstuffs | | \\$ | 36,600,0 0 0 | ,, clot | thing | | \\$ | 5,950,000 | ,, sun | dry articles | | S | 250,000 | ,, inte | ellectual relief | | | | (bo | oks. games, etc.). | In February 1947, the ICRC issued an appeal to the Governments and Red Cross Societies of 34 countries, which was accompanied by a report on "The situation of German and Austrian Prisoners and War-disabled". The appeal requested Governments to allow the use of frozen German funds, and the collection and despatch of gifts in money and in kind. The National Red Cross Societies were requested to support and cooperate in these collections. The ICRC also sent representatives on special missions to the twenty countries of Latin America, to the United States, and to Spain and Portugal, to submit its appeal to the Authorities, the National Red Cross Societies and the German communities. great numbers of prisoners in need of relief. Some were given the status of "Disarmed Personnel" but this had no bearing on the problem they set. At that time there were, including "Disarmed Personnel", well over three million German PW, of whom almost one million were held in France, about one million in Italy, 80,000 to 100,000 in Jugoslavia, 40,000 to 50,000 in Poland, about 20,000 in Czechoslovakia, a few hundred thousand in the British Commonwealth and the United States, and almost one million in Germany itself. The number held in Russia was not known. Relief was therefore a matter of great urgency, and only the ICRC could supply it. The only resources available, however, were a sum of barely 700,000 Swiss francs, representing the balance of the funds contributed by the former German Government, and about 400 tons of supplies, comprising the last two deliveries of food supplies from the German Red Cross, intended for German prisoners in North Africa, which had not been forwarded for technical reasons. In addition, the shortage of transport prevented any immediate action; accordingly, nothing could be done before 1946 for the German PW in Jugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was in fact, some months before the ICRC, or even the Governments of the Detaining Powers could ascertain the exact number of PW, their postal addresses and the route by rail or road which served each camp. In Poland, for instance, transport was disorganized for so long, that in 1946 there were still prisoners in some provinces of whom the central authorities in Warsaw knew nothing. It was to presumed that all prisoners in the same camp fared in much the same way, and that those who made application were not necessarily the worst off, but rather the more enterprising, who did not hesitate to write to the ICRC and at the same time to other relief organizations such as the YMCA, the Society of Friends and the American Red Cross. Moreover, the system of collective relief was more convenient and effective; it would obviously have been both costly and difficult to despatch parcels to prisoners on farms or in labour detachments far from any railway. It was better to send full wagon-loads of provisions to base camps, for the men's communal kitchen, or for fair distribution by the camp leader. The ICRC therefore, from the autumn of 1945, concentrated its efforts on relief for prisoners in French hands, numbering about a million. By this time, rail communications had been almost entirely restored, and the military authorities, having completed the organization of depots and labour detachments, were anxious for the ICRC to share with them the task of feeding and clothing the men who were being used as labour throughout France. It was also agreed that the ICRC might freely visit the camps, and that the distribution of relief supplies should be carried out by them, or under their supervision. During the summer of 1945, the ICRC learned from its delegates' reports—and the French Government acknowledged the fact—that about 200,000 men out of one million were in serious danger from underfeeding. This was particularly so in the devastated areas, or in non-agricultural regions such as the Atlantic seaboard, Auvergne and the Bordeaux district. The number of cases of hunger oedema and general debility were increasing, and many had, or were likely to have fatal results, the daily rations having fallen to less than one thousand calories. Furthermore, the camps had been overcrowded, owing to the cession by the United States of 200,000 prisoners to France On August 21, the ICRC issued a Memorandum to all Governments concerned on the prisoners' condition. They declared that, in their own view, prisoners handed over to another Power should be given treatment at least equal to that applying before their transfer. On September 14, they again approached the U.S. Government, with a request that they should take urgent steps to alleviate the grievous need of German prisoners in French hands. The head of the Delegation in Paris had several interviews with the United States military authorities in Paris and Frankfort, to whom he detailed the requirements in foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing, and offering at the same time the services of the Committee. Concurrently, a similar plan, called "Operation F" (French) was devised to supplement "Operation A". At the time when it was decided that the situation described above had to be rectified at all costs, the French Government had repatriated the great majority of French PW from Germany, and was at any rate able to estimate the exact amount of supplies still necessary for the repatriation centres. A large stock of food parcels, made up after the liberation of France by the provincial branches of the French Red Cross, still remained in Switzerland, and could not be forwarded to Germany owing to the breakdown in rail transport. At the suggestion of the ICRC, part of these stocks were bought with the proceeds of collections among prisoners and "mess profits". The parcels were sorted and made up by the ICRC, which began to dispatch them in the autumn of 1945. The prisoners thus received about 200 tons more of foodstuffs. German prisoners in France suffered from the lack of clothing no less than from under-nourishment. This need was partially met with the help of collections made in German PW camps in the United States. The Relief Division was thus able to buy, at a cost of \\$ 175,000, 197,000 pairs of shoes from American "surplus stores", that is to say, the reserve stocks which the U.S. Government had built up in France, and which were sold off after the war. Of this footwear, 157,000 pairs were distributed in France, 15,000 in North Africa, and at a later date, 25,000 in Poland and Jugoslavia. Furthermore, the Delegation of the ICRC in Washington purchased, at a cost of \\$ 160,000, 72,000 U.S. Army sleeping bags, which were divided among the camps in France, Jugoslavia and Poland. The delegation in France also issued 25,432 articles of underclothing from American surplus stocks. The ICRC took further measures to procure clothing for PW during the winter of 1945-1946. Assuming that in the comparatively less devastated regions of Germany there would be a considerable number of uniforms belonging to dead, captured or demobilized service men, the Committee requested the occupying Powers to allow them to collect old German army uniforms and other clothing for the prisoners' use. The proposal was accepted only by the French Government, for whom it presented obvious advantages. In November 1945, the collection was organized in the French Zone of occupation, with the help of local welfare organizations, and brought in about 875 tons of clothing, of which 800 were at once despatched to camps in France. The remaining 75 tons were cleaned and disinfected in the Committee's warehouses at Geneva, and then sent on to France and Poland. This was certainly a most satisfactory result. At the same time, the ICRC Delegation in Paris, encouraged by the success of "Operation F", established a "Paid Relief" service, with the approval of the French authorities, in order to provide prisoners with a more varied and substantial diet. It offered to purchase in France, at the request and the charge of camps and labour detachments, especially nutritious foodstuffs, such as date, fig and banana butter, jams, honey, flour made from runner beans, haricot beans, peas, barley and chestnuts, meal for soups, oatflakes, and so on, but no rationed products. Thus, from September 1946 to June 1947, it bought and sold 308 tons of goods at a cost of 20,400,000 French francs and sent off 500 consignments to 76 depots, 18 military hospitals and many labour detachments. The scheme was carried on over the whole period with a working capital of five million French francs, and without any loss of goods. visited South Africa and was fortunate enough to obtain from the South African Red Cross and other relief organizations the gift of several shipments of foodstuffs, as well as funds with which goods were purchased in Egypt. The delegation also received gifts from local sources, and from the German civilian internees in Palestine and Southern Rhodesia. These amounted in all to 258 tons of foodstuffs, including 88 tons abandoned by the German forces on the Island of Rhodes, which the British authorities, in the spring of 1946, handed over for German PW. These commodities (maize, barley, meal, dried peas, tinned meat and lard) were all sent to North Africa, excepting 18 cases containing 645 kilos of lard; 15 cases were forwarded to Poland and three to Czechoslovakia. It was a far more difficult matter to secure the same advantages for PW in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was not until the end of 1946 that the ICRC delegations in Germany, Austria and Jugoslavia obtained the consent of all the authorities concerned to the despatch of family parcels by block-trains for PW in Jugoslavia. The first train, composed of nine wagons from the American zone in Germany and six wagons from Austria, left Salzburg on November 2, 1946 and crossed the Jugoslav frontier on the following day. The contents were distributed by the Jugoslav Red Cross; shortly afterwards the Committee was informed that the parcels had arrived in the camps. The same year, two other block-trains left Salzburg with loads not only from the American zone and from Austria, but also from the French zone. A few months before, the Austrian post-offices had been authorized to accept postal packages in transit for prisoners in Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Committee's delegations in Germany obtained authority to organize, with the local Red Cross branches, the despatch of individual parcels to Poland and Jugoslavia by block-trains sent direct from Germany. The "Surplus Kit Operation", set on foot by the Delegation in Washington, remains to be described. As far back as 1944, when the repatriation of Italian PW was under discussion, it had been assumed that prisoners held in the United States would not be able to take all their personal effects with them when they returned to Europe. At the suggestion of the Delegation, the Secretary for War gave it authority to collect all such excess luggage for despatch to Geneva at the end of hostilities, when it could be sent on to the prisoners' country of origin. There were three categories of articles: - - (2) Books of all descriptions. The surplus kit was forwarded from all the camps to the Committee's warehouse in New York, to await despatch to Europe. Such large quantities arrived that the Committee had to create separate departments to deal with it, both in New York and Geneva. Heavy expenses were incurred, and the Delegation in Washington, which had at first accepted the kit free, was eventually compelled to make a charge to senders. However, costs were lower than at first estimated, and in the end there remained a balance of 470,000 Swiss francs which, with the consent of the Landesverbande of the German Red Cross, was allocated to the purchase of relief supplies for German prisoners. When the last prisoners left the United States in June 1946, the surplus kit in the care of the ICRC amounted to about 180,000 parcels. These parcels weighed in all 2,000 tons and their transport at the ordinary rates would have entailed sums that neither the Committee, nor the owners could have borne. The American authorities were good enough to allow free carriage. The first shipments arrived at Marseilles and Le Havre on board American troopships, and were forwarded by rail, also free of cost, to the Red Cross warehouses in Geneva. When the kit could no longer be shipped in this way, the Delegation in Washington was authorized to send all parcels not exceeding 20 lbs in weight by mailbag. The remaining 1,800 tons were sent to Bremerhaven by the U.S. War Department. After prolonged discussion, the ICRC and the Bavarian Red Cross came to an agreement, approved by the occupying authorities, on the method of forwarding kit to the owners. It was arranged that the Bavarian Red Cross should be responsible for receiving and sorting the parcels, checking addresses, tracing addresses who had changed their residence, and forwarding parcels in Germany and to former inhabitants of territories that had returned to Czechoslovakia, or were under Polish administration. The Austrian and Italian Red Cross Societies undertook the same duties in Austria and Italy. All parcels The Allies had declared beforehand that, at the end of hostilities, they would each in their respective zones of occupation, undertake the provisioning of the citizens of United Nations countries who might be in Germany. From May 1945 onwards, the ICRC therefore made every endeavour to co-operate with the Allied military authorities. The Committee had at that time over 100,000 tons of relief consignments available in its warehouses in Switzerland, in the ports of arrival and in several warehouses in Germany. Apart from some 400 tons intended for German PW in North Africa, these supplies had been given for PW in German hands and included a relatively small quantity for political detainees in the concentration camps. These goods were intended mainly to supplement the rations issued by the occupation authorities to former PW and civilian internees in Germany pending their repatriation; this last process, however, was carried out at such speed that only a very limited proportion of goods was used in this way 1. It was therefore proposed to use them for displaced persons, citizens of United Nations countries, whose situation was extremely critical. The consent of the donors was, however, necessary, and most of these preferred to have their goods returned to them. The American and British Red Cross Societies, on the other hand, pooled all the foodstuffs and clothing sent to the ICRC, and this joint stock could be drawn upon ຝ Supreme Command, and supplied to Displaced Persons of the United Nations in the American and British Zones. The French Government decided that in its own zone the same category of people should be assisted by the military authorities and by the French Red Cross, who would draw on the stocks from French sources that were in the custody of the ICRC. In the first few months after the armistice, the Allies did not consider it necessary to appeal to the ICRC, although relief requirements were urgent and vast in scope. In the course of the early interviews in May 1945 at Kreuzlingen, near the German-Swiss frontier, attended by representatives of the Allied military authorities and of the ICRC, the Committee was informed that its co-operation was no longer considered necesary. Fully informed of the distress of the Displaced Persons, the Committee could not but persist. In July, they opened further negotiations in Augsburg and Frankfort with the United States Army High Command and did not conceal their firm intention to pursue a task which, though temporary, was none the less urgent, and which their technical organization and their large stocks of goods would enable them to carry through with every prospect of success. The Committee pointed out, moreover, that the occupation authorities were so overburdened with work that relief transported by the ICRC to the centres specified, in particular to Augsburg and Mannheim, had not been issued. These arguments were, however, of no avail. Immediately afterwards, the ICRC took similar steps in Paris and in London. Whilst their proposals met with sympathy, neither the French Ministry for Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees, nor the British War Office or the British Red Cross could give an undertaking to intervene in Frankfort. The interviews which took place in Geneva with representatives of the American Red Cross only served to confirm the Committee's point of view in principle, without altering the paradoxical and most deplorable fact that large quantities of food and clothing remained idle in Switzerland, when they might have somewhat relieved the dire distress of the Displaced Persons. In a Memorandum addressed, in August 1945, to the Governments and Red Cross Societies of the countries concerned, the ICRC consequently declined all responsibility for citizens of the United Nations in Germany, since the Committee was prevented from sending them the relief which it considered indispensable and which it could have supplied. The Committee further deplored the fact that it could do nothing in behalf of Displaced Persons who were nationals of countries that the Allies considered as ex-enemy States. The Occupation Authorities had informed the Committee that the maintenance of these people devolved on the German administrative departments in charge of food supplies for the civil population. These departments were, however, unable to distribute even the barest necessities to Baltic, Bulgarian, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Italian nationals or to stateless persons, owing to the shortage of foodstuffs, to requisitioning by the Allied Armies and to transport difficulties. In spite of this fact, the ICRC was not allowed to help this category of war victims by drawing on the pool. The French Government alone placed at its disposal 150,000 five-kilo food parcels for Baltic and Hungarian DPs, which were distributed between May 1945 and February 1946. Despite all the negotiations mentioned above, the situation remained unchanged and, although appeals which increased in urgency and number reached Geneva, it was impossible to send consignments at shorter intervals. Moreover, the goods already sent to Germany and entrusted to Allied organizations which had been recommended to the ICRC, were neither guarded, nor even protected against the weather. After many incidents, a special ICRC mission again went to Frankfort and made it plain to the Allied authorities that the longer the distribution of stocks was delayed, the greater would be the liability incurred by the Governments and Red Cross Societies who were owners of relief supplies, since this state of affairs obliged the ICRC to maintain a large administrative organisation. The Allies then decided to wind up the pool straight away, and from November 1945, sent rolling stock for this purpose to the Swiss frontier. By the end of February 1946, the last wagons had left the warehouses. The ICRC also made every endeavour to bring relief direct to the Displaced Persons. A few donors had left it free to dispose of about a thousand tons of goods, and the Committee decided to use them for this purpose; it was thus, during the winter of 1945-46, able to send 113 wagons of sundry goods to its delegations in Germany and Austria. During the same period, the residue of the 150,000 food parcels given by the French Government for Baltic and Hungarian DPs was dispatched, the first half of this lot having already been issued in the summer of 1945. At the request of the General Post Office in London, the Swiss Postal Administration also handed over to the ICRC about 165 tons of cigarette and tobacco parcels posted direct by relatives of British PW in Germany, and which were still in transit through Switzerland when the war came to an end. Lastly, the Committee had 250 tons of sundry relief supplies available, consisting of foodstuffs, clothing and toilet articles given by the British Red Cross. By the end of March 1946, these gifts had enabled it to send 66 wagons to DPs in Germany, and 40 wagons to those in Austria, and also seven wagons to refugees in France. Part of the tobacco and cigarette parcels mentioned above were handed over to the Belgian and French Red Cross Societies. Sundry relief supplies for Ukrainian DPs in Austria. A sum of 12,000 Swiss francs made over to the ICRC Delegation in Italy for local purchases of relief supplies. Other funds were spent on DPs of specified nationalities. The Esthonian Legation in New York and the Latvian Legation in Washington informed the Committee's delegate in Washington, of their desire to hand over to the ICRC, for the benefit of Esthonian and Latvian refugees in Europe, part of their Governments' funds frozen in the United States. The Committee agreed to these mandates, once convinced that its action as a neutral intermediary was required. It had in fact learned that the United States Treasury would release these funds only on condition that they were entrusted to itself, and moreover, that the authorities of the United States Zone of Occupation were in favour of this plan. Two sums, one of 200,000 and one of 85,000 dollars were then transferred to the ICRC, the first for Esthonian and the second for Latvian refugees; these allowed the despatch of clothing materials, layettes, cobblers' and tailors' material, toilet articles, medicaments and so on, to Germany and Austria. Further, relief organizations in the United States and Canada made a gift of 11,000 dollars for the purchase of foodstuffs for Ukrainian refugees in Austria. tons of dried fruits from the Turkish Red Crescent, cases of clothing from the Chilian Red Cross, 20 tons of sundry relief supplies from the Brazilian Red Cross and two and a half tons of milk powder from the Uruguayan Red Cross. These gifts were despatched to Austria, except the milk powder which went to children of DPs in the French Zone of Germany. The ICRC also received the following relief supplies for Displaced Persons of specified categories: for Ukrainians, some 54 tons of medicaments, foodstuffs, worn clothing and school equipment, provided by the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund in Canada; for Jugoslavs in Austria, some five tons of warm clothing from the Serbian Relief Committee of America in the United States, together with small quantities of relief supplies sent by Jugoslav groups in Great Britain. Although of considerable extent during the winter of 1945-46, relief work in behalf of Displaced Persons diminished after that period, and was confined to carrying out specified commissions. In the autumn of 1946, the ICRC decided to wind up this work as of November 1—with the exception of such commissions as were still in progress—since it was not in a position to act on a sufficiently large scale; moreover, its financial means made it barely possible for it to carry out its main task of giving aid to PW. During 1947, the ICRC received no further appeals for the relief of Displaced Persons, so that this decision was not prejudicial to these victims of the war. ### GENERAL REMARKS In June 1940, after the invasion of France and Italy's entry into the War, there remained only one serviceable line of communication between the British Commonwealth and the Continent — that through Portugal and Spain. Contact between Great Britain and Sweden was broken when Denmark and Norway were occupied; Switzerland, surrounded on all sides by Axis Powers, was also cut off from direct contact with the Commonwealth. Before the belligerents had reached agreement on the Committee's suggestions for the restoration of communications2, the situation was aggravated by the Spanish authorities' decision, early in December 1940, to prohibit the transit of goods through Spain. The events which followed — occupation of the Balkans, invasion of Russia, entry into the war of the United States, landings in North Africa, war in the Pacific, Allied landings in France — everywhere raised impassable barriers, and the destruction of merchant vessels and the bombing of railroads brought sea and land transport almost to a standstill. From August 1944, all communication between territories in German hands and elsewhere had been cut, and only the ICRC ships, motor vehicles and "block-trains", together with the Swedish vessels chartered for relief to Greece, were still able to maintain between belligerent camps the contacts required for the conveyance of mail and relief supplies to the prisoners of war. When Japan became at war with the USSR in 1945, she was also cut off from other countries. Less than a year after the outbreak of war, the British Red Cross had been obliged to charter vessels to carry relief supplies and parcels. The ICRC, on its part, had to ensure the regular transmission of mail from the Central Agency, where all information concerning PW and civilian internees was assembled, and the forwarding of Red Cross Messages. The Committee made every effort to remain in contact with its delegations, especially by wireless. In August 1944, when postal services broke down completely, it arranged for the conveyance of PW correspondence, organized relief transports by sea, road Or "set-trains". The Committee at once sought material assistance, as its limited funds did not allow it to assume such heavy liabilities. As soon as means of transport and funds were available, it put its plans into execution. These were not, however, exclusively a matter of organization. Diplomatic problems grew in number, and effective action in that field by the ICRC depended on the consent of the belligerents, since the contacts which had to be made required special privileges and immunities, and the grant of free passage. These critical and delicate negotiations led the Committee to set up in 1942 a separate department, the Transport and Communications Division, with an expert and technical staff, experienced in postal, wireless and telegraphic communications, and in maritime, road and rail transport. This Division had to cope with the difficulties which the constantly changing war situation threw up; it had to organize transport and obtain the necessary permits from Governments. As some of the vessels employed for sea transport were to become the property of the ICRC, the Committee in 1942 set up the "Foundation for the Organization of Red Cross Transports" as a separate body, with a distinct legal status, and thus entitled to own ships. In some cases these transports were operated for the Committee by private concerns. These possessed technical facilities, the improvisation of which would have raised insuperable financial and practical difficulties and would in any case have served only a temporary need. During the recent War, the Committee was therefore obliged to adapt its methods to an entirely novel situation. It did not shrink from heavy responsibilities, and so ensured the survival of certain humanitarian principles, despite the breakdown of normal communications and transport restrictions. The results obtained are set out in the statistics annexed hereto1. The difficulties of the undertaking and its significance in the field of international law may be estimated in the following chapters, which describe the diplomatic negotiations and the various measures taken to ensure Red Cross transports. ## Maritime Transports ### 1. Earlier schemes. In 1940, when the ICRC first proposed to use vessels under special charter, to fill the gaps in normal communications, it could quote no precedents or treaty stipulations in support of its scheme. The International Red Cross Conferences and a Commission of Naval Experts 1 had already studied the conditions under which protection could be granted to Red Cross maritime transports not covered by the Tenth Hague Convention 2. Nothing, however, was achieved, as none of the proposed systems was approved. These suggestions may, however, be compared with the methods adopted during the last conflict. <sup>3 See Document No 14 submitted to that Conference by the ICRC. <sup>4 See ICRC Report to the XVIth International Red Cross Conference (1938), Document No 2. and financial obstacles caused the scheme to be abandoned; it could not, therefore, serve as the basis on which to build a case for granting immunity to vessels carrying Red Cross relief supplies. On the other hand, there was no question of devising special legislation, or of exempting the vessels and crews from territorial jurisdiction. In consequence, vessels bearing the Red Cross emblem and sailing under the Committee's control remained subject to the laws of the country under whose flag they voyaged, and to maritime law: any immunities enjoyed were those granted by the belligerents. The following peculiar case was reported by the ICRC delegate in Ankara. A relief mission to the Dodecanese Islands, then occupied by German forces, had set out on February 12, 1945; the mission sailed on board Turkish caiques flying their national flag and the Red Cross emblem. On February 23, when Turkey declared war on Germany, the Turkish flag was hauled down and from that time the vessels only displayed the Red Cross flag. None the less they continued to sail in Greek waters with the belligerents' approval, and were universally considered by the military authorities as owned by the ICRC. The ships' charter papers held by the Turkish skippers had been drawn up in the name of the ICRC, and the delegate in charge of the mission was considered as the head of the Red Cross fleet. This incident was, as it were, the first practical realisation of the scheme for the international Red Cross fleet, although, of course, the legal problem involved had not yet been settled. <sup>2 See Document No 2 submitted by the ICRC to the XVIth International Red Cross Conference (1938). Medical stores carried in vessels other than hospital ships enjoy no special protection. The Committee could not, on the other hand, use the vessels in its service to convey medical stores, because these ships had to be exclusively reserved for the tasks that the belligerents had agreed to cover by the grant of safe-conducts. The ICRC therefore submitted the proposal of the British Red Cross to the belligerent Governments concerned. The United States Government raised no objection of principle, but asked for detailed schedules for each voyage. No other replies were received. ## 2. First attempt to commission ICRC vessels. <sup>1 See p. pp. 132-133. In the meantime, the belligerents had agreed to allow the transport in the Mediterranean of PW parcels which had been held up at Lisbon owing to the suspension of rail transit through Spain 1. This maritime service was confined to the carriage of relief supplies for PW, whereas the scheme for a cross-Channel service had been planned on a wider basis. Its acceptance would have allowed the institution from the outset of the war of a service similar to that for conveying relief supplies to PW, and the exchange of repatriates could thus have been systematically organized under Red Cross auspices. This failure was not due to objections to the principle of the scheme, and the question even of the route was of secondary importance, since the two parties had successively proposed communication between enemy ports (Great Britain — Occupied France), and between neutral ports (Ireland—Peninsula). It was however found impossible to reach agreement on the exchange of civilian internees, the repatriation of seriously wounded and medical personnel and the other charitable operations which the use of a Red Cross vessel was to have facilitated. Furthermore, the Governments made their decision depend on the settlement of other problems, some of which were handled by the Committee and others by the Protecting Power, and even, in some cases, by both agencies at the same time. This duplication was bound to be prejudicial to the work of the Committee, particularly when proposals submitted through the Protecting Power were accompanied by threats of reprisals. Lastly, the belligerents were usually inclined to regard these questions as being interdependent; for instance, the ICRC was confidentially informed that the German authorities would only accept the British offer, provided the mail service for German PW in Canada was improved. Employment of protected vessels. — The Red Cross emblem was used during the war to protect certain vessels, as follows: Although many vessels were put into service under the Red Cross emblem, this practice was limited to strictly defined cases, and could not be extended to all the maritime transports that were required in the execution of relief undertakings. The belligerents were only requested to grant special protection when conveyance by ordinary vessels appeared impracticable owing to the suspension of services, or when such transports were exposed to great risks. The repatriation of seriously wounded and the exchange of civil internees were carried out partly by ordinary vessels, partly by hospital ships and by steamers sailing under special safe-conducts. In regard to the transport of goods, the parcels and relief supplies intended for Axis PW and civil internees were almost invariably sent by ordinary means. Large quantities of parcels and relief supplies for Allied PW and civil internees in Europe were also carried by neutral or belligerent vessels which did not bear the Red Cross emblem. In the course of the war, Swiss vessels, for instance, shipped about 124,000 tons of Red Cross relief supplies, whilst the Committee's vessels carried about 470,000 tons. ### § 2. STATUS OF THE COMMITTEE'S VESSELS ## I. Safe-conducts The ICRC, however, occasionally applied for safe-conducts for vessels which did not carry its emblem, and for which it disclaimed any responsibility, either because the belligerents failed to give sufficient security guarantees, or because the ICRC itself was not in a position to exercise effective supervision. As an example of the first class, we may quote the relief tranports from Sweden to Germany 1, and of the second, the sailing vessels first used between Lisbon and Marseilles 2, as well as the first Swedish cargo boats which carried relief to Greece, the Radmenso and the Sicilia, chartered by the British and the American Red Cross respectively. <sup>2 See p. 158. <sup>1 See p. 128. <sup>2 See Report of the Foundation for the Organization of Red Cross Transports, p. 7 et seq. ## 2. Distinctive Markings. <sup>2 See above p. 130. German authorities offered to place a hospital ship at the disposal of the ICRC, while the British authorities suggested the use of a neutral vessel chartered by the ICRC; they were, however, silent on the question of distinctive markings. Six months later, when applying for authority to put into service the Jugoslav steamer \*Herzegovina\* and the French ships \*Penerf\* and \*Ile Rousse\* for carrying parcels between Lisbon and Marseilles 1, the ICRC advised the British, French, German and Italian Governments of their intention to place the inscription "C. INTERNATIONAL" on these vessels, in addition to a red cross on a white ground. Before the result of these negociations was known, transports had been started by means of motorized sailing vessels of the Spanish and Portuguese merchant services. At this time the German and Italian authorities made the safe-conduct granted to these ships two months previously, conditional upon their being marked thenceforward with the Red Cross emblem. The Committee, however, wished this marking to be reserved for craft over which they could exercise effective control. On the other hand, the British Admiralty objected to the use of the emblem for vessels other than those covered by the Tenth Hague Convention of 1907, and considered that craft sailing under the Committee's auspices would be sufficiently distinguished if they bore an inscription such as "C. INTERNATIO-TIONAL CR" Shortly afterwards, the transports were organized so as to give the Committee the control it desired. Vessels were chartered direct by the British Red Cross, in agreement with the ICRC, and were accompanied by a convoying agent appointed by the Committee. In these circumstances, the ICRC endeavoured to ensure the protection of the Red Cross emblem. Since the Committee's independence and neutrality were pledged, it was in a position to accept responsibility for these transports towards the belligerents, in so far at least as the latter undertook to give them protection. <sup>1 See below p. 158. rista, soriesters. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 15. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 16. trans. 17. trans. 17. trans. 17. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. 18. trans. ### (a) Principles. on deck, fore and aft, preferably on the hatchways, and if required, on the roof of the deckhouses, the Red Cross emblem on a white ground, ### (c) Dimensions of markings. The dimensions of the markings may vary according to the space available. The markings shall be painted directly on the hull or the deck, where they shall preferably be placed on the hatchways. ### (d) Illumination. Misuse of markings. — In April 1941, the British Government agreed to the use of the Red Cross emblem on the Committee's vessels, but reserved the right to withdraw their consent, should enemy Governments be shown guilty of misusing the emblem. Throughout the war, however, only once was an incident of this kind reported. According to a communication made by the German Government to the ICRC, German naval forces had observed an unusual number of vessels bearing the Committee's markings and moving along the Portuguese coast, during the night of November 6, 7 and 8, 1942, that is, just before the Allied landing in North Africa. This observation justified every kind of suspicion 1. No confirmation was, however, found for these allegations, and it would therefore appear that on no occasion was there any misuse of Red Cross markings on vessels. ## 3. Use of vessels. <sup>1 There were, in fact, six Red Cross vessels sailing in these waters at that particular time. Mail bags, addressed to the Swiss postal authorities or to the ICRC and containing PW parcels, may also be conveyed by Red Cross vessels On the other hand, the ICRC was unable to get the use of a vessel to carry medicaments and supplies for the medical corps of expeditionary forces 1. ຝ the ban on the transport of passengers. At the request of the Swedish Government, the Committee agreed to allow their diplomatic messengers and other Swedish citizens to travel on Swedish vessels chartered by the Foundation, subject to the approval of the belligerents concerned. In all, 145 passengers thus crossed the Atlantic on Red Cross ships. Since the ICRC itself had no funds with which to procure means of transport, these were supplied by the relief organizations or the Governments concerned. The latter were, however, inclined to claim the exclusive use of the vessels thus supplied, whereas the Committee's policy of strict impartiality forbade it to waive its rights in favour of any particular body. The ICRC therefore accepted means of transport only on condition of being free to use them for the benefit of all nationalities; the only concession made was a bare priority for the organization bearing the costs incurred. ## 4. Organization of supervision. The ICRC was obliged, in view of its responsibilities, to take steps for the protection of the rights of belligerents. It was unable, however, to give any absolute guarantees, especially before having acquired some experience in this field. The Italian Government, which was dissatisfied with these reservations, proposed that the ships should call at an Italian port, instead of Marseilles, in order to "ease the task of the ICRC and to simplify the machinery of supervision". But the gradual organization of transports allowed the Committee to exercise more effective control and to gain the belligerents' confidence to an increasing degree. These Powers confined themselves to sanctioning and making compulsory the presence of convoying agents, whom the ICRC had itself introduced on the vessels sailing under the Red Cross flag. In other respects the ships at sea and in port were subject to the same supervision as any other neutral merchant shipping. Special charter clauses. — Since financial considerations prevented the ICRC from purchasing or chartering ships itself, it could only fulfil its obligation towards the belligerents by obtaining certain guarantees in turn from the owners and charterers. To this end, it required of all subscribers to the charter-party a formal undertaking to observe and to ensure the observation of the regulations laid down for Red Cross transports. The purpose of the charter had to be expressly named in the agreements: the contracting parties undertook to place the vessels at the sole disposal of the ICRC, and to follow the instructions given them by its representatives, in particular those relating to schedule and routes. - (3) Convoying agents of the ICRC. Since the obligations towards the belligerents impose a responsibility upon the ICRC, the Committee shall place a convoying agent on board each vessel, to represent the ICRC in all questions involving its interests. The primary duty of the convoying agent shall be to ensure the observance of the pledges given by the Committee, covering the vessel. The ship will supply the convoying agent with appropriate accommodation and food. - If, despite all precautions, stowaways or unauthorized cargo are discovered during the voyage, such persons or goods shall in principle be taken back to the sailing port and put ashore. The captain and the convoying agent shall do their utmost to follow this rule, and all vessels in the service of the ICRC shall lend each other assistance. - (5) Neutrality of Red Cross vessels. The duties assigned to the Red Cross vessels entail the observance of strict neutrality by all personnel on board. Masters shall require their crews to abstain from giving to any third person any information that might be of interest to belligerents. Members of the crew must refuse to answer questions put to them by officials, except those relating to their duties on board, stating, if necessary, that they have strict orders from the ICRC to this effect. The above provisions were inserted in the charter-parties. The ICRC moreover reserved the right to name the consignees of both vessels and cargo. Delegations. — The Committee's delegations organized and supervised the loading and unloading of the ships. They had sole responsibility for the allocation of tonnage for the various consignments; they received and forwarded cargoes, determined the schedules for each voyage (which had to be notified to the belligerents concerned), and gave the necessary instructions to the owners or their agents, particularly in regard to distinctive markings, sailing dates and routes. The delegations themselves discussed all matters relating to the movements of vessels with the local authorities and the representatives of belligerent Powers in neutral countries. This method prevented the risk of contradictory instructions to the masters. When on duty, the convoying agents took their instructions direct from the delegations in the ports. The convoying agent had to remain on board from the time the customs water-guard went ashore, until the officers at the arrival port came on board. He was empowered to make a complete inspection of the vessel. During the voyage, no cargo could be loaded or discharged; no strangers were admitted on board and no-one could leave the ship. In the event of any infringements of the obligations assumed towards the belligerents, the convoying agent had to take all appropriate steps. Responsibility for navigation, however, belonged exclusively to the master The British Government insisted, in the case of the Rosa Smith, which sailed between Gothenburg and Aberdeen, that the crew list should be submitted to the British Consul at Gothenburg. The members of the crew were allowed to go ashore at Aberdeen, but could not leave the town. <sup>1 When it was proposed to charter an ICRC vessel for service in the Far East, the Allies consented to the crew's being composed of Japanese seamen, provided this concession induced the Japanese authorities to approve Red Cross transports. rista, st. tor. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. rists. The object of notification was to allow belligerent Governments to inform their armed forces. Its chief disadvantage was that any vessel which for some reason could not keep to the schedule, had to be held in port during the period required for fresh notification. The ICRC was, moreover, at times completely cut off from all communication with its ships: it had, for instance, from 1944 onwards, no means of rapid communication with its delegations in Marseilles and Toulon, and was in consequence not in a position to report any delays incurred by vessels calling at these ports2. Sea routes. — Safe-conducts were granted for voyages not only between the ports of call, but also along courses precisely defined by geographical pin-points. The determination of the route was one cause of unfortunate delays, as it usually entailed drawn-out negotiations with the belligerents. One of the Governments concerned would sometimes accept beforehand the route to be fixed by its allies, or would even leave it in part to the discretion of the adversary. All parties were informed of the route finally chosen. However, changes were often demanded during the time the vessels were in service. Shoals or minefields made certain routes very dangerous for ships, which bad weather might divert slightly from their course. The Vega in this way ran aground on a sand bank, and the Padua sank after striking a mine in the Gulf of Lions. In view of the dangers to navigation between Port Vendres and Marseilles, the ICRC itself requested the German authorities to provide pilots. The request was granted, on condition that the pilots should be regarded as neutral; this the United States Government accepted, but the British Government refused. Three months later, the British revoked their decision and gave an assurance that pilots shipped between Port Vendres and Marseilles would be treated as neutrals by the British authorities, and be exempt from capture. After this arrangement no further incidents occurred on this route. Scope of regulations. — All these regulations were intended to enhance the safety of the Committee's vessels. The latter might, however, on occasion be unable to comply with them, owing either to orders issued by the military authorities, or to some other imperative reason. The question arose, therefore, whether vessels might be without protection in especially dangerous situations. The British Government repeatedly made it clear that they would accept no responsibility for attacks on ships or crews that had failed strictly to observe regulations. The ICRC vessels were thus exposed to the perils inevitable in a state of war, whilst their safety depended solely on the exact observance of all regulations to which they were subject. Although no consequences ensued, the fact that these vessels bore the onus of obligations which could not in all circumstances be fulfilled, created an unusual situation. From a logical point of view, withdrawal of protection could only be grounded in breaches of the general conditions governing safe - conducts, use of the vessel, schedule of routes, and distinctive markings. This question was not specially discussed, but the Italian authorities seemed to have interpreted the principles of protection in this sense. When the ICRC made certain reservations early in 1941 regarding the use of the Red Cross emblem, they replied as follows: In conclusion, provisions governing navigation should be framed solely to ensure the better identification of the vessels; the protection of those vessels should not be in any way conditional on such regulations. Belligerents should not therefore be entitled to decline all responsibility for attacks against vessels displaying the emblem, on the grounds that they were unable to identify them. ## 7. Transfer of flag. Owing to the losses suffered by their merchant fleets, the neutral countries were hardly able to offer tonnage to the ICRC. Moreover, the United States and the German authorities had on several occasions expressed a wish for all Red Cross transport to be placed under the control of the ICRC and under the Swiss flag. The Committee therefore asked the Governments concerned to grant exceptions to the provisions of international law governing the transfer of flag, and succeeded in having three belligerent vessels placed under the Swiss flag. The Swiss Confederation approved these transfers, on condition that the vessels should be subject to Swiss law, in particular with regard to transfer of ownership of the vessels to Swiss nationals, and removal from the shipping register of the home country. The ICRC was, moreover, required to obtain the consent of the belligerents to the proposed transfers, and to take responsibility for the employment of the vessels, which could not be included in the allocation of tonnage assigned to Switzerland by the belligerents. In short the ICRC, in order to transfer belligerent vessels to a neutral flag, had to bring about the following: - (3) The purchase should not lead to any financial gain to the belligerents. The ICRC also contemplated the chartering of ships 1 either at the expense of the Governments concerned, or at the charge of National Red Cross Societies. The plans fell through and the Committee soon abandoned the idea, having in the meantime had recourse to a method by which its own interests and those of relief organizations and Governments were protected. Charterparties were concluded between the British Red Cross and owners in neutral countries, but the ICRC had the exclusive use of the vessels and all facilities for carrying out the supervision required by the belligerents. This system, concurrently with another adopted in 1942, lasted until the end of the war. After the United States' entry into the war, the American Red Cross asked the ICRC if the relief supplies given by them might not be carried by vessels flying the Swiss flag and sailing under the same conditions as the ships of the Committee already in service. On being consulted, the Swiss Government were willing to allow vessels to be transferred to their flag, provided the ICRC obtained the necessary authority. They offered meantime to set aside from 2,000 to 3,000 tons per month of cargo space in their own ships, for use in the transatlantic service of the Red Cross 2. The terms of the charters were adapted to the forms in common use, and were different in almost every case; some vessels were on time-charter, some for the voyage and others for the duration of the war. ### Lisbon-Marseilles At the outbreak of the war, relief supplies for Allied PW were conveyed from Lisbon to Germany by rail. In the winter of 1940, the Spanish Government was obliged to prohibit the transit of goods from Portugal over its railway system. The ICRC then began to carry relief supplies by sea from Lisbon to Genoa or Marseilles. Our review of this service, as of the others dealt with below, will be confined to essentials; space does not permit an account in detail of the technical problems connected with the various shipping routes, of the many negotiations they involved, or of the regulations — frequently modified — which were established by the belligerents 1. The first shipments in the Mediterranean began in December 1939 and January 1940, and were carried out by small Portuguese sailing ships chartered by the British Red Cross and sailing under a safe-conduct from the belligerents. Their supervision was not, however, sufficiently strict, and the German Government indicated that they were disinclined to place confidence in these vessels for an indefinite period. The ICRC then had recourse to steamers, each having one of their agents on board; these would carry exclusively goods intended for PW and civilian internees. This course proved satisfactory as regards British PW; it was not so, however, in the case of French PW, since the plan for employing vessels chartered by the French Red Cross met with insurmountable obstacles. The French authorities, who were faced with urgent needs, had to resort to "block-trains" from Portugal, although the costs were heavy. After the United States came into the war, shipments for PW steadily increased, and the use of large cargo-vessels became essential. There were, moreover, drawbacks to the chartering of Portuguese steamers, since the ICRC had to deal with shipowners on a purely commercial basis; furthermore, no voyage could be made without authority from the Portuguese Government. At this juncture the Foundation for Red Cross Transports, recently set up by the ICRC, purchased the Belgian vessels \*Frederic\*, which thenceforth sailed under the name of \*Caritas I\*. This ship was intended for the United States-Marseilles route, but its first voyage was from Lisbon to the Mediterranean. to great risks in following the difficult routes laid down by the belligerents. Others were repeatedly attacked by aircraft, and one was sunk. The ICRC then suspended the Marseilles-Lisbon service and sent a protest to London. The British authorities expressed their regret; to avoid the recurrence of similar incidents, they requested that the Red Cross vessels should report their position and speed four times a day by wireless. Several cargo-boats were thus able to leave Marseilles, but shortly afterwards the Allied landing on the French coast (August, 1944) again held up all navigation. Since there was no more room in the warehouses at Lisbon for goods which continued to arrive from overseas, several ships unloaded at Barcelona. By the autum of 1944, conditions for navigation had once more become almost normal, and it was possible to send relief supplies to Toulon, until the port of Marseilles was again made serviceable. Throughout the war, relief supplies from South America were carried almost entirely in Swiss vessels. Agreements concluded by the British and United States Governments and by the ICRC with the Swiss Government supplied the Argentine Red Cross with cargo space of varying capacity in vessels detailed for carrying food to Switzerland. This space it was asked to allocate impartially between the various Allied nations. The system did not however allow of rapid disposal of available stocks. The British Red Cross therefore, at the beginning of 1943, chartered a Swedish vessel lying in Buenos Aires, which then made several voyages between that port and Marseilles, with the consent of the belligerents and under the emblem of the ICRC. ### 4. North American Route In the early years of the war, the American Red Cross had sent relief supplies to Europe on board American ships, which unloaded at Lisbon. The United States, on entering the war, were anxious to supply their nationals held in Europe and Japan. Two maritime services, Atlantic and Pacific, were planned for this purpose, under the auspices of the ICRC; they were the subject of negotiations at the beginning of 1942, and in the case of the Atlantic transports, were brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Negotiations which took place at that time between the Swiss and British Governments led to an agreement, countersigned by the ICRC, under which Switzerland set aside 4,000 tons a month for the ICRC, 3,000 tons being allotted to the British Red Cross and 1,000 tons to the American Red Cross. These cargoes were carried at preferential rates. In its concern for neutrality, the Swiss Federal Government decided that, on the return voyage from Europe, the cargo space it had made available to belligerents should be used for relief supplies sent to PW of the Axis countries in the United States and Canada. In the summer of 1944 the Allied landing in the South of France debarred the port of Marseilles from use by navigation. The ICRC had already considered the possibility of linking North America with a North German port, via the Faroe Isles and the Scandinavian coast. The dangers to shipping north of the German coast prevented Red Cross vessels in the Atlantic service from sailing direct to German ports. The ICRC was thus obliged to warehouse relief supplies at Gothenburg, which henceforth served as a relay station for goods bound for Germany from the North. A delegation was opened there, with the same duties for the Baltic as those of the delegation in Lisbon for the Mediterranean. A few vessels, nevertheless, continued to operate on the southern route and discharged their cargoes at Barcelona, A direct line between Great Britain and Sweden was proposed by the British Red Cross as early as September 1941. Aberdeen had been selected in view of its good communications with the interior. It was not until the autumn of 1944, however, that the German authorities accepted this plan in principle, on condition that the ships, on their return passage, should carry mail and parcels for German PW. Their uncompromising attitude moreover prevented any agreement being reached before March 1945 on the choice, status and conditions of charter of such vessels. The first shipment of relief from Aberdeen did not therefore reach Gothenburg until after the armistice. ## 6. Gothenburg-Lübeck Route Events in the Mediterranean theatre of war at first led the ICRC to consider linking the United States direct with Germany by the north. The British Government and the owners of vessels chartered by the Foundation objected, however, to this idea, on account of the dangers referred to above. In default of other routes, it was decided to ship relief supplies to Gothenburg, whence it was hoped to convey them to Germany via Denmark by the Helsingborg-Elsinore ferry. This service was irregular, however, and the ICRC attempted to set up a coastal shuttle service between Sweden and Germany. This service could not be opened until November 1944. The belligerents had chosen the port of Lübeck, despite the danger of destruction by bombing. Since the Allies had refused safe-conducts to these Swedish vessels, the ICRC did not provide them with the Red Cross emblem, or place their convoying agents on board, for no responsibility for this service could be assumed in these conditions. The ICRC delegates did, however, supervise the loading and discharging of goods and their forwarding to the camps in Germany. The Swedish Government asked that the cargo-boats should at least be painted white, The occupation of the Balkans by Axis forces made communications with the Near East both difficult and precarious. Great delays and losses attended the transport of parcels to Axis PW and civilian internees in countries overseas, and the conveyance of supplies from India, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. To rectify this situation and to promote the despatch of urgent relief supplies to the 3,000 British PW held in Greece, the ICRC attempted to put a line in operation between Turkey and the Adriatic, similar to that between Lisbon and Marseilles. After some hesitation, the belligerents, at the beginning of 1942, agreed to this plan in principle. Unfortunately, none of the vessels the ICRC wished to place in service were approved by all the Governments concerned, and since railway communications had meanwhile been re-opened, the scheme was abandoned. ## 8. Projected Far East Route An account of the Committee's attempts to organize the sea transport of relief supplies to Allied PW in Japanese hands will be found in the chapter covering all the problems of the war in the Far East1. ## 9. Maritime Transport of Relief for Civilian Populations See pp. 401 et scq. ## Chapter 2 Relief supplies to PW in Europe were carried largely by the French, Italian, Swiss, German, Hungarian and Balkan railway systems. Although conditions were often most difficult, the railway staff everywhere showed a devotion to duty which earned the gratitude of the ICRC and the donor agencies. - (c) Application of provisions for free transport ## (a) Organization At first, the ICRC commissioned international transport firms to attend to the receipt and despatch of goods sent to PW through its agency. After a few months this system proved too costly. Without entirely dispensing with the services of international shipping agencies, the ICRC set up its own Transport Department. As this was not a commercial undertaking, expenses were much reduced (from 1942 to 1946 they were no higher than 4.5 centimes per kilogram); more important, the consignments sent to PW and internees of all categories shared the privileges enjoyed by the Committee itself. ## (b) Shortage of wagons in September and October 1943. The German Railways then announced that the goods would be directed over sixteen sectors of their network. Consequently, the ICRC had to set up a composition department. As consignments for single camps did not always make up a full wagon-load, the German Railways had agreed to accept single wagons of not less than five tons weight and addressed to several camps in the same neighbourhood. In such cases all the addressees had to be entered on the way-bill and the customs declaration, and the various lots so marked that they could without difficulty be unloaded separately. All the parcels in one car were numbered according to a system which allowed the ICRC to keep a statistical record. - (d) Combined cars routed indirectly; one lading. These remained sealed until they reached their first destination; they carried supplies from one warehouse and for PW of different nationalities in two or three camps in the same railway sector. (f) "Composite" cars. — These were sent to Singen and contained separate consignments. This system was only used in the last resort. (2) In 1943, the Committee's railway transport passed through a second critical period, chiefly as regards transport to Germany. Up to that time, the ICRC had been able to secure numbers of German wagons, and a fair number of Italian, French and other cars, mainly owing to the volume of commercial traffic between Germany and Italy by way of the Brenner and the St. Gothard. The Swiss Federal Railways were then able to provide the ICRC with German empties returning from Italy through the St. Gothard. In the spring of 1943 difficulties arose, as the result of the air raids on the stations of Milan, Bologna, Verona and Rome. After the capitulation of Italy, the number of German wagons crossing Switzerland became steadily less, and there were no Italian cars available at all. This was at the same time a period of unprecedented need for rolling stock, as thousands of Allied prisoners were being transferred to Germany. At a conference held in Berne, in November 1943, it was found that the shipment of Christmas parcels alone to all the Allied prisoners in Germany would require 1,300 wagons. The Federal Railways could, however, only provide a few dozen. In face of this serious situation, the ICRC urged the Allied Red Cross Societies to send rolling stock to assist in maintaining the supply of relief to Allied PW. It had already made similar appeals, first in 1940 to the British Red Cross, at the time when this Society was establishing its relief programme, and again in 1941, when the ICRC advised the representative of the American Red Cross to make plans for sending American freight-cars, in the event of relief supplies from the United States arriving in still greater quantities. These negotiations were unsuccessful, and as before, the ICRC had to rely wholly on German rolling stock. The confusion which followed the armistice in Italy was, it is true, of short duration, and the situation improved slightly by the end of 1943. Nevertheless, from November 1943 to July 1944, the despatch schedule of supplies was delayed by about two months, on an average. This situation righted itself later, when from June to October shipments from overseas ceased entirely, as the result of the Allied landing in France 1, while shipments from Switzerland to Germany between June and November averaged 900 wagons monthly. (3) In November 1944, a third rail transport crisis occurred and this lasted until the close of hostilities. During this period, the steadily increasing air attacks on the German railway system, in particular on the lines leading to the marshalling yards at Cassel, Leipzig, Berlin and Munich, immobilized or destroyed tens of thousands of wagons; in addition, they caused the loss of loads standing in these yards. The consequences were soon felt in Geneva; owing to the lack of rolling stock, the number of consignments fell rapidly and in December 1944 there was an arrears of 1,700 wagons. In October, supplies from overseas arrived again in Switzerland through the ports of Toulon and Marseilles, which had both been hastily repaired. The line from Marseilles to Geneva, through Lyons, became a bottle-neck, as more than five ships had unloaded simultaneously at Marseilles. In Switzerland, the Committee's warehouses were full, and it was not easy to find other storage room for the mass of supplies arriving in American wagons which had to be returned to France within twenty-four hours of their arrival. On the other hand, the situation of the PW and internees daily became worse, since in view of the concentric attack on the Reich itself, they were being transferred from the frontier districts to the interior of the country. The ICRC dispatched a representative to Berlin, to make a last effort to obtain as many German wagons as possible. In December 1944, the German Railways promised to put 1,000 wagons at the immediate disposal of the ICRC. Despite their undoubted goodwill, the competent authorities were unable to keep their word: instead of one thousand, they supplied only a few dozen. The earlier negotiations with the American, British and Canadian Red Cross Societies now bore fruit, the more so as the Allied Governments felt the need for quick action, if their nationals in Germany were to be saved. These Governments and Red Cross Societies, after consultation with the Transport Division of the Allied High Command, agreed to put rolling stock at the disposal of the ICRC: the American, Canadian and Polish Red Cross Societies undertook to supply motor-trucks1, while the Belgian and French Governments promised railway wagons. The ICRC thereupon drew up a scheme, based on the nationality and number of PW in Germany, the rate of issue desired by the donors, and the stocks available in Switzerland. The Committee asked for at least 2,460 wagons, as from the end of December 1944, or the beginning of January 1945. In February 1945, the French Railways furnished 247 wagons, and the Belgian Railways 71, instead of the promised initial deliveries of 300 and 100 respectively. The remainder was to be delivered by March, but in the meantime the course of events was hastened, and the ICRC would in any case have been unable to use the total number requested. <sup>1 See p. 186. At the beginning of 1945 the camps in North, East, West and Central Germany, as well as those in Upper and Lower Austria, could no longer be reached by rail, owing to the close proximity of the combat areas. The ICRC had therefore to continue its use of railways for transport to Southern Germany (Baden, Wurtemberg and Bavaria), and Western Austria (Vorarlberg and the Tyrol). Here foodstuffs and medicaments were the more urgently required, as the Detaining Power had removed large numbers of PW to these areas and could no longer give them their regular basic rations. The ICRC thereupon decided to send "block-trains" of 20 or 25 wagons each to supply these camps and to build up stocks which could be sent by road to camps near the zone of operations. Negociations with the French National Railways in this connexion were particularly important. Not only were nearly all shipments from North and South America to Central Europe directed across France, but the French départements all despatched large quantities of relief goods to Switzerland, for onward carriage to French PW in Germany. The movement of supplies in the reverse direction was no less heavy, as the ICRC forwarded considerable relief consignments from Switzerland to the camps for Allied PW, civilian internees and others in France; in addition, the shipments which the Committee sent on behalf of the German Red Cross to its delegations overseas had to cross French territory. <sup>1 To this end, the ICRC set up a large depot of foodstuffs at Landeck, at the end of the Arlberg tunnel; road transport left from here for the East. This depot was also used for the feeding of PW in transit. <sup>2 As no official confirmation was given by the Director-General of the Italian Railways, the Committee was obliged, throughout the war, to negotiate with district managers and stationmasters in order to secure the application of Art. 38 in each particular case. No controversy arose in this connection until the close of hostilities. Large quantities of relief supplies, warehoused in Switzerland, were then returned to the donors, since they could not be sent to Germany. The cost of their transport by the French railways was claimed, not from the Comité de la reconnaissance française, but from the French Red Cross, which in turn requested reimbursement from the ICRC. Finally, the donors, after discussions with the Committee, agreed to meet these costs, as they concerned goods which were returned to them. On this occasion, the Ministry for War in Paris agreed to bear the carriage charges for the relief supplies sent by the ICRC to German PW in France. The technical features of rail transport dealt with above relate only to European countries; in others, where the transport The matter was of slight importance until 1943; before that date, the numbers of PW from the Axis countries were relatively low, and the small quantities addressed to them could be sent by post. In 1943, however, the German Red Cross made large consignments of uniforms, games, books, Christmas presents and other goods, while the Italian Red Cross sent considerable quantities of medicaments. The ICRC thereupon applied to the Governments and railway companies in Great Britain, Canada, India, South Africa and Turkey, and to the Government and Red Cross of the United States, for the carriage of these supplies under the terms of Article 38 also. On the other hand, the many attempts made to obtain free transport on the Turkish Railways unfortunately remained unavailing. From the outset a variety of difficulties attended the transit of cases of medicaments and Christmas parcels for German and Italian PW in Egypt, Palestine, India and the Near East. These goods had in fact to pass through Turkey to Mersina, whence they were shipped to their destination, but were often held up at that port. When the German and Italian Red Cross learned of these delays, they ceased to send collective parcels in cases and returned to the system of parcel post. ## (d) Looting, Accidents and Petty Theft. Losses through theft, looting or accident were of different kinds. - (6). Thefts during transit through neutral countries were negligible. The ICRC had only two means of discovering losses: The forwarding of postal packages intended for PW and civilian internees was one of the most important matters before the ICRC throughout the war, firstly, because the parcel post afforded easy and rapid distribution of packages to individual addressees, and secondly, because the free carriage of postal packages was guaranteed by the World Postal Convention signed in Cairo in 1935. This Convention however, could obviously make no provision for the technical problems inherent in the bulk consignment of relief to PW under Art. 38 of the Geneva Convention. These were problems which the ICRC could solve only in close collaboration with the national postal authorities members of the World Postal Union. When any two countries go to war, their direct postal intercommunication is automatically cut. However, since relief supplies were guaranteed to PW, and as most categories of civilian internees eventually shared this benefit, the postal authorities of the countries at war attempted to maintain a regular service through the postal machinery of neutral countries. Thus the transport of postal packages on the continent of Europe depended to a large extent on Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey. rista, soriesterista. 15. (15. ) 15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. ) (15. (15. Postal packages sent to or from the South-East of Europe, the Near East and India had to pass through the Turkish postal system. This traffic consisted of parcels sent in one direction from Italy and Germany to PW and civilian internees in Egypt, Palestine, East Africa and India, and in the other from Allied organizations in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Turkey to PW and civilian internees held in Italy and Germany. The postal authorities sent considerable quantities of goods by this route, which was cut for a few months in 1941, owing to military operations in the Balkans: it was later in use again provisionally, and finally opened to regular traffic from October 1941 until the summer of 1944. ICRC, the National Red Cross Societies sent in statistics at regular intervals, showing the quantity and sometimes the serial numbers of the consignments, as well as the percentage of receipts returned after a reasonable lapse of time. It was thus able to take action when delays and losses exceeded the proportion considered normal in time of war. Delays were due either to congestion in the ports such as Lisbon, Aleppo and Mersina 1, or to the accumulation of goods at the censorship offices. In the first case, the ICRC was, as a rule, able to improve matters by applying to the shipowners and charterers, as well as to Governments who might put shipping space at its disposal. In the second case, however, it had to content itself with making recommendations to the Detaining Power. The problem of theft- became still more complicated, as mentioned above 2. ## (1). General Survey The work of relief was dependent on transport facilities not only by sea and rail, but also by road. The latter even became a major problem after the Allied landing in France. In the reigning total disorder, a transport system capable of supplying food for the millions of detainees in Germany, facing starvation in the camps or on the roads, had to be established within a few weeks. The only way in which the ICRC could reach them was, besides a few "block-trains", by means of fleets of motor-trucks. Earlier, however, the Committee had already been active in this field, as the following brief details will show. Greece. — In Greece, the representatives of the ICRC also needed motor-trucks for the distribution of relief supplies to Allied PW and to the war-disabled of the Greek Army, but these vehicles could not be taken from the park held by the Managing Commission for the feeding of the civilian population 1. The ICRC then applied to the Greek War Relief in New-York, which sent four trucks of Canadian origin for the exclusive use of the ICRC. These trucks were returned to the Greek War Relief in Athens when they were no longer required. France and Germany. — Later, it will be seen how the steps taken by the ICRC to transport overseas relief supplies by road from the Mediterranean to Switzerland enabled it to build up a large fleet of vehicles. These were used in 1945 for conveying food to the camps in Germany. A road service of this kind had already been contemplated in 1943, when the German railway system began to deteriorate. In May 1943, at the request of the British Red Cross, the ICRC asked the German Government to authorize the transport of relief supplies in lorries driven by Swiss personnel. The ICRC requested the British Red Cross to supply the lorries and sent a representative to Great Britain and the United States to discuss the matter with the Red Cross Societies of these countries. In the meantime, it asked the Swiss Army Command for permission to use Swiss trucks, and sought the consent of the German Government. The ICRC counted on Germany's supplying the fuel, in return for the trucks which it would save in this way. But the German Command informed the ICRC that it had not sufficient oil or fuel for these vehicles; other arrangements therefore had to be sought. ### A. Lorries. Foreseeing an interruption of rail traffic in the Rhone Valley, the ICRC in May 1944 proposed to the American Red Cross that motor-trucks be sent to Europe, and asked the United States Legation in Berne to support this motion. Shortly afterwards, the Ministry of Economic Warfare expressed a desire for a road service between Portugal and Switzerland. The ICRC then addressed a definite request for thirty trucks to the American Red Cross. This request was approved, but the ARC advised the Committee in the meantime to use Swiss or Spanish vehicles, for which the U.S.A would supply the tyres, fuel and oil. The ICRC then asked the Spanish Government for the temporary loan of about fifty vehicles, and some fuel. But neither Spain nor Switzerland could offer any lorries. been sent. The first 26 were shipped on the Caritas I, and landed at Barcelona on September 20. These heavy trucks, with ten wheels and a capacity of eight tons, were not able to reach the Spanish frontier with their loads until three months later. A great many formalities and lengthy negotiations were required before the vehicles could be handed over to the ICRC and allowed to take the road. The visas required to enable the Swiss drivers to take over these vehicles were not granted until the end of November. By an agreement signed on September 29, 1944, these trucks were handed over to the ICRC for the transport of PW parcels, after which they were to be returned to the American Red Cross. This Society also assumed all operation expenses and maintenance. The ICRC had originally intended all these vehicles for the transport to Switzerland of the relief supplies unloaded in Portugal or on the Mediterranean. But when the lorries arrived at Geneva, the situation had completely changed. The Committee's ships were again calling at the southern French ports, and from there to Switzerland the railways were sufficiently repaired for a resumption of traffic. On the other hand, the disorganisation of transport in Germany was so great that it threatened to halt the flow of relief to the interior of the country. In January 1945, the German authorities made no further objection to the entry of Red Cross motor convoys to German Northern Germany. — At that time help was not sent from Switzerland alone. After the opening of the maritime route in the North, Lübeck had become the relief-centre for Northern Germany. The Committee's representative in that town was therefore also in urgent need of vehicles in order to transport food to the camps in Prussia. The ICRC could however only make about thirty trucks available to that sector, since the remainder were absolutely essential for its work in South Germany and Austria. The American Red Cross then sent direct to the Committee's representative in Lübeck the trucks which it was able to purchase in Sweden. About fifty of these vehicles were thus transported to Lübeck, in April, on Red Cross ships; moreover, about sixty trucks from America were unloaded there in May. ### B. Fuel. When preparing to use American and Canadian trucks in Germany, the ICRC had to ensure fuel supplies in advance. The Allied High Command in Paris, to which it applied, granted some petrol, which had to be sent from Marseilles and Lyons in tank-wagons. The French Government also promised to deliver 250 litres a day at the frontier close to Geneva. Finally, some of the fuel was sent from Switzerland, through the ICRC, to the supply-centres set up in Germany. Thus, two tank-wagons (i.e. about 36,000 litres of petrol) were sent to Moosburg in March; and tank-lorries also accompanied the convoys. For the Lübeck service the ICRC at the same time sent five lorries carrying petrol in containers. Later, the Lübeck delegation was supplied direct by the Allies. The trucks were reserved at first exclusively for carrying food supplies to Allied prisoners and internees, but it was not long before they were also used for the benefit of deportees, particularly in the case of the trucks assigned to the ICRC by the French Government; the latter hoped in this way to send relief to the civilian workers, whose position was causing it great anxiety. When the war came to an end, the ICRC was authorized to use American trucks for the relief of civilians. The ICRC's trucks were also used to transport people from one camp to another and to repatriate them, and to carry Red Cross mail and correspondence for PW. Before they were sent to Germany, the trucks were used for conveying to Switzerland the goods unloaded at Barcelona, Toulon and Marseilles by the Committee's ships. During this period the ICRC was negotiating for permission to send its trucks into Germany, where the situation was growing more alarming every day. The foodstocks in the camps were inadequate; moreover, the camps in Eastern Germany had been evacuated and the prisoners were being moved westward; during these long marches the meagre provisions with which they set out were soon exhausted. The ICRC delegation in Berlin procured two trucks at the beginning of February, for the emergency relief of these PW columns. The supplies were loaded at the ICRC depots at Lübeck; the lorries thence made their way across Pomerania, leaving depots en route at Demmin, Altburgund (Oflag 63) and especially at Neubrandenburg, which became a distribution centre for the secondary depots (Parchim, Tatarow, etc.), situated along the route traversed by the evacuated prisoners. Any PW picked up on the roads were carried to the hospital at Neubrandenburg. 5,000 strong, had come from the camp at Lamsdorf and was marching towards Bayreuth; the other, 6,000 strong, came from Teschen and was making for Auschwitz. The marching columns were spread over a distance of hundreds of kilometres, and their commanders were ignorant of the exact position of each group. The delegate's car and a motor-cycle were used for frequent reconnaissances. When the convoy located a company, on information from the commanders, the contents of one truck were handed over, against a receipt, to the camp leader and were distributed by him. The operations were carried out at night, when the men were halted. The supplies were distributed between March 9 and 11; each of the prisoners received about 5 kilos of food. %..................................... As already mentioned, the ICRC trucks were also used to carry mail to and from PW and from the Central Prisoners of War Agency. When normal communications were interrupted in August 1944 by the Allied offensive, the ICRC took immediate steps to provide alternative arrangements, with the consent of the Allied authorities and the postal administrations of the countries affected. As it then had no vehicles for the transport of relief, the ICRC acquired a three-ton lorry and organized, at its own expense, a regular service between Geneva, Lyons and Marseilles, for the exclusive carriage of PW and Red Cross mail. After December 1944, an American plane also maintained a regular service between New York and Geneva, solely however ## (4) Organization of Road Transport. In order to protect its trucks as much as possible against air attacks, the Committee had them painted white and placed on them both the cross of the Swiss Confederation and the emblem of the Red Cross, with the initials of the ICRC between However carefully planned, the itinerary laid down in the convoy-leader's instructions had frequently to be modified \*en route\*. The orders of the military authorities and the destruction of roads might at any moment require the trucks to make long détours. Road transport activity, at its peak, required a staff of about 400, twenty-five of whom were convoy-leaders. The drivers were exempt from military service and were furnished with the necessary passports, permits, visas and safe-conducts, together with an armlet bearing the emblem of the ICRC. They carried everything they needed for their own use (sleeping-sacks, blankets, provisions and cooking utensils). Every convoy also had a receiving set, because no warnings were given of isolated air-attacks, which were announced only by wire-less. The ICRC also established a number of depots and distribution centres near the German frontier, at Kreuzlingen and St. Margrethen in particular. These centres had repair shops and lorry parks. The work in Germany itself was divided into two zones by a line running from Berlin to Cassel. The depots in Switzerland, and that at Ravensburg, were the centres for the Southern Zone, while the delegation at Lübeck was responsible for the Northern Zone. Three fleets of trucks, 35 vehicles in all, were attached to the permanent depot at Ravensburg, about 20 kilometres from the Lake of Constance. The parcels were sent by rail from the Committee's warehouses at Geneva and Vallorbe to Ravensburg, and thence were <sup>1 See also p. 87. As from the month of June, the American Red Cross announced its intention of offering to the American Army the vehicles it had lent to the ICRC. As a result, 164 trucks and 137 trailers were assembled at Geneva and made over on July 31, 1945, to the representative of the American Red Cross. The trucks were finally parked in Basle and the trailers in Geneva. In August, 75 trucks left Basle for Paris. Others were sent in different directions (Italy, Jugoslavia and Poland). Many of them were made over to the representatives of the American Red Cross in Europe: five in Denmark, four in Czechoslovakia and seven in Rumania. ### PART III ### EXECUTION OF RELIEF SCHEMES ## Chapter 1 These organizations complied with this advice and as a rule sent standard five-kilogram unaddressed parcels in cases—a new method which was evolved during the war. The censorship of parcels in the camps was very thorough; family parcels were often found to contain prohibited articles, or written and printed messages, which entailed total or partial confiscation. Not all consignments, indeed, were carefully checked on departure, as they were in Great Britain. Here the British Red Cross had organized two big packing centres for family parcels, the larger in London and the other in Glasgow. The Red Cross Societies of the Dominions, in particular those of South Africa and New Zealand, also had centres of this kind. Parcels made up by individuals were sent there and opened, their contents checked with the greatest care, then repacked according to a standard method, and put in sealed mail-bags. Despatch through the post was both uncertain and difficult. The considerable increase in the number of PW in Germany brought about such an influx of letters, parcels, and receipts that the postal censors and distribution departments were often overwhelmed with work. Consignments were held up at some points in transit, and were liable to arrive at their destination several months later, or not at all. It transpired that from 60 to 70 per cent of personal parcels were lost in transit. The postal authorities declined all responsibility, since post-free carriage excluded parcels from registration. Searches by the Committee were therefore confined to enquiries in the camps. The temporary or final suspension of rail transport in different countries further complicated the situation.

---

## Navigation

- Parent: [Books](https://samisdat.in/en/books.md)
- Previous: [A Program for The Jews and An Answer Against All Anti-Semites](https://samisdat.in/en/books/1939%20-%20program%20for%20the%20jews.md)
- Next: [Out of Step: Events in the Two Lives of an Anti-Jewish Camel-Doctor](https://samisdat.in/en/books/1956%20-%20out%20of%20step.md)