The Russian Church Since The Revolution

they .know their people, and the failure of the Bolsheviks , to tear
Christianity out of their hearts is evident; the frontal attack on the Church has
been largely abandoned.

The methods now followed are more sinister, if less direct. In the ''first
place, all training of candidates for the ministry has been rendered impossible;
what will happen when clergy and sacrament alike disappear?</div>'
language: eng
title_sort: Russian Church Since The Revolution, The
calibre_id: '313'
uuid: 6983b327-5b17-4469-9b44-152e30df8230

they .know their people, and the failure of the Bolsheviks , to tear
Christianity out of their hearts is evident; the frontal attack on the Church has
been largely abandoned.

The methods now followed are more sinister, if less direct. In the ''first
place, all training of candidates for the ministry has been rendered impossible;
what will happen when clergy and sacrament alike disappear?</div>'
language: eng
title_sort: Russian Church Since The Revolution, The
calibre_id: '313'
uuid: 6983b327-5b17-4469-9b44-152e30df8230

they
.know their people, and the failure of the Bolsheviks , to tear Christianity out
of their hearts is evident; the frontal attack on the Church has been largely abandoned.

The methods now followed are more sinister, if less direct. In the ''first place, all training of candidates for the ministry has been rendered impossible; what will happen when clergy and sacrament alike disappear?

' language: eng title_sort: Russian Church Since The Revolution, The calibre_id: '313' uuid: 6983b327-5b17-4469-9b44-152e30df8230 --- # The Russian Church since the Revolution BY G. P. FEDOTOFF # LONDON SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE First published 1928 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER # CONTENTS | | Pref. | ACE | - | • | - | - | - | V | |-------------|-----------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|----| | CHAPT
I. | ТНЕ | Revol | UTION | of 191 | 7 AND | тне М | loscow | | | | 501 | BOR | - | - | - | - | - | 9 | | II. | SEPAR | MOITA | ог Сн | URCH A | AND STA | TE - | - | 20 | | III. | THE | Persec | UTION ( | of Re | LIGION | - | • | 32 | | IV. | $T_{\text{HE}}$ | "Reno | VATION | " Ѕсн | ISM - | - | - | 51 | | V. | THE | Inner | Life o | F THE | Ortho | рож Сн | URCH - | 80 | | | Appr | NDIX | - | - | - | . • | - | 94 | # PREFACE AFTER a total suspension of news from Russia lasting between twenty-four and forty-eight hours, news reached England of the Revolution and the abdication of the Tsar. I remember going to my club and witnessing the enthusiasm of the members: "Have you heard the glorious news from Russia?" My suggestion that it was a great disaster was received with pitying incredulity, and for months afterwards the censorship imposed upon the Press the obligation of "writing up" the Revolution. Three months later, in a postcript to Birkbeck and the Russian Church (S.P.C.K., 1917), I attempted to appraise the effect on the Church of the great change in its position. But neither I nor any other individual at that time could foresee the extent of the catastrophe or could believe that it presaged the most ferocious attack upon Christianity that the world has ever seen. The surviving Bishops of Russia generally speak with quiet confidence of the future—they know their people, and the failure of the Bolsheviks to tear Christianity out of their hearts is evident; the frontal attack on the Church has been largely abandoned. The methods now followed are more sinister, if less direct. In the first place, all training of candidates for the ministry has been rendered impossible; what will happen when clergy and sacrament alike disappear? That brings me to the final consideration. What is the nature of the force which is making this relentless attack, not only on Christianity, but against the very idea of God, in widely different quarters of the globe—Russia, Turkey, Mexico? In what other countries will the same attack appear? That it is in a very real sense supernatural is abundantly clear. Is it the coming of Antichrist? And if so, how will our portion of the Christian family sustain the attack? Are we prepared, like our Russian brothers and sisters, to lay down our lives, if need be, for Him Who bought us with His precious Blood? Monsieur Fedotoff was educated in the University # PREFACE of Petrograd and was subsequently professor of Medieval History in the Universities of Saratoff and Petrograd. He remained in Russia till 1925, and speaks, therefore, with a very complete knowledge of eight years of the great persecution. He belongs to that section of the Russian Church in exile which is gathered round the Metropolitan Eulogie in Paris, and sees things from that point of view; he is now teaching in the Russian Theological Institute in that city. He may be regarded, therefore, as a competent and trustworthy witness, and he writes with moderation and restraint. I trust his little work will have a wide circulation in this country. ATHELSTAN RILEY. PENTECOST, 1928. # CHAPTER I THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 AND THE MOSCOW SOBOR The second reason for the Church's undisturbedly accepting the revolution lay in the fact that the moral breakdown of the régime during the last few years had touched the Church in its weakest place. It was a secret to no one that the appointment of bishops, even the very membership of the Holy Synod, was effected by the influence of Rasputin, who was all-powerful at Court. Such a lowering of the position of the Church was unbearable even to the most fanatical defenders of the autocracy among the bishops, such as Hermogen and Theophan. had canonical authority for this. The Ober-procuror of the old régime represented in the Church the sacred person of the Tsar. The dependence of the Church upon an entirely non-ecclesiastical, liberal, and republican (becoming more and more socialistic) government was a paradox, offensive to ecclesiastical conceptions, even though perhaps politically unavoidable. These events, the hard hand of the Ober-procuror and the appearance of class antagonism within the clergy, seriously dampened the joy of regained freedom for the Church, which so many Othodox people experienced during the first days of the revolution. This movement, just mentioned above, contained the seed of the future Church schism. The revolution penetrated the life of the nation, taking on more and more the appearance of anarchy. It became clear that, for the army, the chief meaning of the overthrow lay in the conclusion of peace, regardless of cost. Peasants seized the land of the landlords, in some places killing the proprietors. Workmen demanded the nationalization of factories. In the cities mobs of deserters in soldiers' uniforms reigned; murders, robberies, crimes of all sort were committed throughout the country practically without punishment. In the midst of the general breakdown, the Communist Party, headed by Lenin, pressed forward for the seizure of authority, promising to the masses peace, land, and bread. It was in such circumstances that the elections to the All Russian Church "Sobor" (Council) took place. The Russian Church had had no Sobor during the whole period of the Empire, the last Sobor being in 1666. The restoration of the conciliar basis in the Church had long been the watchword of liberals and Slavophiles, and corresponded with the deepest conceptions of the Church. In 1905 the Emperor, making a concession to certain Church circles, recognized the necessity of calling a general Sobor of the Russian Church. The organizing committee worked for many years, but before long it became clear that the object of the bureaucracy was to bury the Sobor, in which it saw dangers of liberalism. As a matter of fact, when the elections to the Sobor took place, in the summer of 1917, the general attitude of Orthodox Russia was rather conservative, among the peasants as well as in the broad mass of the "bourgeoisie" and nationally inclined intelligentzia. The Sobor opened in Moscow on August 15, 1917. The "left" group in the Church, represented by priests and professors of the Theological Academies, found itself greatly in the minority. The balance was on the side of the moderate and right. It would be wrong to assert that the Sobor was controlled by the "right," headed by the well-known Anthony Khrapovitsky, Archbishop of Kharkoff, formerly of Volhynia. The influence of this bishop, one of the most learned and talented in the Russian Church, was of course great, but the dominating influence unquestionably belonged to the centre, led by a group of devoted laymen, such as Professor S. N. Bulgakoff (now a priest) and Professor E. N. Trubetzkoy (deceased), well-known philosophers and This is the attitude of Professor B. V. Titlinoff in his book, "The Church during the Revolution," pp. 68 and 91-92. Petrograd, 1924. theologians of the new school. As regards both Church and politics, they must be placed among the moderate liberals, near to the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadet). The bishops in the Sobor, more inclined to the right, found support in the peasants, whose representation gave democratic character to the Sobor. Certainly there was a wide gulf between the conservative, Orthodox peasants and those who at that time were burning the estate houses of the gentry. The Sobor sat for a long time, adjourning in the fall of 1918, in the midst of the fighting of the Civil War, with its work unfinished. However, it delineated and in part effected a broad programme of reform in Church administration which reflects a spirit of moderate liberalism. The principal results were the democratizing of the parish administrations, the drawing of laymen into active participation in Church life, such as in the selection of their pastors, and the establishment of the conciliar basis in the higher Church administration. Many of these ecclesiastical reforms failed of realization because of the beginning of Communist persecution of the Church. But the principal achievement of the Sobor was unquestionably the restoration of the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate in Russia, it will be remembered, was abandoned by Peter the Great, and replaced by the Holy Synod, consisting of bishops appointed by the Tsar. Before the revolution the idea of the restoration of the Patriarchate was supported in episcopal circles by those who longed for Church independence. This movement was stimulated largely by Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitzky, and was not popular among the liberals. The defenders of "sobornostj" (conciliarity) feared that in the person of the Patriarch there would be a despotic head for the Church. But in the fall of 1917 the situation was such that the idea of a Patriarch united practically the whole of Orthodox Russia. In the Government there was little authority, and the Church without question faced a bitter cup of adversity. In a year of general turmoil it was necessary to put the care of the Church in strong hands, to find leaders around whom it would be possible to unite persecuted Orthodoxy. The October (November) Revolution obliged the Sobor to hasten the election of the Patriarch. The solemn ceremony of election took place to the thunder of cannon, for the Bolsheviks were bombarding the Kremlin, which was defended by a band of junkers remaining loyal to the Provisional Government. Three candidates were chosen by ballot, and of these one was to be elected by lot. The Sobor left the final selection to the will of God, and a revered staretz—a monk honoured by the whole of Moscow—drew from the urn the name of Tikhon (Belavin), the Metropolitan of Moscow. Anthony, who was the favourite candidate for the Patriarchate, and who even received a majority of votes in the ballot, was disappointed in his expectations. The one on whom the lot fell had in no way been distinguished among the bishops, either by learning or by oratory, by asceticism or by political influence. Modest and unassuming, he conquered everyone who knew him by his goodness and amiability. Several years of service in America had broadened his ad- ministrative experience, but he remained above all a humble and simple pastor of the humility-loving Russian Church. It would have been difficult for the Church to find a better representative of her real spiritual character. Doubtless this accounts for the extraordinary love of the people for the Patriarch. However, the principal factor lay not in these decrees, but rather in the general atheistic ideology ing faith in God, planting envy, greed, and rapaciousness." "The Russian nation is being destroyed by this demoniacal godlessness." And it was not a personal act, nor did the Patriarch Tikhon take upon himself the rôle of leader of counter-revolution when, entirely in the spirit of this proclamation of the Sobor, he placed an anathema on the Bolsheviks for "persecuting the Truth of Christ, for daily and in beastly manner destroying entirely innocent people." Recounting the numerous acts of violence against the Church, the Patriarch called the faithful "to rise up in defence of the insulted and oppressed Church, even to suffer for the cause of Christ if necessary." This famous proclamation of the Patriarch is dated January 19, 1919. In order correctly to assess its meaning, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that in it the "Bolsheviks" are not definitely mentioned, that excommunication from the Church was passed not upon definite individuals or groups of individuals, but upon "the outcast of mankind." Yet it was not difficult to surmise whom the Patriarch had in mind. He openly spoke of the power which "displayed unrestrained self-will and continuous violence against everyone." This indefinite excommunication could not have strict canonical effect. On no occasion did any priest refuse the sacraments of the services to Communists who turned to the Church (and there were such, especially among the soldiers). The "anathema" of the Patriarch was in fact only the energetic expression of religious and moral condemnation. And in this judgment the entire Russian Church stood behind the Patriarch. In 1918, however, the Church no longer represented the whole Russian people. Against the background of the terrible events taking place in the Civil War, the activities of the Sobor remained comparatively unnoticed by the broad masses of the people. Several times suspending its work and having by no means finished it, the Sobor adjourned in the fall of 1918, placing upon the Patriarch Tikhon the heavy burden of authority in the Church, at the moment of the very sharpest revolutionary crisis. # CHAPTER II # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE The decree regarding the separation of Church and State was published on January 23, 1918. It consisted of thirteen articles, the major part of which only defined the status necessarily consequent upon the new secularized form of government. In principle it proclaimed freedom of conscience and freedom of faith. Article 2 stated: "Within the confines of the Republic it is forbidden to pass any local laws, or issue decrees, which may hinder or limit the freedom of conscience." Article 3 stated: "Every citizen may confess any religion or may confess no religion; every loss of legal rights connected with the confessing of any faith or confessing of no faith is abolished." Article 5 stated: "The free practice of religious ceremonies is guaranteed in so far as it does not interfere with social order." Nevertheless, the decree did not consistently sustain this liberal attitude. Four of its articles encroached upon essential rights of the Church, binding its activities hand and foot. Article 13 proclaimed all property of the churches and of church societies to be the possession of the people. Article 11 forbade "obligatory collections and assessments on behalf of church societies." And Article 12 reads: "No church or religious societies have the right to possess # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE property. They do not have the right of juridical persons." In accordance with the wording of the last article, all economic activities of the parishes were in fact rendered impossible. They could not have a regular budget, could not prepare estimates (e.g., for repair of buildings), did not have even the right of assessing themselves. Article 13 appropriated from the churches even church buildings and church vessels, although the nationalization procedure was circumscribed by the following limitation: "Buildings and objects used specifically for purposes of worship shall be assigned by special decree of the local or central authorities for free use by the respective religious societies." The indefinite wording of this article threatened even the conducting of Church services, and made men fear the worst: What if the organs of Government should refuse to issue the necessary decrees of assignment? And, finally, the greatest anxiety was created by Article 9, which encroached even on the spiritual activity of the Church. "The school is separated from the Church. Religious instruction is forbidden in all government and public schools, as well as in private schools where general educational subjects are taught. Citizens may teach and be taught religion privately." This article forbade even private, voluntary religious instruction in the school, which parents' committees everywhere insisted upon. On the very day of the publishing of the decree, January 23, the Central Committee of the All-Russian Union of Parents' Organizations proclaimed the prohibition of religious teaching to be " contrary to the principle of the autonomy of the Russian school and a negation of the true freedom of conscience." In January, 1918, however, the faithful found all other troubles secondary in face of anxiety for the fate of the churches and of religious services. Did not the decree regarding the separation of Church and State actually imply the closing of the churches? A few days before its publication, an order was issued for the requisition of the Alexander-Nevsky Lavra, in Petroprad, the principal monastery of the capital. # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE the Sobor addressed a proclamation to the "Orthodox people": "Unite all of you, men and women, old and young for the defence of our inherited Sacred Things . . . for the people's rulers seek to despoil the people of this heritage of God. . . . It is better to shed one's blood and to become worthy of a martyr's crown than to surrender the Orthodox faith ^1 Tserhovnia Viedomosti, No. 3-4, 1918. Quoted by Titlinoff, op. cit. # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE is contained in the "Black Book," edited by A. A. Valentinoff. Most pitiful of all was the fate of the monasteries. ^1 Published in Paris, 1925. Also an English edition, 1924, bearing the title "The Assault of Heaven," and a German edition. ^2 Isvestia Vsik (Official organ of the Soviet Government). Moscow, No. 78 (1815), 1923. ^\* Pravda [Official organ of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party]. Moscow, No. 117, May 30, 1923. # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE by Saint Seraphim. The revenue from pilgrims stopping at the monastery hostels has saved these sacred places from the general fate of being closed and destroyed. # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE the dictatorship of the party. We shall see later that the Communist party combines in its ideology struggle against capitalism and struggle against God. By a certain inconsistency, the authorities tolerate the existence of a few theological schools, or, rather, courses for the preparation of priests. Up to 1923 the Theological Institute in Petrograd, the successor of the closed Theological Academy, continued to work. The terror of 1923, however, caused it to close its doors. Subsequently modest pastoral courses were opened. The schismatic "Renovated" Church has three higher schools, in Moscow, Petrograd, and Kiev. If one leaves aside the Renovated Church, the most likely explanation for the existence of the Petrograd Courses (incidentally, with very few students and limited in its activities) is the desire of the authorities to control the attitude of the church intelligentzia. There is little need to say that printed defence of the faith is impossible. Not in principle but in practice the censor forbids the issuing of any books of religious content. Exceptions, and those very rare, are made for the sectarians and Renovated Church. In spite of numerous applications, the Church has not yet been permitted even to print Gospels, prayer-books, or indispensable liturgical books. Printing in the Church Slavonic language is altogether prohibited. Furthermore, the authorities have taken every possible measure for the destruction of the old religious literature. In the nationalized bookshops and stockrooms of publishing houses great quantities of such literature were seized and sent to the paper factories or sold by weight in various localities for use as wrapping paper by market tradesmen. In the course of this operation a large number of scientifically valuable works were lost, such as the editions of the "Palestine Society" and of the theological academies. In all the public libraries, except for the universities and the Central Government library, books on religion were confiscated, together with a great quantity of philosophical, historical, sociological, and even artistic literature. # SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE evidence of this. It may be noted further that the struggle against idealism, in the mind of the convinced Communist, draws from the same source as his struggle against religion: idealism is potentially religious, very refined, but a no less dangerous form of mystical contagion. # CHAPTER III #### THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION | White clerg | y (priests) | ••• | | `••• | 2,691 | | |-------------|---------------|-------|-----|------|----------------|--| | Monks | | ranks | | ••• | 1,962
3,447 | | | Nuns and o | ther ordained | | ••• | ••• | | | | | | | | 1 | 8,100 | | None of these figures pretend to accuracy. However, the undisputed fact that mass executions of the clergy took place does not exhaust the evidence of persecution against the Church. These terrible figures do not constitute the largest sums in the ^1 Cf. Melgunoff, "The Red Terror in Russia." Berlin, 1924. ² Taken from P. N. Miliukoff, "Russia in Transformation," I., p. 194. Paris, 1927. bloody totals. According to approximate data of the Denikin Commission for the same period, there were 6,775 professors and teachers, 8,800 doctors, etc., in the general figure of 1,716,118 (!) killed. The bloody machine of the terror was not instituted against the Church alone, and other professions from among the intelligentzia gave even larger numbers of victims. Another evasion of the charge of persecution is attempted by raising the question of political motives necessitating the terror—i.e., the possibility of political guilt of the clergy. Knowing the loyalty of the clergy to the Tsarist régime, it was easy to reach the conviction that ministers of the Church had to play an outstanding part in the "White" counter-revolutionary movement. However, this supposition is entirely erroneous. In actual fact, in the territory of the White governments, the clergy, especially the bishops, blessed and inspired the troops, but these representatives of the Church, who took a definite side in the Civil War, for the most part evacuated Russia along with the defeated White troops in 1920. What we see in the interior of Red Russia is something quite different. Here, after the first wrathful gestures of the Sobor and the Patriarch in the beginning of 1918, a change set in, not, however, in the attitude towards the anti-religious revolution, but in establishing practical relationships with it. As early as March, 1919, the representatives of the Sobor conducted negotiations with the authorities to secure possible favourable interpretation of the decree for the Church. The popular movement in defence of # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION the Church was not so powerful as the leaders of the Church had hoped. Soon they understood that they could not speak in the name of one hundred million Orthodox, that the former Orthodox peasant Russia in its broad masses had been won over by the Communist Revolution. The leaders of the Church soon understood the hopelessness of open struggle and the danger of bringing the Church under heavy fire, possibly endangering even the holding of services of worship. According to Orthodox conceptions, the cult so completely embraces the public service of the Church, that for its preservation the leaders were ready to make great sacrifices. We shall see when we speak of the internal life of the Church, that this line of conduct was dictated by purely religious, mysticoascetic conceptions—conceptions inherent to Orthodoxy renewed by the regenerated Church. We have one very valuable impression of the political attitude of the Patriarch in the summer of 1918, belonging to a witness who unquestionably commands confidence, Prince G. N. Trubetzkoy, the former Russian minister in Serbia. Five years after this date, at the time of the trial of the Patriarch, he made the following statement to the Vienna representative of the telegraph agency Russpress: "As a worker in the White Movement, I visited the Patriarch Tikhon and asked him to send his blessing to the White armies, secretly if necessary. I was expected to convey his blessing to the Don, and I guaranteed that this secret would not be disclosed. I endeavoured to persuade the Patriarch to do this, for the reason that his blessing would greatly raise the morale of the troops. But the Patriarch was unmov- able, and even in this decisive moment did not alter his conviction that the clergy must stand outside politics and political struggle." In a letter to the editor of the Russian newspaper Rul, published in Berlin, July 17, 1923, the Prince inserted into this interview the following correction, still further emphasizing the non-political attitude of the Patriarch: "I did not ask the permission of the Patriarch to give his blessing to the troops of the Volunteer Army. . . . I requested the permission of His Holiness to give in his name a blessing personally to one of the outstanding leaders of the White Movement, under condition of maintaining absolute secrecy. However, the Patriarch did not find even this possible, so strongly did he hold himself aloof from any sort of politics." On the first anniversary of the October Revolution (October 21, 1918), the Patriarch addressed a long communication to the Soviet of People's Commissars. Recounting all the misdeeds of the Bolsheviks against the people and the Church, the Patriarch concluded with the remarkable words: "It is not for us to judge earthly powers; all authority from God would draw unto itself our blessing if it were in truth the 'servant of God,' for 'rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil' (Rom. xiii. 3). However, to you who use your power for the persecution and the destruction of the innocent, we issue our word of admonition: celebrate the anniversary of your coming to power by the release of the imprisoned, the cessation of blood letting, of violence, of ruination, of restraint of faith; turn not to destruction but to the construction of order and law; give to the people the respite from Rul (Berlin Russian daily), No. 798. July 17, 1923. civil warfare which they have longed for and deserved. For otherwise the blood will be on your own head. 'For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' (Matt. xxvi. 52)." Despite the vigour and sharpness of this remonstrance, it is easy to see in it the patriarch's recognition of the Bolsheviks as de jure in authority. In the fifteenth century the Metropolitan Philip of Moscow similarly admonished Ivan the Terrible, yet without calling for revolt against him as Tsar. It was the admonition of a pastor, not the proclamation of a political enemy. A year later, in 1919, in an encyclical dated September 25, the Patriarch imposed on the priesthood responsibility for keeping aloof from the Civil War. "I remember how we," continued Prince Trubetzkoy, "standing at that time close to the Volunteer Army in Southern Russia, were distressed over the epistle of the Patriarch; but, subsequently, I could not help but admire his wise restraint. Whereever bishops and priests conducted prayers for the victorious advance of the Volunteer Army, the clergy shared the fate of this army and were obliged hastily to abandon their parishes, to the great detriment of the Church." This brings us back to the question of the counterrevolutionary crimes of the clergy. So far as records are available, they show that in practically every instance where punishment was imposed for political offence, it was on account of conducting prayers for the White Guards. But was it possible for a simple priest to refuse the passing troops their natural de- ¹ Cf. "The Assault of Heaven." mand to dedicate their advance with prayers? Not all the priests after this "crime" abandoned their parishes for safety with the retreating White Army. Many remained for torture and death. As for the Reds, no prayers were requested; they got along without the blessing of the Lord. In the majority of cases the priests were arrested and shot without guilt of any sort. They succumbed along with the "hostage" bourgeoisie, along with the landowners, merchants, barristers, and other representatives of the liberal professions and political parties. The terror which the Communist Party conducted had not a personal, but class character, in accordance with the spirit of Marxist philosophy. "We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class," writes Latzis, one of the leading workers in the Tchéka, in the "Weekly Gazette" of the Extraordinary Commission. "In drawing up evidence, do not look for incriminating material to prove that the person under prosecution acted by deed or word against the Soviet power. The first question which you must ask him is, what is his ancestry, education, or profession. These questions must determine the fate of the accused. Therein lies the meaning and the essence of the Red terror." The priests perished as representatives of the "bourgeoisie," a category corresponding to the "aristocracy" of the French Revolution. Is there evidence which would allow us to say that the keen edge of the Red terror was directed against them with especial hatred? I believe that one may answer this question affirmatively. The evidence regarding Voro- ^1 Quoted from Miliukoff, op. cit., pp. 187-188. # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION bieff, President of the Tchéka in Perm, may be applied not to him alone. His secretary gave evidence in a deposition to the French Lieutenant, Adrian Souberbiel (February 10, 1919): "Toward the clergy, Vorobieff's attitude was that of hatred, and he called them 'black magpies.' I can confirm that he shot many priests and monks."1 Quoted from "The Assault of Heaven." There is evidence of special hatred toward the Church in those tortures and "qualified" executions which in some places were inflicted on the clergy. We have information regarding the most beastly cruelty, which we are not yet in a position to confirm. Nevertheless, the bodies of the executed which were exhumed and photographed by the Whites confirm the most awful rumours and testimonies. We are told of a case of impaling in Poltava, as in Kherson of a priest who was hung on a cross, etc. An English diplomatic agent reported to his Government that Andronik, Bishop of Perm, was buried alive. There is no need to say more. This hatred toward the clergy on the part of the Tchéka officials completely harmonizes with confirmed instances of the most cynical sacrilege in the churches, especially those occupied by the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. However, the question of persecution of the Church is less to be decided by various, although numerous, cases of violence, than by the avowed character of the entire system, by the spirit of Bolshevism. Russian Communism makes the struggle with religion one of its chief objectives. In the "Programme of the Communists," Bukharin says: "Faith in God is a reflection of the most abominable of earthly relationships—faith in slavery." Every member of the Party is required to conduct anti-religious propaganda. For observing Church ceremonies (marriage, baptizing of children) he may be excluded from the Party. The same objective stands before the Comsomol (the Communist Youth Association). (Paragraph 5 of the Section concerning Political-Educational Work of the ¹ Melgunoff, op. cit. # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION Russian Comsomol.) The programme accepted at the Third Congress, October 2, 1920, reads as follows: "Rearing its members to be convinced Communists, the Russian Comsomol conducts an ideological struggle with the religious plague which is consuming the young generation of workers and aids the representatives of the bourgeoisie to deceive the people." The reference here is not to the Church as connected with the old régime and not to one or another religious organization, but to the very principle of religious faith, which is so hateful to Communism. "We must act so that every blow to the traditional structure of the church, to the clergy, etc., will be turned into a blow against religion in general." "Even to the blind it is clear to what extent a decisive struggle is necessary against the priests, whether they call themselves pastors, abbots, rabbis, patriarchs, mullahs, or the pope; and similarly it is inevitable that at a certain stage this struggle must be carried on as a struggle against God, whether He is called Jehovah, Jesus, Buddha, or Allah." Thus writes one of the inaugurators of the anti-religious struggle, the old Marxist, L. Stepanoff. To be sure, this attitude toward religion is no novelty in Marxism. The renowned phrase, "Religion is opium for the people," which is written large on the wall of the City Hall opposite the shrine of the Iversky Virgin, is a quotation from Marx. But in none of the European socialist parties or groupings has the struggle against religion 1 N. Bukharin, "Programma Kommunistoff," p. 51. ^{\* &}quot;Purposes and Methods of Anti-Religious Propaganda," pp. 18-37. Moscow, 1923. During the Civil War the Bolsheviks had little time for the Church. While by no means hiding their attitude towards it, and working off their hatred by persecuting individual priests, organizing lectures (Spitzberg, Lunacharsky), etc., they did not undertake the struggle on a broad programme. Leaving the Patriarch in freedom, they even seemed to forgive # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION At the end of 1918 there began a move of exposing relics, carried out under especially imposing circumstances, for the sake of publicity. Photographs, even cinema films, were taken of the certain occasions, where exposure was made by priests and monks forcibly set to the task. In the majority of the coffine there were found simply bones or dummies of padding stuffed in canvas to resemble a human body. It seemed that the religious deception was unmasked in plain sight. But the Bolsheviks were mistaken in their reckonings. Everywhere the desecration of coffins brought forth an explosion of religious feeling. There was no open opposition, but legends of new miracles were born and spread throughout Russia. They told of Commissars destroyed by heavenly anger, of disturbed saints appearing to haunt the ungodly, of real relics being miraculously hid, so as not to be given up to the enemy, and in place of themselves leaving only the few bones which the investigators discovered. Above all, in some places the relics were found actually to be in the condition of mummified bodies. Such bodies were transferred to Moscow to the Museum of Hygiene (!), apparently for the purpose of rooting out the superstition; but even here they were made objects of reverence on the part of Orthodox visitors. The exposure of relics was the sharpest form of anti-religious propaganda during the first period of the revolution. So long as military Communism was conducting the struggle at the front in the Civil War, cultural life in Russia remained comparatively free, however strange this may seem at first glance. This refers to the Church, to the universities, to the Press, etc. It is true that there was no political Press except that of the Government, but religious, philosophical, and scientific publications were not suppressed by the military censorship, which was the only one that existed during these years. "N.E.P." put an end to this, however. Partly emancipating the peasantry and ^{1 &}quot; New Economic Policy." # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION In the schools they demanded that the teachers actively participate in the propagation of godlessness. On the great holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, special lectures were given to explain to the children the superstitious and pagan sources of Christian ceremonies and beliefs. Tiny children being brought up in Government "children's homes" were instilled with atheism as the official symbol of faith. Here is an example of a picture from life printed in the *Pravda*, June 4, 1923 (No. 242), regarding an incredible voting which took place in the children's home in Krementchug. "Who believes that there is a God, raise his hand." Up come three, four, seven . . . two are dropped. "Who is against God?" Up comes a forest of hands. A cheerful cry: "Hurrah. God hast lost." It was at Christmas, 1922, that the Comsomol first brought its atheist propaganda out on the street, endeavouring, with its sacrilegious carnival, to insult the religious feelings of Christians. In all the chief cities # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION of Russia, parades were organized as parodies of the Orthodox sacred processions. A Soviet semi-official correspondent picturesquely describes the "Comsomol Christmas" in Moscow in the following manner: "The God-fearing Moscow population saw a rare spectacle. From the Sadowa to the Place of the Revolution there stretched an unending procession of gods and heathen priests. It was a splendid method for learning about this thousand-year-old fanaticism. Here was a yellow Buddha with short feet and hands giving the blessing, squinting and exhaustingly roguish; and the Babylonian Marduk, the Orthodox Virgin, Chinese bonzes, and Catholic priests, the Roman Pope in his yellow tiara, giving the blessing to new adepts; a Protestant pastor on a high pole; Russian priests in typical stoles, offering for a small price to marry anybody. And here a monk sitting on a black coffin with exposed relics. He is praising his wares for possible purchasers. A student from Sverdloff Communist University splendidly acts a comedy of priestly greediness. We need no rabbis! We need no priests! Down with the bourgeoisie! Down with the kulaks!"2 Similar mockery took place all over Russia. Here and there the celebration was concluded by burning the "gods," as in Tiflis, where the day was made the occasion for turning over the former military cathedral to the Comsomol. The population, and not only the faithful, looked upon this hideous carnival with dumb ¹ Izvestia Vaik. January 10, 1923. The "tight-fisted," the popular name for well-to-do peasants, horror. There were no protests from the silent streets—the years of terror had done their work—but nearly everyone tried to turn off the road when it met this shocking procession. I, personally, as a witness of the Moscow carnival, may certify that there was not a drop of popular pleasure in it. The parade moved along empty streets and its attempts at creating laughter or provocation were met with dull silence on # THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGION But Drews is too heavy an instrument for the masses. For them, and especially for youth, there is published a "comic" magazine "Bezbojnik (Godless)." It is hard to conceive of anything more insipid or wretched than this "humour." The talentless pictures with unending similarity give constantly the same sort of caricatures of Jehovah, Christ, the Virgin, and the titles constantly emphasize that these "Gods" are in the service of the bourgeoisie. A crude pornography runs through this impious literature. There can be no doubt regarding the purpose of the governing power in Russia. It is endeavouring to 49 D # CHAPTER IV # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM THE new religious policy of the Communist power has not been limited to the spread of atheistic propaganda. As regards the Orthodox Church, efforts have even been made to rupture it from within—and in part successfully. In the spring of 1922 a schism took place in the Church which even up to the present divides it into two, although unequal, parts. In order to understand this so-called "Living Church" or "Renovated Church" schism it is necessary to make certain explanations. Up to the present time the minutes of the councils of the central organs of the Communist Party on Church questions have not been published, so we do not know who is principally responsible for inspiring the religious policy of the Party. But so far as the views of the leaders find expression in the Party Press, we note two points of view. One, which we may call doctrinaire, struggles with religion as such, with every sort of religion, making no distinction between religious forms. For Communists of this type, rationalistic and democratic confessions seem the most dangerous, because they are more deceptive for the masses. "No compromise with religion" is their watchword. The other type may be called opportunists, they recognize the energy alive in religious "prejudices," and desire to root them out step by step; for these the change from Orthodox conservative forms of religion to more free or sectarian forms is considered desirable. They maintain, for instance, that Protestantism and the rationalistic sects are stages in the wearing out of Christianity, and are willing to grant them comparative support. The Baptists in Russia received from Lenin himself the privilege of free preaching, and even special Red passports, guaranteeing them this privilege. The same refers to certain other sects, Seventh Day Adventists, Pashkovites, and others. # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM Such, approximately, was the trend of thought which, in 1922, led the Party to the staging of a Church revolution. This was a victory of the opportunists over the doctrinaires, although for the Church it brought a new wave of terror. It is not without reason that from this time on, Church policy is directed not from the Commissariat of Justice but from the terrible G.P.U. (the new name of the Tchéka). At the head of the ecclesiastical section of this institution there was placed a mysterious person, hitherto unknown, a certain Tutchkoff, who at the present time occupies in Russia the position of secret, so to speak underground (similar to all the institutions of the G.P.U.), Ober-procuror of the Russian Church. But neither the G.P.U. nor the Party was able openly to take upon itself the organizing of the Church revolution. It was not so much the constitutional freedom of conscience as the atheistic ethics of the Party which made any participation in the reformation of the Church impossible for them. For this they found other people. We have already acquainted ourselves with the democratic movement in the clergy and with its failures in the Moscow Sobor. Remaining in the minority, the clerical democrats did not leave the Church but worked in it, without meeting opposition, in spite of the conservative attitude of the majority. Those siding with Communist social principles were able to advance their ideas from church pulpits, especially in the workingmen's sections. Such a person was the priest Boyarsky in Petrograd. His Christian Communism did not hinder him from being a professor in the Theological We do not know the moment of formation of this unnatural union of Church reformers with atheists which appeared in the open in the spring of 1922. Did the Communists support a movement spontaneously arising within the Church, or did they themselves project it, in collaboration with revolutionary churchmen? The latter seems the more likely (in certain particulars) but, as I must repeat, we have no direct evidence of this. As is well known, the occasion for the schism was the terrible famine of 1921-1922 and the related # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM It must be noted that the notion of private property had by no means died out, in spite of the abortive attempt of Communism, and both the population generally and the authorities felt that the ikons and sacred vessels, as heretofore, belonged to the Church. On February 23 a resolution was passed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to proceed with the confiscation of church treasures and to transfer them to the organs of the Commissariat of Finance for aiding the famine-stricken. The Patriarch replied to this decree by his encyclical of February 28, in which he stated: "We call upon faithful followers of the Church even at the present moment to make such contributions, desiring only that these contributions may be the response of a loving heart to the needs of a neighbour, only that they may actually provide real help to our suffering brothers. But we cannot approve the withdrawal from the churches, even though it be by voluntary contribution, of the sacred objects, whose use for other than services of worship is forbidden by the canons of the Œcumenical Church, and is punishable as sacrilege—laymen by excommunication, ordained persons by dismissal from Orders." This epistle clearly forbade the clergy to turn over church sacred objects to agents of the Government. Evidently, however, the authorities consciously sought conflict, desiring to discredit the Church in the eyes of the people. The conditions laid down by the Patriarch, in the absence of a free Press, remained unknown to the broad masses. To show up the Church as the enemy of the suffering and dying population was more advantageous to the Communists than, in agreement with the Church, to receive the treasures which they demanded. The confiscation was effected throughout Russia (principally by tearing off the precious metals and jewels from ikons), but led to the opposite results. For the first time since the events of early 1918, the masses showed readiness to defend the things they held sacred. The people, who had permitted the desecration of relics, rose in defence of ikons. Yet there was no general revolt. Crowds of # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM people surrounded the churches, hindering the commissions from carrying away the treasures, in some places making use of fists and stones. The priest Krasnitzky, at the trial of the Petrograd Metropolitan Benjamin, stated that there were 1,414 local cases of sanguinary excesses. The decree was carried out in full, yet the robbing of the churches gave the People's Commissariat of Finance altogether only 23,997 puds of silver, and a certain quantity of gold and jewels — a figure which the official organ recognized as ridiculously small. The wealth of the Church turned out to be a myth. But the "sanguinary excesses" claimed still more bloody victims than fell in the local disturbances. In each city in Russia court trials were begun. Thousands of priests, bishops, and laymen were brought to trial before revolutionary tribunals, now held in public as distinguished from the trials of 1918-1920. Everywhere death sentences were passed. Scores of executions mark this fatal summer (1922) for the Church. In the Moscow trial, which took place in May and resulted in eleven death sentences, the Patriarch gave evidence as a witness. As the author of the February epistle, he asked that all the guilt might be borne by himself. As a result he was deprived of liberty (confined in a monastery) and remanded for trial. This was the moment which the revolutionary group in the clergy used for revolt. ¹ Pravda, No. 110, 1922. Moscow. 8 Isvestia Vsik. December 19, 1922. Moscow The figures when put into English weight equivalents are, approximately: gold, 993 lbs.; silver, 823,267 lbs.; pearls, 10 lbs.; platinum, etc., 2,971 lbs.; diamonds, etc., 1,313 carats. From the very beginning of the campaign, the Petrograd group came out openly, in meetings and in newspapers, in favour of the confiscation of the treasures on behalf of the famine-stricken. The priest Vvedensky spoke with passionate eloquence, winning over a great many. Certainly the conscience of many of the faithful was torn by conflicting claims. They wanted to contribute, but were indignant at enforced confiscation. They gladly gave up the "treasures," but wished to retain the "holy things"—even though it be by providing the money equivalent of them. secretary Numeroff." This clearly states that this group of opposition priests was authorized to be the link between the imprisoned Patriarch and the Metropolitan Agathangel. Such are the facts, communicated by the Patriarch himself after his release (in the encyclical, July 15, 1923), and recognized even by the official historian of the Renovated Church. The Metropolitan Agathangel was able, before his exile, to issue an encyclical prohibiting relationships ¹ Professor Titlinoff, "The New Church," p. 55. Petrograd, 1923. ^1 Cf. account of one who attended the trial, published in "The Assault of Heaven." # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM Under the threat of imprisonment and possible execution, and being without bishops, the larger part of the rank and file of the priesthood recognized, unwillingly, the authority of the Higher Church Administration. The Government recognized only the H.C.A. as de facto at the head of the Orthodox Church in Russia; the Patriarch and all who followed him were placed in a half-outlaw condition. The Patriarchal Church went underground. Services of worship in private homes, and secret bishops, gave it a "catacomb" character. It seemed as though the Renovation had won a great victory. It was at this time that it developed a programme of reform, with which we shall become acquainted. tionate the revolutionary character of their tactical methods and phraseology. The entire reformation was directed along the line of the cult and the canonical structure of the Church. For some the reform of the cult found expression in the movement toward simplification, towards comprehensibility—hence the conducting of Liturgy in the Russian language (as against the usual Church-Slavonic). Others—e.g., Vvedensky, Antonin—wished to conduct the eucharistic ceremony openly before the congregation, though in the Eastern Church it has always been mysteriously celebrated in the sanctuary, behind the screen of the "Royal Doors." In the new practice, the doors were not # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM closed, the secret eucharistic prayers were recited aloud (Vvedensky), finally, the sanctuary lost its significance and the altar was placed in the middle of the church (Antonin). Titlinoff, "The New Church," pp. 14 ff. opposed the renovation of the Church, the Congress requested the new Church authority to depose them immediately, and to deal similarly with such persons in future. "For the improvement of the episcopacy, the Congress proposed that immediately, without awaiting the Sobor, episcopal appointments be opened not only to widowers but to married clergy. In order to crush all Church counter-revolution, the Congress recommended the most decisive measures, up to deportation of the guilty from their dioceses. Incidentally, the Congress resolved to disband immediately those parish councils which opposed the Renovation Movement, and to form new councils consisting of persons recommended by the priest and made responsible to him. The opponents of this resolution were threatened by punishment, even up to excommunication. Discussing the future internal construction of the Church, the Congress went so far as to pass a resolution recognizing as fully franchised laymen only those who carry out in life the principles of the Living Church." The dictatorship of the parish priest is expressed in this resolution in a most radical form. However, "deportation from the diocese" might be carried out only by the Government authorities—G.P.U. The resolution thereby recognizes the connection between the Living Church and this institution. It is in the relation of the Renovated Church to the State that one finds the key to the understanding of the schism. The Living Church rising against the Church of the Patriarch accused the latter of political counter-revolution. In the avowal of the political sins of the old Church (under the Tsar's régime) lies the prin- # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM ^1 Isvestia Vsik, No. 106, May 14, 1922. evil. Christians cannot be passive observers in this struggle. The Sobor proclaims capitalism a deadly sin, and struggle with it the sacred duty of Christians. The Congress calls attention to the fact that the Soviet power, in its system of government, alone in the whole world is realizing the ideals of the Kingdom of God. Consequently, every believing churchman must not only be a loyal citizen, but also persistently struggle in union with the Soviet power for the realizing of the ideals of the Kingdom of God." The Renovated Sobor in January, 1925, in its congratulation to the Government, had the bad taste to call this mixture from the Gospels and Marxism "religious Leninism," forgetting Lenin's avowed godlessness. The same Sobor requested the Government's "favourable attention" in view of the "unquestioned value of its work for the State." "This (the Renovation Movement) must unquestionably promote the improvement of the standing of the Soviet Government, even among its enemies abroad, and the final strengthening of the Soviet régime within." In the two years between the Sobor of 1923 and the Sobor of 1925, the revolutionary sentiment faded. Instead of world revolution there had taken place only the strengthening of the Soviet régime in Russia. This evolution partly corresponds to the evolution of Communistic policy. Only one thing remains clear, the continued endeavour of the Renovated Church to remain under the protection of the Government. Herein lies the key to the whole movement. The idea of social revolution, it is true, governed the Russian # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM It is characteristic of the membership of the movement that there participated in it not so much the younger as the older groups of the clergy, "respectable" priests, etc. For this group the thought of loss of Government protection was unbearable. Not being ready to suffer martyrdom, imprisonment, or exile, it sought the mercy of the new authority without any particularly difficult compromises with its religious conscience. Hence comes the peculiar combination of moderation in religious programme with verbal radicalism in politics. The Red formulæ of the revolution were simply expressions of servility, and sub- mission to the authorities was the favourite theme in Renovated sermons. The professional programme of the Renovated clergy (as distinct from the reforming programme of its leaders) was realized in the Sobor of May, 1923. This Congress, which the Renovated consider the Second Sobor of the Russian Church after revolution, was in point of fact the Sobor of a separatist fraction. The partisans of the Patriarch did not participate in it. At this Sobor, monasticism was practically liquidated. Second marriage of the clergy was permitted, and the "White episcopacy" was estab- # THE "RENOYATION" SCHISM lished. A great number of priests received mitres the new Church had practically no canonical bishops. Readers and lower clergy were made into priests. There was opened a wide field for personal ambition. Vvedensky, from being a priest, was immediately made Metropolitan, and soon thereafter, in recognition of his service as preacher, was given the title of "Apologist-Evangelist." condition. Hereafter the Patriarch Tikhon is the layman Vasily Belavin." The Sobor proclaimed the Patriarchate itself to be a counter-revolutionary institution and abolished it. When they informed the Patriarch Tikhon, in his imprisonment, of the resolution of the Sobor, he wrote on it: "Not valid. The humble Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and of all Russia." But the triumph of the Renovated was imaginary and turned out to be short-lived. They were able, having the friendly collaboration of the G.P.U., to seize the majority of the churches and even to attract a large portion of the White clergy. But their influence on the laymen was entirely insignificant. We quote the words of the moderate Renovated laymen, cited above, summarizing the results of the first stage of the movement: "The first sin of the ecclesiastical-renovated movement lay in its separating from the Church masses. The Living Church was unable to attract the lay elements into the sphere of its influence." Yet the financial basis of the Church lay in the laity, in their voluntary contributions. Very soon the Renovated were obliged to feel the influence of this powerful factor. Episcopal mitres constituted poor compensation for empty Church treasuries. The emptiness of the churches themselves was plain evidence of the attitude of the people. We have said that in the first months after the revolution the Church was prepared even to accept an illegal position, "to enter the catacombs." In this condition the episcopate found itself. For the parish priesthood, however, there remained another way out, ¹ Titlinoff, "The New Church," p. 20. which many took advantage of. Discontinuing the mention of the Patriarch in the cult, they nevertheless declined to submit to the new Higher Church Administration, announcing themselves—i.e., their parishes—to be Autocephalic. This condition was canonically absurd, but legally invulnerable under the Soviet Constitution. The Patriarchal Church was broken up into a mass of separate communes with secret connection between them. The authorities had no more basis for persecuting them than any sectarians. There was even an heroic minority which made no compromise and continued to pray for the Patriarch unafraid of arrest. After the period of the sharpest terror (executions) had passed, the strength of these confessors was triumphant over the weakness of the timid. Priests of the Renovated began a mass return to the Patriarchal Church. They were gladly received on condition of public penitence. One may well ask why the authorities did not exert their entire strength in order to destroy the Patriarchal Church. But it must be remembered that in the policy of the Soviet Government toward religion there has never been complete unanimity. In 1923 we see in its Press the domination of the tendency which we have called doctrinaire. The Communists cast ridicule upon the new Church. The organization of the Living Church is called by the *Izvestia* an ecclesiastical N.E.P. trust (No. 220, 1922). Particularly characteristic is the speech of Bukharin, delivered after the closing of the Living Church Sobor, stating that the Sobor did not live up to the expectations of the Government. The Living Church people did not secure the confidence or esteem of the mass of the faithful, who saw in them only deserters and heretics. Bukharin is in favour of liquidating the present Higher Church Administration, looking upon the activity of Antonin and his collaborators as "petit-bourgeois habits." "The churches must be wiped off the face of the earth as the breeding ground of counter-revolution. The struggle against the Church should be entrusted to comrade Dzerjinsky (the then head of the G.P.U.). Citizen Belavin should be executed." # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM of verbal expressions of loyalty on the part of the Church. For us it is sufficient if the Church seriously and finally ceases counter-revolutionary activity." But the Bolsheviks knew very well that the Patriarch was not guilty of counter-revolution. We have seen that as early as in September, 1919, he addressed to the clergy an encyclical concerning the non-participation of the Church in politics and advising "submission to the instructions of the Soviet Government when they are not contrary to faith and conscience." The Patriarch had been ready to sacrifice personal ambition for the sake of the Church and now he confirmed his position. We have no information regarding the negotiations which led to the publication of the well-known letter of June 16, 1923, but it is clear that the Patriarch speaks in good faith. In this letter he recognizes his guilt before the Soviet Government at the beginning of the revolution, he promises to exhibit loyalty in relation to the Soviet Government, and rejects the monarchist movement inside Russia as well as in the emigrations. (The last point is in reference to the Sobor held in December, 1921, in Sremsky Karlovtzi, Jugoslavia, at which, under the presidency of Antony Khrapovitzky, there was passed a resolution concerning the necessity of restoring the Romanoff dynasty in Russia.) Judging by its style of composition, the document signed by the Patriarch could not have been composed by him. He signed the prepared text, sacrificing its form. This sacrifice brought him comparative freedom, and to the Church its head. The charge against him was dropped, and he passed the last year and a half of his life in the Don Monastery (Moscow) under the surveillance of agents, but able to receive visitors and to go to the Moscow churches to officiate at services. Tutchkoff did not let him out of sight. The meeting of the Patriarch with the bishops was made difficult in the extreme. Nevertheless, the return of its head to the Church had a great moral significance. The masses met their "Father" with enthusiasm. The ranks of the Renovated melted rapidly. Churches, together with penitent priests, were turned into "Tikhon" churches. Soon the number of the Renovated churches in the cities fell to about one-third of the total number—a proportion which is maintained up to the present time. According to the latest information received from Russia, in the summer of 1927, the number of the Orthodox Tikhon parishes is 35,000, that of the Renovated 17.000 (the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church 3.000). The Patriarch Tikhon died on March 8, 1925. His death made a tremendous impression on the whole of Orthodox Russia. Hundreds of thousands crowded to his funeral in the Don Monastery. This demonstration of popular love and faithfulness reminded the Moscow population of the great funeral of Lenin. Before his death the Patriarch signed a document, analogous to the letter of 1923, in which he bequeathed to his successors loyalty to the Soviet power, and once again condemned the Karlovtzi bishops. The authenticity of this "testament" was questioned, but without adequate grounds. The Metropolitan Peter, one of the three candidates named by the Patriarch for the post of locum tenens, certifies to its authenticity. The election of a new Patriarch was impossible for the reason that the # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM authorities would not grant the old Church permission to hold a Sobor. The administration of the Church came into the hands of a "guardian of the Patriarchal throne." The Metropolitan Peter, who declined the Renovated proposal of peace, was soon arrested, and authority actually passed into the hands of the Metropolitan Sergius of Nijni-Novgorod. In the beginning of 1926 this bishop had made efforts to conduct the election of a Patriarch by means of a circular memorandum vote of the bishops, and this was made the occasion for the new devastation of the Orthodox hierarchy in 1926. Not only Sergius, but a whole series of "successors" were arrested, one after the other. Yet the name of the locum tenens Peter continued to be used in the ritual, and the memory of the Patriarch Tikhon was stronger than any hierarchical force in holding the Church together. The evolution of the Renovated movement during the last few years is extraordinarily characteristic. It has endeavoured more and more with each year to smooth over the traces of its revolutionary origin. Already in the autumn of 1923 it announced the discharge of those of its groups whose names had become hateful to the people. Since Krasnitzky and Bishop Antonin declined to submit to this decision, the Living Church and The Union of Regeneration drag along their existence as little sects, each defying the other. The Renovated desire no other title than Orthodox. At the 1923 Sobor, the Metropolitan Alexander Vvedensky, who continues the leader of the movement, announced: "Renovation is Orthodoxy, and the Renovated are Orthodox." Since their Church is now headed not by the Higher Church Administration but by a Synod (here also a return to tradition), it became proper to call it the "Synodical Church." In order to present greater semblance of canonicity, the Synod elected as its chairman the Bishop Eudokim, whose consecration in the episco- pacy dated from long before the schism. ^1 Cf. Viestnik Sviatieshevo Synoda Rossieskoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi (Organ of the Renovated Synodical Church), No. 1-2, 1926. Moscow. The Synodicals themselves were not subject to repression. Notwithstanding the contempt with which the Communists look upon them, the Government organs have had two distinct attitudes towards the Church groups. Only the Synodicals have been permitted to issue an official organ, to publish brochures (polemical); certain of their leaders have been able even to hold public lectures. It would appear that, among the Orthodox, the Metropolitan Vvedensky enjoys a monopoly of public religious addresses in Russia. He travels throughout the whole of Russia with lectures on various religious subjects, even Posliednia Novosti. Paris Russian daily. July 22, 1927. appearing in debates against the Communists. By way of privilege, he is permitted publicly to defend Christianity. One of his debates with Lunacharsky created a strong impression on Father d'Herbigny, who notes this in the report of his visit to Russia. The reverend author was unable, unfortunately, to secure any interviews with representatives of the Patriarchal Church (meetings with foreigners subjected them to dangers). Consequently he condemned the old Church and received an entirely erroneous impression regarding the essentials of disagreement (the question of priests shaving their beards, and the struggle for the calendar seems to occupy his principal attention).¹ A brief summary may be in order. We do not deny the existence of disinterested reformatory endeavours on the part of certain leaders of the schism, nor that this tendency follows the line of the old liberal movement in the Russian Church. But these ideological tendencies from the very beginning were ruined by the crimes of political intriguers and later submerged in the shadow of old régime opportunism. The miserable failure of the reformation has compromised for the future the healthy ideological contents of this movement. A few words in regard to the Church in the Ukraine. Here the Church schism was complicated by the development of a third, so-called Autocephalic Ukrainian Church. Its tendency is definitely ^1 D'Herbigny, "L'Aspect Religieux de Moscou en Octobre, 1925." Cf. also the objective chronicle, published in the several numbers of the *Irenikon*, Catholic monthly. Amay-sur-Meuse, Belgium. # THE "RENOVATION" SCHISM # CHAPTER V # THE INNER LIFE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH In conclusion we should like to lift the curtain hiding the inner spiritual life of the persecuted but uncrushed Russian Church. All observers are in agreement that Russia, in spite of the apparent victory of Communism, is passing through a religious regeneration. But foreign observers are condemned to see only the externals, whereas the real Christian Russia is doomed to silence. We take the liberty, therefore, of concluding our review of the Church since the revolution with a rather long quotation from a letter from Russia printed in the Paris religious journal Pout.¹ Now, as formerly, the Church is the national sanctuary. Nowhere but in the Church does one find the breaking down of class barriers, the liberating joy of unity, of communion between many people otherwise held far apart from each other. But the worshippers are not the same as ten years ago. Ordinary, simple folk no longer fill the churches. Rather one sees a majority of the intellectuals, particularly in the cities. These are of very different types and have been brought to the Church in many different ways. Some find in her arms consolation for their bereave- ^1 Pout, Russian Religious-Philosophical Quarterly, No. 2, pp. 3-12, "A Letter from Russia." Paris. ment, some a shelter for their wounded love of country. Others, the young and hopeful, are not driven to her by sorrow and suffering, but are attracted by love and hope and by the youthful enthusiasm that the Church awakens in them. Many of our clergymen and bishops now come from the ranks of the laymen. It would be an exaggeration to say that the intellectuals outnumber the others, but they are a very considerable fraction of our congregations. Many workmen attend the suburban churches, as do many tradesmen. The latter have somewhat resumed their place in society, with the economic regeneration of the country, and, more than any other class, retain both the outward appearance and the conservative traditions of the old Russia. And what of their numbers? They are very large, but it is difficult to say whether they form a minority or a majority of the nation. We have no accurate statistics, and can judge only by the size of our congregations. Our churches are filled, but not to overflowing. When we consider that the edifices turned over to the Living Church are practically empty, it would appear that the total attendance is smaller than before the revolution. Neither is it increasing rapidly. The terrible years of 1917-1920 were a period of religious revival. Since then conversions have been less frequent. That part of the intelligentzia which stood aloof from the Church is not caught up in the present stream of return to it, it is deeply rooted in the old trenches of positivism or absorbed in the search for material well-being. Among the city poor, the Baptists and different sects of "Brethren" find many new adherents. The simplicity of their moral Яı preaching and the strictness of their personal lives attract many. Among the cultured, the old infatuation for Tolstoi, theosophy, and even for Roman Catholicism has vanished. The Orthodox Church has rallied to itself practically all the truly religious-minded among our intellectuals. One consolation is that we have no more "dead leaves," in the phrase of Tiutcheff. None among us attends in order "to do the proper thing," or "to stand well in the community." On the contrary, some are prevented from attending because they hold official positions. Those who come pray here as perhaps they never before prayed. In the villages we witness a different picture—although our knowledge of conditions there is far less general. We can judge only from what we see in villages near a railway, and consequently more or less influenced by city manners. Unquestionably Russia still has a great number of secluded corners where conditions remain as they have been for centuries, almost untouched by the revolution. But can there be many such corners, after the tremendous upheaval which rocked the very foundations of the nation? The first thing we notice in the villages is that the churches are nearly empty. As a rule, only women and old men attend service. The youth have imbibed the teaching of atheism. The middle-aged who have come back from the war, after travelling far and wide over the world, have brought with them a large dose of scepticism, or at least religious indifference. Only now is the village living through a period of enlightenment, two hundred years behind the rest of Europe, but without special enthusiasm at that. The #### THE INNER LIFE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH As a rule, the village clergy have not passed through the purifying fire of persecution. They remain timid and oppressed, not much above their fellow villagers in culture and education. Materially they have lost some of their revenues, but the village still gives them enough to live upon—in any case more than the school-teachers. When at a certain period the schools were made dependent upon local support one after the other was closed. The Sobor of 1917-1918 had a noticeable effect in strengthening # THE INNER LIFE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH their priests into the Living Church Movement, and these circumstances seem to have cooled the enthusiasm for brotherhoods. In church committees the voice of the more well-todo part of the community has greater weight. Attracted by the beauty of the ritual and by financial success, it is sometimes inclined not to value moral way of salvation. In this it is impossible not to see the special outpouring of Grace, which has not departed from Russia. What have been the spiritual fruits plainly produced within the Russian Church? I shall begin with the most evident, visible to all observers. We have witnessed a remarkable adornment of Divine service. It now possesses a severe beauty that could not formerly be found. Never before has it been performed in so solemn and spiritual a manner. And although the secret of this new revelation of spiritual beauty lies principally in the deep faith of the serving priest, yet the new spirit has taken hold of all those worshipping in the churches, giving clarity and a richness of impression to each word of the reader, every exclamation of the deacon. In nearly all, even in the smallest churches, there are beautiful choirs. The faithful are loath to quit the temple. They love the long services, sometimes lasting on festival days for five hours. The reformation of the ritual proclaimed by the Living Church followed the line of returning to old forms of worship, reviving forgotten ritualistic traditions. In the attempt to enrich the ritual, the North borrowed somewhat from the Orthodox Ukraine. Such, for instance, was the acceptance of the Lenten "Passion" and the service of burial of the Virgin at the all-night vigil service before Assumption. In a few cases, though this is with great circumspection, new prayers have been introduced into the ritual. But it is clear to all that the living meaning of the ritual is revealed in the eucharistic service, in the inner attitude of the faithful toward it. For many it From the Church, from the ritual, there proceed various spiritual streams which feed the customary and family life, but these personal and family fruits of the Church are not easily measured. Among some you will see the revival of Orthodox customs, elsewhere you will see rooms made into oratories and apartments into monasteries. In the noise of the great cities, along with monstrous "godless" demonstrations, there is blazing the fire of ascetic and spiritual life. Private prayer, sometimes prayer meetings, complement worship in the church. As is well known, national shrines and monasteries throughout the whole of Russia have been desecrated and destroyed. But it is probably not known to all that this destruction was not complete. As heretofore, in the summer time, pilgrims go on foot to the shrine of St. Seraphim, and to Kiev for Assumption. Sometimes there appear new centres of pilgrimage, as in Podolia, where a vision of the Crucifixion served as the occasion for a great movement of pilgrims. The need for miracles, the thirst for visions of heavenly mysteries, is still strong in all ranks of Church people, though it was especially marked during the years of persecution and famine. At that time one frequently heard of visions, prophecies, or miraculous signs. It was during this period that there occurred in Southern Russia the renovating of ikons and cupolas, and the appearance in the village of Kolomensk, near Moscow, of the Ikon of the Sovereign Virgin, symbolically receiving the crown of the last Russian Tsar. The monastic idea, which a short time ago seemed to belong to the past ages, is again growing popular. Not all monasteries have been closed. Here and there they still exist under the name of "labouring communities," some even in the capital itself. Others have been converted into institutions where aged cripples and invalids are allowed to pass the remainder of their lives as custodians and keepers of sacred objects and relics that have been declared to be objects of art worthy of preservation by the existing Govern- ^1 In April, 1927, the monastery at Sarow was closed, and the relics of St. Seraphim removed to an unknown destination. ment. In some places young novices are accepted into monastic life with the customary ceremony, but taking no other vows than to be prepared to suffer and to be crucified for the world. These monasteries attract many, but monastic life is to-day possible for only a few. So the ascetic ideal seeks a new outlet, which is found by uniting in lay communities while still living the life of the world. These groups keep in close touch with the Church, but are not in the same degree under the guidance of the clergy. Even "startchestvo" has passed beyond the confines of monastic walls. Sometimes a parish priest famous for his ascetic life and deep spiritual insight becomes known as a "staretz." Not infrequently he is a priest deprived of his parish by the Soviet authorities. Such men wield great influence over large numbers of people. These non-monastic startzy occupy somewhat the place of father-confessors to their followers. Their influence, which is more widespread than formerly, must be regarded as a new feature of Russian life. The influence of father-confessors is not limited to the sacrament of confession, but occasionally, directing the whole of life in all its daily difficulties and trials, the father-confessor becomes the director of conscience. The ascetic and mystical strain is particularly noticeable in modern religious tendencies. It is evident, for instance, in the attraction which laymen ^1 Startchestvo: the institution or custom of turning for spiritual guidance to aged and particularly venerated monks, popularly known as "startzy," famous for saintliness and spiritual gifts, find in the ascetic literature of the early Church. However, this tendency is not the only, perhaps not the dominating one, for along with it there is active, practical Christianity, finding various forms. Occasionally it bears the character of Orthodox "evangelism," giving primacy to active love. Under present conditions such evangelic love is closely related to the regeneration of the apostolic ideal—preaching the Gospel. You meet many people, touchingly selfless, who give themselves entirely over to the task of saving their brothers, sowing the Word of Life, and laying up nothing for the morrow. And, finally, among the Christian intelligentzia, there is particularly strong the demand for the incarnation of Christianity in practice, not in personal life so much as in general cultural work. There arise questions, certainly not new, concerned with the Christianizing of culture, with the possibility or practicability of this endeavour, regarding the future of the Church and the fate of theocracy. Here we find the continual development of subjects presented by Vladimir Solovieff, and growing out of his theological school. Various answers are, of course, given, just as the attitudes towards these questions are various—from the apocalyptic view, expecting a cataclysmic end of the world and paradoxically rejecting all problems of culture, up to the optimistic acceptance of the new life (in Russia, that created by the revolution) as the foundation on which to build a new Christian society. If, on the one hand, there is a lively interest in questions of social and national life, on the other, for the mystically inclined intelligentizia the more characteristic questions are those of dogmatic theology (for example, the dogma of redemption), problems connected with "imyaslavchestvo," which though not disturbing the Church, and not affecting the masses, has yet attracted many followers in theologically authoritative circles. But interests are interwoven. Even the mystics are necessarily obliged to determine for themselves—even though negatively—their attitude towards culture, and among the socially active there is a great attraction in ascetic problems. That is, mystical realism, renewing the theological movement (St. Gregory Palama) of the fourteenth century in the Byzantine Church, in which the name of God was worshipped. # THE INNER LIFE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH duce any ill-feeling, any inner separation; do not stand in the way of a brotherly communion between people of very different points of view. Life in the midst of a Church that is persecuted, life in the midst of Christ's enemies, face to face with schism, constant communion in the same divine service and in the sacraments—all this produces a feeling of great unity even among those following different tendencies and possessing different religious opinions. With this voice from Russia we conclude our scattered notes. The time for objective history has not yet come. The most important material is still kept in archives. No one of our contemporaries has yet shared his personal recollections. Herein lies the excuse for the numerous gaps and inaccuracies of the present work, which can only pretend to serve as an outline for future investigations. # APPENDIX These pages had already been written when, in the summer of 1927, there took place events which may mark the beginning of a new era in the life of the Church in Russia. The Metropolitan Sergius, temporary locum tenens, being released from prison on July 29, addressed an encyclical to the Church, from which it is evident that, as a result of his negotiations with the Soviet Government, the latter has agreed to register a new "Tikhon" Synod attached to the locum tenens, thereby giving recognition to a central organization for the Tikhon Church. Furthermore, it became known that the Metropolitan Sergius is endeavouring to secure legalization for the diocesan administrations, the Church schools, a Church Press, and permission to proceed with the election of a new Patriarch at an All-Russian Sobor. In a word, some sort of a concordat seems to be in formation between the Church and the Soviet Government. The Metropolitan Sergius in the above-mentioned encyclical, which is countersigned by seven bishops, members of the new Patriarchal (Tikhon) Synod, calls upon the faithful, especially the clergy, to show loyalty in their attitude towards the U.S.S.R. and its Government, and condemns the terroristic acts of counter-revolutionaries. Referring particularly to the representatives of the Church in emigration, the Metropolitan Sergius proposes that they certify to their political loyalty (to the Soviet Government) or drop their adherence to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Russian Church is making great sacrifices in questions of personal and political dignity, but this does not make it the servant of the authorities. A great gulf separates the "loyalty" of the Patriarch Tikhon and the Metropolitan Sergius from the servility of the Renovated. It is another question as to how far this step, taken by the Metropolitan Sergius, will be crowned with success—i.e., is the Government willing to cease the régime of persecution and to give the Church a peaceful existence? The future will show this. But even in case of failure attending the step taken by the Metropolitan Sergius, it will retain its significance, one of the stages on the way to a concordat between the Church and the State. Naturally the Russian emigration was unable to present a united answer to the appeal for "loyalty" proceeding from the Metropolitan Sergius. It divided on this question. The Metropolitan Eulogius (Paris), appointed by the Patriarch Tikhon as the head of the Churches in Western Europe, gave for himself, as well as in the name of his clergy, the signature demanded regarding loyalty, in the sense of not participating in political affairs. The Balkan bishops, grouping themselves around the Metropolitan Anthony and the so-called Karlovtzy Synod (Jugoslavia) with equal decisiveness cut themselves off from Metropolitan Sergius. Incidentally, this only widened the schism in the emigration which for a long time has separated the Metropolitan Eulogius and the Metropolitan Anthony on this very fundamental question: the non-participation in politics on the part of the Church, and the recognition of inner unity between the Church in the emigration and the Church in Russia