The Enemy Within the Empire

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND

By ERIC D. BUTLER

T H E CONSPIRATORS.

Dr. Schacht (of the German Reichsbank) and Mr. Montagu Norman (Governor of the Bank of England) talking things over before the Second World War.

"In view of the disastrous policy followed by the Bank of England after the last war and the part it is believed to have played in the re-armament of Germany, does not the right hon. gentleman (Sir John Simon) consider it time that the people knew a bit more about the proprietors of this unique concern?"

—Mr . R. Stokes, in the British House of Commons, Apri l 16, 1940.

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The Enemy Within the Empire

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND

By ERIC D. BUTLER .

INTRODUCTIO N

Most orthodox history that is crammed into the heads of our children is one long list of contradictions. There is no real background to our social development because the main underlying factors have been completely ignored.

T he part played by the money system in the growth of society has been tremendous ; yet ho w many of our historians mention it? We teach our children about the development of the Britis h Commonwealt h of Nations , although the rea l basis of thi s growth has been either neglected or distorted, whil e the development of that powerful , privat e and anti-social institution, the Ban k of England, i s very rarely mentioned. If we are really desirous of preserving and developing Britis h culture , it i s essential that we attempt to gain at least an elementary knowledge of the attack whic h was launched against the Britis h people at the time of Cromwell . It is significant that the introduction of wha t has been termed a "spurious Whi g culture," marke d the origin of the present bankin g racket in Britain . Thi s cultura l and financial attack has been going ever since, although there is sound reason to believe that the enemy is at last being turned on both flanks . However, as yet, there is no sign of a rout in the enemy's ranks .

Eve n the Londo n "Times," one of the chief mouthpieces of the financial oligarchy, offered the following criticism of "Whigism " in its issue of Augus t 4, 1840:—

"There is certainly in 'Whigism' an inherent propensity to tyranny; and of all the methods which tyranny ever invented for sucking out the essential vitality of free institutions, without appearing materially to touch their forms, this centralising system is the most plausible and the most pernicious. .. . If it shall be fully carried out, British liberty . . . will rest no longer on the possession of constitutional power by the people, but upon the sufferance of a majority of those who, for the time being, may call themselves the people's representatives."

T he man wh o wrote the above lines, 100 year s ago, ha d a deep insight into the principles of social organisation.

Those wh o seek to re-writ e history find it a ver y formidabl e undertaking, because it has become a "vested interest" wit h the official historians . An y historian wh o refused to portray Cromwel l as a saviour of the Britis h people, pointed out that his rea l name was Williams , and that he belonged to a small group of men wh o ha d been enriching themselves at the expense of the Monarch y and the people, whil e bringing a group of foreigners fro m Hollan d to batten on the Britis h people, woul d not find hi s books recommended for use in our schools or universities . Ou r "Whig " historians tell us about the tyrannies of Charle s I. and Charle s II., and ho w they reigned without Parliament. The impression i s given that Parliament in those days was simila r to what we have to-day. Nothin g i s furthe r fro m the truth. It was comprised of a group of wealthy me n who were not ver y responsible to the Britis h people. Th e rea l fight was between the Mone y Powe r and Monarchy , wit h the victory of the Mone y Powe r in 1688, when James II. was drive n off the throne by hi s son-in-law , Willia m III., who was brought to Britai n at the behest of the financial interests. The Ban k of England was formed six year s later—1694—and wit h it began the Nationa l Debt. The Ban k was formed for the purpose of lending money to the crow n and was modelled on the Ban k of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, the firs t bank in Norther n Europe. The part played by Jews in this formation of the moder n bankin g system, together wit h the modern Stock Exchange , was considerable.

THE PRELUDE IN BRITAIN

It is essential that we mak e ourselves conversant wit h the growth of the forces whic h paved the wa y for the establishment of the Ban k of England and the debtsystem. Anyon e wh o cares to study Britis h history durin g the six and a half centuries from the Norma n Conquest, unti l the financier s arrived at the invitation of Cromwell, wil l find that the Monarch y did exercise its sovereign right of issuing money. There was adequate money for the people's needs. Moder n history books fail to tell us of the general standard of prosperity and cultur e whic h existed prior to the banking swindle . It has remained for such writer s as Willia m Cobbett and Thorold Rogers to give us a true pictur e of those times. Writer s lik e Sir Joh n Fortesque (about 1460) give detailed evidence of the general prosperity of the English people.

Ther e i s no need for me to deal wit h the Trade Guild s and the great architecture of whic h the Britis h people still have muc h evidence—although aerial bombing has wrought muc h destruction. Wit h a population of three millions , there were ten thousand students at Oxfor d University .

In Quee n Elizabeth' s reign Britai n produced some of the finest minds the worl d has ever seen. Bot h Baco n and Shakespeare have had a tremendous influence on Western civilisation—particularly Bacon, to who m we chiefly owe the modern system of experimenta l science based on inductive reasoning.

In 1655, the Jewis h influx unde r Cromwel l started. Cromwel l firs t called Councils to consider the matter, but al l wer e against it. Cromwel l dismissed his counsellors a nd allowed the Amsterda m Jews to enter Britai n surreptitiously. The following extracts fro m "Th e Jewis h Encyclopaedia " are most instructive on this matter:—

"Toward the middle of the seventeenth century a considerable number of Marrano merchants settled in London, and founded there a secret foundation at the head of which was Antonio Fernandez Carjaval. They conducted a large business with the Levant, East and West Indies, Canary Islands and Brazil, and, above all, with the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal."

"Outwardly, they seemed as Spaniards and Catholics, but they held prayermeetings at Cree Church Lane . . . meanwhile, public opinion in England had become prepared by the Puritanical movement for a sympathetic treatment of any proposal by the Judaizing sects among the extremists of the Parliamentary Party for the readmission of the Jews into England."

Thi s is a most interesting admission, confirming wha t I have mentioned concerning the attack on Britis h cultur e by the Puritans , or Whigs . It was in 1650 that Manasseh b en Israel, the man through who m the Jews had financed Cromwell , published hi s "Hop e of Israel," in whic h he said that the Messiah could not appear unti l the Jews h ad settled in every country. He said that if England woul d only admit them the Messiani c Ag e might be expected.

Furthe r extract s fro m "Th e Jewis h Encyclopaedia" wil l prove of interest:—

"Meanwhile the commercial policy which led to the Navigation Act in October, 1651, made Cromwell desirous of attracting the rich Jews from Amsterdam to London so that they might transfer their important interests from the Spanish Main from Holland to England . . . the mission of St. John to Amsterdam, which had previously proposed as an alternative to the Navigation Act a coalition between the English and Dutch commercial interests had negotiated with Manasseh ben Israel. . . ."

M. ben Israel then left for Londo n wher e he "printed his 'humble address' to Cromwell .. . as a consequence, a National conference was summoned at Whitehall. Both the divines and the merchants were opposed to the re-admission and Cromwell stopped the discussion in order to prevent an adverse decision."

"The question came to a practical issue through the declaration of war against Spain, which resulted in the arrest of Antonio Rodrigues Robles and forced the Marranos of London to avow of their Judaism as a means of avoiding arrest as Spaniards, and the confiscation of their goods. As a final result, Cromwell appears to have given informal permission to the Jews on condition that they did not obtrude their worship on public notice. Under cover of this permission Carjaval and S. de Carcerces purchased a piece of land for a Jewish cemetery . . . and Solomon Dormido, a nephew of M. ben Israel, was admitted to the Royal Exchange as duly licensed broker to the City of London without taking the usual oath involving faith in Christianity.

"This somewhat surreptitious method of solving the Jewish Question in England had the advantage of not raising anti-Semitic feeling too strongly, and it likewise enabled Charles II., on his return, to avoid taking any action on the petition of the merchants of London asking him to revoke Cromwell's concession."

Althoug h several determined attempts wer e made to have the Jew s removed, they maintained rather a precarious position unti l the arriva l of Willia m III., in 1688. H e was surrounded b y Jewis h banker s fro m Amsterdam . I n a n articl e i n "Th e Jewis h Encyclopaedia" on Holland , we read that the reign of Willia m III. marke d a "period of exceptional prosperity for the Jews . . . the prince employed Jews in his negotiations with foreign kings . . . and Isaac Lopez Suasso (who lent 2,000,000 gulden to William for his descent upon England)."

T he following extrac t i s from Sir Archibal d Alison' s "Histor y of Europe": —

"Th e Princ e of Orange brought fro m the Republi c of Holland , wher e it had been already practised and thoroughly understood, the secret of governing popula r assemblies and extracting heavy taxes fro m popula r communities . . . . Hi s whol e efforts wer e directed to gain the majority of the constituencies by corruption, a nd o f votes i n Parliament b y patronage. .. . It was then that the Nationa l Deb t began; and government was taught the dangerous secret of providin g fo r the necessities, and maintaining the influence, of present times by borrowin g money and laying its payment on posterity."

THE FORMATION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND

The modern banking system di d not exist in Britai n unti l Cromwell' s regime . In his history of England, Macaula y says that bankin g ha d not started at the time of the Restoration (1660). Merchant s had their strong-boxe s and paid out hones t coin o n demand. A. E. Feaveryear, i n "The Poun d Sterling " (Clarendon Press , Oxford , 1931) fixes the origin of Englis h bankin g as 1662. Goldsmiths started to give receipts for money held. These wer e passed about, and thus the cheque and banknot e were born. The goldsmiths began to find that they could mak e mor e loans than they ha d cash. Macaula y quotes a pamphlet, published in 1695, as saying: "Indeed, no goldsmith had in his vaults guineas and crowns to the full value of his paper." In other words , the goldsmiths wer e swindlin g their customer s by lending, or pretending to lend, wha t they di d not possess.

Willia m was finding that hi s wa r against Franc e was not ver y popular. Mone y was hard to obtain. It was at that stage that Willia m Paterson, a Scottish economist and financier, hit upon the brilliant idea of formin g a Bank , to be called the Ban k of England, for the purpose of lending the Kin g money. Whateve r the present supporters of the banking swindl e may say, the ma n wh o was primaril y responsible for the Ban k of England frankl y admitted wha t he was doing. In a pla n fo r forming the bank whic h he dre w up at that time, he said: "The Bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it creates out of nothing." Thi s Scot kne w the rea l basis of banking, and, unlik e his successors, did not bother to conceal it. Th e merchant s of Londo n wer e very keen on the idea, although the Government of the da y wa s not ver y enthusiastic. In his "Histor y of Hi s Ow n Times " (1693), Bisho p Burne t wrote : "The fear of centralisation of the money power was indeed the grounds upon which the Tories and Commons fought so bitterly against the founding of the Bank of England, thinking that the bank would grow to be a monopoly. Al l the money in England would come into their hands, and they would, in a few years, become the masters of the stock and wealth of the nation."

Needless to say, the majority of the Whig s favoured the establishment of the Bank. The firs t Governo r was Sir Joh n Doublon , a Dutchman . Th e formation of the Ban k in 1694 was incredibl y camouflaged in its authorisation by "The Tonnage Act." As far as I am aware, there had been no attempt to have the Charte r of the Ban k revoked unti l Augus t 13, 1940, when Mr . Stokes, Labou r Membe r for Ipswich, asked the Prim e Ministe r whethe r there woul d be time made availabl e to discus s a motion to that end standing in hi s name. Mr . Attlee , replied, and said that no time f or discussion was possible. Whic h indicates quit e clearly that there i s ver y littl e hope of financia l reform from the Britis h Labou r Party . Mr . Stokes's resolution read as follows :

"Tha t this Hous e calls upon Hi s Majesty' s Government to revoke the Charte r of the Ban k of England, whereby the right to issue money wa s passed to privat e interest in the reign of Willia m and Mary , and to repeal all Act s of Parliament passed in support thereof since its granting, so as to take back for the benefit of the people the powe r whic h rightl y belongs to them. . . ."

T h e ownership of the Ban k of England has always been a matter of muc h speculation, although its close contact wit h International Jewish financ e i s wel l known . In 1696 the la w laid it dow n that stock in the Ban k might be held by "any and every persons, natives and foreigners , bodies politick and corporate, wh o may so subscribe." Late r legislation has required that the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Director s mus t be "natural-bor n or naturalised" Britis h subjects.

In 1847 a Britis h Parliamentar y Committe e took evidence about the Ban k of England. One witness , a Mr . Samue l Gurney , was asked a question concerning the functioning of the Ban k in the publi c interest. Th e question was as follows : "Is it not a principl e laid dow n by the Ac t of 1844, that in all its dealings wit h the publi c the Bankin g Department of the Ban k of England i s to carry on its transactions wit h reference to its ow n interest alone, and not wit h any vie w to the publi c advantage?" M r . Gurney , know n in hi s time as "the bankers ' banker," replied: "Tha t i s one of the principle s to be followed unde r that Act."

T h e following interesting report in connection wit h the Ban k of England appeared in the "Mancheste r Guardian " on Decembe r 28, 1839, and was republished in that paper on Januar y 6, 1940:—

"A special general meeting of the Mancheste r Chambe r of Commerc e and Manufacturer s was held a t their offices, Tow n Hal l Buildings , Kin g Street, on Thursday last, 'to receive a report fro m the board of director s on the effects of the administration of the Ban k of Englan d upon the commercia l and manufacturing interests of the country.'

"(Th e report of the meeting, whic h ran to five and a half columns , contained the lengthy report of the director s on the Bank , the concluding paragraphs of whic h were): "Althoug h it scarcely comes withi n the scope of their present object, the board wil l a d d a reflection upo n the subject of the undue privilege s possessed by the Ban k of England .

"Tha t such a powe r ove r the property, and, as has been seen, the health, morals, a nd ver y lives of the communit y should be vested in the hands of 26 irresponsible individual s for the exclusive benefit of a body of bank proprietors , mus t be regarded as one of the mos t singula r anomalies of the present day—that the secret of these individuals , veiled as they are even from the eyes of their ow n constituents, should decide the fortunes of our capitalists, and the fate of our artisans—that upon the erro r or wisdo m of their judgment should depend the happiness or misery of millions —an d that against the most capricious exercise of this powe r there should be neither appeal nor remedy; that such a state of things should be allowed to exist, mus t be regarded as a reproach to the intelligence of the age, and as totally irreconcilable wit h every principl e of publi c justice.

"If instead of havin g been handed dow n to us from our ancestors, it had been proposed in the present day to create a joint stock bank, to be endowed wit h the power s and privilege s enjoyed by the Ban k of England, the common sense of the country woul d have revolted against the attempt to establish so dangerous a monopoly."

At the famous Macmilla n Commission in 1929, the evidence of Sir Ernes t Harvey, Deput y Governo r of the Ban k of England, dealt wit h this same point. He said: "The Ban k of England is practically free to do whateve r it likes . . . ."

In the "Mancheste r Guardian " of Ma y 23, 1940, the financial editor wrote: . . It still remains to be seen whether the Treasury, with all the enabling powers in the world, can make the views of the War Cabinet prevail over the views of the Bank of England."

As we trace its influence on the affairs of the Britis h people, and practically every country throughout the Britis h Commonwealt h of Nations , we wil l see that this private monopoly i s the greatest interna l enemy the Britis h people have in their midst.

BANK ASSESSES ITS OWN INCOME TAX

One of the outstanding features of the Bank of England is the manner in which its history and operations have been shrouded in secrecy. A very good orthodox history was published in 1908, but revealed nothing. Research in regard to this institution has not been simple. There are no publicly available files of the Bank of England. Since it is not a limited company, but operates under Parliamentary charters, it has no registered offices, and, therefore, no place where, by law, its accounts may be examined.

T he followin g i s a reply to one enquiry: —

" I n repl y to you r recent letter I have to infor m yo u as follows :

(1) Th e lis t of stockholder s published by the Ban k is for internal use, and is availabl e to proprietor s of Ban k Stock only.

(2) The Ban k has no Statutes or Article s of Association; the constitution being based upon a Charte r of 1694 and various Act s of Parliament, of whic h the chief is that of 1844.

"I may mention that a Statistical Summary , compiled by the Ban k of England, has recently been made availabl e at an inclusive charge of 12/- pe r annum, payable in advance."

RONAL D DALE , Secretary."

One of the most remarkabl e facts about the Ban k is that it assesses its ow n profits for Income Tax . The following extrac t i s fro m the Britis h "Hansard," dated June 13, 1940:

"Mr. Stokes asked the Chancellor of the Excheque r whethe r he is awar e that the Ban k of England assesses its ow n profits for Income Tax ; and whethe r he wil l take such steps as may be necessary to have them assessed by an independent authority?

"Sir Kingsley Wood: I woul d refer the hon . Membe r to Section 68; the actual computation of liabilit y is subjected to examination and check by the officers of the Board of Inland Revenue .

"Mr. Glenvil Hall: Ho w can they mak e an assessment if they do not issue a balance sheet?

"Sir Kingsley Wood: Tha t is another matter."

It was by Section 24 of the Income Ta x Act , 1842, that the Ban k of England, a privat e institution, was empowered to assess and tax itself wit h no other person or body in control.

T he present authority for this i s contained in the Consolidation Act , the Income T a x Act, 1918, Section 68, from whic h I quote the opening paragraphs :

"Fo r the purposes of assessing and charging Income Ta x and in the cases mentioned in this Section, the following persons shall be commissioners , and shall have al l the powers of the general commissioner s for that purpose, and shall mak e assessments under and subject to the provisions and rules of this Act , that is to say:

• (1) The Governo r and director s of the Ban k of Englan d and Ban k of Ireland respectively, in respect of interest, annuities , dividends and shares of annuities , a nd the profits attached to same, payable to either bank out of the publi c revenue of the Unite d Kingdom ;
• (2) The Governo r and director s of the Ban k of Englan d and of the Ban k of Ireland respectively, in respect of:
  • (a) Interest, annuities, dividends and shares of annuities , entrusted to either bank for payment;
  • (b) Profit s or gains of either bank chargeable unde r Schedul e D;
  • (c) Al l other interest, annuities and dividends , and salaries and pensions payabl e by either bank; and
  • (d) Al l other interest profits chargeable wit h tax arising withi n any office or department unde r the management or control of either bank."

These important concessions not only indicat e that the Ban k has something to hide; it i s definite evidence that the Ban k of Englan d has powe r ove r the Britis h Government.

THE MACMILLAN ENQUIRY

The Macmilla n Committe e was appointed by a Labou r Government in 1929 "to enquire into banking, finance, and credit, paying regard to the factors, both internal and international, which govern their operation, and to make recommendations calculated to enable their agencies to promote the development of trade and commerce and the employment of labour."

T h e list of member s on this committee i s particularly interesting:

T he Rt. Hon . Lor d Macmilla n (Chairman)—Lawyer.

M r . Ernes t Bevin—Trade Unio n Official.

T h e Rt. Hon . Lor d Bradbury—Treasur y Official; President, Britis h Bankers ' Association.

T he Hon . R. H . Brand—Managin g Director, Lazar d Bros., Merchant Bankers ; Director, Lloyd s Bank ; Vice-President, International Financia l Conference. League of Nations , 1920; membe r of Expert Committe e advising Germa n Government on stabilisation of the mark, 1922.

Professor Theodor Emanue l Guggenhei m Gregory—Bankers ' orthodox economist. M r . J . M . Keynes—Orthodo x economist; Treasury, 1915-1919; Principa l Repre sentative of Treasury, Pari s Peace Conference, 1919.

M r . Lenno x B. Lee—Chairman , Calico Printers ' Association; membe r o f Advisor y Council , Boar d of Trade ; President, Federation of Britis h Industries, 1929. M r . Ceci l Lubbock—Director, Ban k o f England.

T h e Rt. Hon . Reginald McKenna—Chairman , Midlan d Ban k since 1919; Chancello r of Exchequer, 1915-16.

M r . J. T. Walto n Newbold—Fabia n Society, 1908; Independent Labour Party, 1910; Pleb s League , 1917; left I.L.P . to joi n Communis t Party, 1921; member of the Executive , Labou r Research Department, 1922-26; member of the Executiv e of the Communis t Part y and Communis t International, 1921-23; resigned fro m Communis t Part y and International, 1924; Labou r Part y candidate (Epping), May , 1929.

S ir Walte r Raine—Coa l Exporter; ex-President, Association, Britis h Chamber s of Commerce ; ex-Chairma n Coa l Exporters ' Federation of Grea t Britain .

M r . J. Frate r Taylor—Associated wit h various industria l undertakings i n England, India , Canada , U.S.A. ; Director, International Powe r and Pape r Co., Newfoundland ; Director, Canadian and Foreign Investors, Ltd .

M r . A . A . G . Tulloch .

S ir Frederic k Leit h Ross—Entered Treasury, 1909; Britis h Representative on Financ e Board, Reparation Commission, 1920-25.

M r . Pau l Einzig , in hi s admirin g biography o f Mr . Montagu Norman , wrote: "The efforts of the Macmillan Committee to throw more light upon the machine of the Bank of England failed almost completely. . . . Indeed, the evidence of Mr. Norman is a study in non-committal and evasive answers." However, some significant facts wer e brought to light.

M r . A . N . Field , the Ne w Zealand author, write s a s follows : "Th e Ban k o f England i s controlled by a Governor, a Deput y Governor, and twenty-thre e director s elected by holder s of £50 0 or mor e of Ban k Stock. Th e Court of Director s i s not required by la w to meet mor e than twic e a year. Sir Ernes t Harve y explained that the Ban k i s reall y managed by wha t he called 'an Inne r Cabinet,' know n as the Committee of the Treasury. Thi s Inner Cabine t consists of the Governor, Deput y Governor, and nine director s elected fro m among their numbe r by the Court of Directors . The rest of the director s stay outside.

"Fro m the questions asked of Sir Ernes t Harvey , some member s of the Macmilla n Committe e wer e strongly unde r the impression that certain powerful firms had permanently reserved seats on the Ban k o f England. Mr . J. M. Keynes , the economist, asked whethe r 'the class of merchant banker s fro m who m the director s of the Ban k are largely draw n historically, by reason of ancient tradition, i s suited to modern conditions.'

"Sir Ernes t Harve y replied that recent tendency 'has not been to follow quite the old historica l tradition. ' He doubted whethe r it woul d be possible to collect by any other method a body of me n 'so absolutely unbiassed and disinterested in judgment,' and 'if the names of the representatives of certain firms do appear it is generally the result of seeking for somebody of the ver y highest financial standing in the Cit y of London, ' etc., etc.

"Mr . J. T. Walto n Newbold , another membe r o f the Committee, chipped in wit h a remar k that: 'It i s ver y strange ho w certain merchant banker s have member s of their firms appearing on the Court of Director s over a period of fifty years. As fast as one goes off another comes on.' Sir Ernes t Harve y replied that this was not true in recent year s except in one case. Mr . Newbol d rejoined that there had been a continuity in merchant banker s since 1889, adding, 'I checked it the other day.' Sir Ernes t Harve y said: 'No , pardon me, there has always been an interval, except once.' Whethe r the 'interval' wa s in the natur e of hours , days , months , or years, was not disclosed, the matte r being dropped at this point.

"Th e 'merchant bankers ' referred to as sitting so continuously on the directorate of the Ban k of Englan d and thus controlling the Britis h Empir e wer e later on described to the Macmilla n Committe e by Sir Robert M. Kindersley , himself a director of one of these firms , that of Lazar d Brothers . The y are also know n as 'issuing houses' for b i g loan flotations and as 'acceptance houses.' 'Practically every acceptance house of long standing in this country, ' said Sir Robert M. Kindersley , 'commenced purely a s merchant s trading wit h foreign countries, and a great man y of them, most of them, I think I ma y say, are of foreign origin. If yo u take the names, Goschen, Hambro , Klienwort , and Lazard , and Brandt, yo u can go through the whol e lis t of them, and I think yo u wil l find a ver y large number, the majority, are people of foreign origin.

. . . It is only the origin . . . some people might thin k they are stil l ver y largely, perhaps, unde r foreign influence, which , of course, is not so.'

" I n spite of Sir Robert Kindersley' s assurances, the fact remains that whe n the Great Wa r broke out in 1914, the head of one prominent firm of merchant bankers , long represented on the directorate of the Ban k of England, wa s discovered to have omitted even the easy formality of naturalisation. Thi s was Baro n Brun o vo n Shroeder, who, according to statements by Lor d Wittenham in the Hous e of Lord s on Jul y 26, 1918, had to be naturalised after wa r was declared in order to save the solvency of the Cit y of London .

"Havin g got so fa r in our glance a t the Ban k of England, whic h governs our Empir e in its monetary affairs, we have nex t to note another pleasant littl e trait in it s habits . It i s answerable to nobody, and neve r explains its actions. On Mr . Keyne s asking Sir Ernes t Harve y if this was the case, the repl y was , 'Well, I think it has been our practice to leave our actions to explain our policy.' Wha t about the reasons for the Bank' s policy? asked Mr . Keynes . 'It is a dangerous thing to start giving reasons,' said Sir Ernest Harvey.

HOW WAR DEBTS ARE JUGGLED

People who urge that the present disastrous financial policy of needless debt and taxation should be abolished in order to allow the British peoples to win this war FOR THEMSELVES , in the shortest possible time, are sneered at by our financial "experts," who tell us that "we must pay the cost of the war."

I agree. Bu t the rea l cost of a wa r i s the sacrifice in me n and materials . Thi s cost i s paid as the wa r i s fought. Unde r the present financia l swindl e the people are sacrificed in order to pa y financial tribut e in the for m of taxation for al l time. To ask me n an d their families to pay the interest bil l for al l time on the material s they used to defend themselves is little short of treachery.

Those wh o think that we should be sacrificed to an insane financial policy at the end of the wa r might note that Britain , durin g the last war, actually increased her assets by 25 per cent. Thi s was done in spite of the millions of me n taken out of production and doing the fighting in France . Whe n these me n ha d wo n the military conflict, they came back to civi l lif e and started producing furthe r goods. In 1919 Britai n possessed the greatest industria l machine in the world . She was in the position to give he r people the highes t standard of livin g the worl d has ye t seen—in fact, a lan d reall y fit for heroes to live in .

But, as we have seen previously, whil e the Britis h people wer e standing up to the Germa n militar y machine, the financiers wer e plotting to obtain eve r a greater control of the nation. No wonde r that Willia m Jennings Bryan , the famous America n statesman, once said: "The money power preys upon the nation in times of peace and conspires against it in times of adversity."

We should always remembe r the sinister Cunliff e Committee , and its recommenda tions to put Britai n back on the gold standard after the war. Dealin g wit h these recommendations, Mr . A . N . Field , the Ne w Zealand writer, has stated: "Th e recommenda tion of the Cunliff e Committe e was 'for the maintenance of a complete and effective gold standard.' In plain language, this simpl y meant that the enormous debt incurre d in 8/- and 10/- pounds should be paid back in 20/- pounds . Th e nation was saddled wit h a debt mor e than ten times that existing in pre-wa r days , in nomina l value ; but in actual value, in consequence of the depreciation in the purchasing powe r of the pound, about five times the pre-wa r debt. Thi s committee recommended that the load on the back of the people should be doubled by a restoration of the pound to the value it had possessed before the banks had lowered its value by lending thousands of millions of imaginary money.

" T o realise the enormous fraud whic h was perpetrated by this juggling wit h money it i s sufficient to take one example. An important item in munitions manufactur e was copper. A good deal of this was purchased from the Unite d States. In a publication at hand it i s stated that the average pric e for copper in the Unite d States durin g the ten year s preceding the wa r was 16.2-3 cents per pound; the wa r pric e was 27 cents per pound. Commoditie s bought wit h 8/- and 10/- pounds at war-tim e prices of this sort wer e lumped in the huge bil l tied roun d the nation's neck, to be paid off in 20/- pounds . In the words of Mr . Reginald McKenna , in his annua l address as chairman of the Midlan d Ban k at thi s time, the whol e proceeding was 'repugnant to every principl e of equity and economi c propriety.'"

Dealing wit h the recommendations of the Cunliff e Committe e in a series of articles i n the Londo n "Times " fro m Ma y t o October, 1918, Mr . Arthu r Kitso n said:

". . . The nation should be on its guard to see that the war debt is not enhanced by some jugglery with our legal tender after the war. . . . The method is so insidious and can be accomplished so easily that the public may be cheated before they are aware of it. The war debt has been incurred in cheap pounds, and honest dealing requires repayment in pounds and commodities of the same value as when the debt was incurred.

"To raise the value of money after the war is an old trick of the financiers. . . . At all costs a repetition of such jugglery should be prevented."

MONTAGU NORMAN TAKES CONTROL

In spite of the warnings of Kitso n and others, the policy of deflation was introduced in 1920 by the ne w Governo r of the Ban k of England, Mr . Montagu Norman . He introduced Wal l Street's deflation policy .

Norma n was a forme r partne r in the bankin g house of Brown , Shipley and Company, the Londo n end o f Brow n Brother s an d Company , international bankers , Ne w York . He was partl y trained in America . He became Deput y Governo r of the Ban k of Englan d in 1915, and Governo r in 1920. Immediately upon hi s rise to the Governorship, D r. Olive r Sprague, of the Federa l Reserve Board, whic h i s dominated by the Wal l Street group, Warburgs , etc., was sent ove r fro m Americ a to help hi m wit h hi s task.

Withi n three year s of Norma n taking control, Britai n was reduced to chaos. Unemployment figures rose to approximately 2,000,000. Me n wh o fought to beat the Germa n militar y gangsters wer e stabbed in the back by the financial gangsters. Ship buildin g yards closed, neve r to open again. Slu m areas increased, whil e the defences of the nation wer e whittle d away. Ther e wa s no money! Million s of Britis h people have live d in hel l unde r the dictatorship of Norma n and hi s Wal l Street friends . It i s a magnificent tribut e to the millions of people in Britai n wh o have been crucified by the financial system for so long, that their moral e remained unbroken unde r the Naz i blitzkriegs .

In 1922 Mr . Norma n went to Americ a wit h Stanley Baldwi n to fi x the America n debt. The result of this visit was to "fix " the Britis h people mor e firmly unde r the hee l of the Wal l Street group. Stanley Baldwi n immediately afterwards ha d a meteoric rise to the Prim e Ministership of Grea t Britain , and played a traitor' s rol e in introducing Plannin g an d Boards—part of the Ban k of England' s programme of Socialism, as we wil l see later—and acquiesced in the reduction of Britai n to a second-rate Power.

Whe n Mr . Montag u Norma n returned fro m Americ a wit h the Debt Settlement, M r . Bona r Law , Prim e Ministe r of Britai n a t that time, i s reported to have said: "If I sign this I will be cursed for generations." Nothin g mor e propheti c could have been uttered.

Tha t Mr . Norma n had the "right" outlook for his job of controlling the Britis h Empir e wil l be seen fro m the followin g significant extract fro m Joh n Gunther' s book, "Inside Europe":

"Once, amiably chatting with a banker friend, he (Norman) listened imperviously to the argument that the gold standard would impoverish Britain in the long run. 'Tell me,' Norman is reported to have said, 'do you think it better to be rich than to be poor?' His friend replied: 'Well, I have been poor, and now I am fairly rich, and I hope to be richer.' Norman replied that he was not sure but that countries which were too rich went to pieces; he pointed to the examples of Periclean Athens and Imperial Rome. His friend did not reveal the substance of the conversation; the indication that the Governor of the Bank of England might consider it his duty to impoverish his country for the country's 'benefit' would not have been too popular."

Jus t lik e Hitle r and other gangsters: "I kno w wha t i s good for you." "I wil l have y o u throw n into a concentration camp and have yo u beaten to death wit h a rubbe r truncheon," says Hitler. Norma n and hi s associates are mor e subtle. The Britis h people are muc h harde r to dea l wit h than the Germans . "I wil l have yo u livin g on the dole in slum areas. It i s good for you," says Norman .

Civilisatio n wil l neve r be safe unti l the Hitler s and Normans are removed fro m control.

SOME INTERESTING QUOTATIONS

Apart fro m the actual history of wha t took place after the last war, the following quotations, whic h I have selected fro m a variety of sources, leave no doubt that even man y orthodox people realised that the control of the financial policy of Britai n had been transferred to Wal l Street:

"The City, the financiers and the moneylenders in New York and Paris, refused to put up credits in support of a balanced budget."

"They wanted humanity crucified on a cross of gold. We declined absolutely, and resigned. . . . Twenty men and one woman—a British Cabinet—waited one black Sunday afternoon in a Downing Street garden for a financial decision from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. "

—Thomas Johnston, M.P. , Civi l Defence Commissione r for Scotland, and Lor d Priv y Seal in the Ramsay Macdonal d Labou r Government.

"Man y nations ma y laugh at our State Department, but all mus t trembl e before our Federal Reserve Board. . . . Hig h money rates in the Unite d States of Americ a early in 1929, for instance, forced an increase in the official bank rates at once in England, ten European countries, in two Latin-America n countries , and tw o in the F a r East; and in almost every case that action restricted business and brought suffering to millions of foreign workers . That blow hit Britain hardest of all."

—Mr . Ludwel l Denny , well-know n America n bankin g authority, i n hi s book, "Americ a Conquer s Britain," published in 1930.

"Neve r in the history of the worl d has so muc h powe r been vested in a small body of me n as in the Federa l Reserve Board. These men have the welfare of the world in their hands, and they could upset the rest of us either deliberately or by some unconscious action."

—Sir Josiah Stamp, Director of Ban k of England, reported in the "Nationa l Ban k Monthly," February , 1926.

The memoir s of the late Lor d Snowden, wh o was Chancellor of the Excheque r in the Ramsa y Macdonald Labou r Cabinet, reveal the fact that durin g the 1929-32 depression Wal l Street demanded a reduction in the Britis h unemployment dole. Lor d Snowden said: "On Saturday, the 22nd August, the situation was hectic. The Bank of England submitted to Mr. Harrison, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the tentative suggestion for a reduction of unemployment payments. . . . Mr. Harrison replied by telephone that, while he was not in a position to give the answer until he had consulted his financial associates, his opinion was that it would give satisfactory assurance."

"The interdependence of the money policies of the U.S . and Grea t Britain , or —not to put too fine a point upon it—the dependence of the latter upon the former, has been dramatically demonstrated. We are informed that the bank-rat e mus t certainly be raised from 4 to 5 per cent. next Thursday . Ther e is nothing in the present position of Britis h Industry whic h woul d in itself call for an increase in the rate. . . . The incident seems to show clearly wh o it is that cracks the whi p and wh o obeys the signal."

—Sir Josiah Stamp, in a letter to the "Times," London , Februar y 3, 1923.

"Nor is the growing importance of American finance in international trade an assuring event. One of the things that can be assumed as a certain consequence of the war is that finance is to hold a more important grip on international industry than hitherto, and that in their own interests communities must protect themselves so far as possible against an imperious international financial trust.

"In any event, it is quite clear that this country will have to watch not only Lombard Street, but Lombard Street and Wall Street.

".. . For finance can command the sluices of every stream that runs to turn the wheels of industry, and can put fetters upon the feet of every Government that is in existence. Those who control finance can paralyse the nation, can make it drunk, can keep it normal. And in all their transactions their own interests are put first. Of course, these interests are involved in the general interest. They cannot flourish in a dead economic state.

"But they fix exchanges, bank rates, capital values; they can tighten or loosen the purse strings of Governments and manufacturers; they control the means upon which the political and industrial State depends for its existence."

—Mr . Ramsay Macdonald, i n "Socialism, Critica l and Constructive."

"The Prime Minister, at his interview with the junior Ministers on Monday, said the proposals which the Government submitted to the Bank of England had to be telephoned to America to see if they could be approved of there."

—Mr . Ernes t Thurtle , Labou r Government Whip , i n the "Dail y Herald," Augus t 27, 1931.

Speaking in the British House of Commons on September 10, 1931, Mr. W. Graham explained how the British Government was forced to reduce the dole rates at the instigation of Wall Street: ". . . It was specifically put to us (the late Ministers) that, unless one item in particular—a 10 per cent. cut in unemployment benefit, to yield £12,250,000 —was included in the programme, it would not restore confidence, and we were told that no other item could be put in substitution. . . . Let the House be under no misapprehension. It was because of an outside insistence upon that specific point that the late Government broke."

"To propitiate Wall Street, British industry is to be taxed another 1 per cent. From the list of directors of the Bank of England we publish (under the heading of 'Our Masters: Who's Who at the Bank: Who are the Financial Dictators of Great Britain?'), it will be seen how few of them are engaged in the daily uphill task of making goods and finding markets. Their eyes and minds are more on the ends of the earth than on the troubles and needs of their immediate fellow-citizens. The voice of Wall-street is heard and obeyed in their councils. . . . The Governor of the Bank has followed his customary line by leaving industry to shift for itself, while he moves his pieces on the board as though credit, and all that depends on it, were merely favours in a game of international chess. We have to face the fact that the power of the world to-day is in the hands, not of kings or governments, nor of armies or navies, but of financiers."

—"Sunda y Dispatch," Augus t 16, 1931.

On the previous day the Dea n of Wincheste r ha d written in the "Times": "The recent experience of Australia shows us that the banking community is at long last a very effective Second Chamber." Whe n we study the control of Australia n Govern ment s by the local representatives of the Ban k of England we mus t agree that the Dea n of Wincheste r was right.

On September 25, 1929, following a rise in the Londo n bank rate, the editor of the "Dail y Express " said, in an open letter to the Governo r of the Bank :

"Among your colleagues are several who are closely identified with large foreign interests, and who may be tempted to consider questions of current policy from the standpoint of international finance. But the Bank of England is, or should be, a British institution serving British interests."

T h e questions whic h every Britisher, loya l to the principle s upon whic h the Britis h Commonwealt h of Nations has been built an d the sovereignty of the Monarchy particularl y in the issue of the nation' s money supply—should ask: "Ar e the Britis h peoples stil l controlled by a financial policy dictated by a group of aliens? Ca n we hope to preserve Britis h institutions and Britis h cultur e unde r such domination? "

THE FINANCING OF NAZI GERMANY

In the British House of Commons on April 16, 1940, Mr. Stokes asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he would introduce legislation to alter the charter of the Bank of England, so as to enable the names of the bank proprietors, together with the capital holding of each of such proprietors, to be published.

S ir Joh n Simon : "No , sir."

M r . Stokes : "I n vie w of the disastrous policy followed by the Ban k after the last wa r and the part it is believed to have played in the re-armament of Germany, does the right hon. gentleman not consider it time that the people kne w a bit mor e about the proprietor s of thi s unique concern? "

T h e followin g humorous item, whic h appeared in the "News-Chronicle " on Ma y 10, 1940, is ver y pointed: " 'Germany is an ungrateful beast, and I don't care who hears me say it,' declared Miss Ruby Fossicks, the Bank of England May Queen for 1940, at Brighton yesterday, opening the £500,000 Golden Calf Rest Home for Tired Usurers. A wan smile from a Mr. Skinner and frantic applause from 5000 City usurers, each with features more brutally degraded than the last, rewarded this stinging attack. 'Heil der interest on der Unprodugtif Loan!' cried Sir Henry Glockenspiel, a leading British financier. A resolution never to arm the Prussian Spirit with money ever again till the present war is over was carried unanimously."

" L e Canar d Enchainé " for August, 1939, published the following interesting item: " I n 1933 there appeared in Hollan d a book, written by a certain Sidney Warburg , whic h quickl y disappeared fro m booksellers ' windows . In it the author stated that in the preceding year, 1932, he had attended meetings in the Unite d States of financial gentlem e n wh o wer e seeking means of subsidising Hitler. It appears that among those present wer e Sir Henri Deterding, representatives o f Morgan' s Bank , Mr . Montagu Norma n (Governo r of the Ban k of England), and representatives of the Mendelssohn Bank."

M r . Montag u Norma n was openly in favour o f supporting the ne w Hitle r movement by 1931. By 1935 the Ban k of Englan d was openly pro-Nazi , as revealed even in the "Financia l News " of Ma y 15 of that year.

In 1937, the "Banker" said that "we regret to have to admit that from a small but

influential circle in the City of London there flows a constant stream of propaganda in favour of credits for Germany."

T he following report appeared i n the Sydne y "Sun " o n Apri l 3 , 1941: "A sharp attack on Mr . Montag u Norma n i s made by the foreign editor of the conservative 'Financial News, ' urging a publi c enquir y into the governorship of the Ban k of England . 'We ought to probe more deeply into Mr . Norman' s apparently unending reign as Governor,' he writes . 'An y criticism of this reign fro m financial quarter s i s still regarded as something aki n to sacrilege, but we ought to ask ourselves whethe r it i s to Britain' s advantage that Mr . Norma n remains Governo r at such a critica l period.

. . Mr . Norma n was largely responsible for our ill-advise d retur n to the gold standard in 1925. He strongly opposed the Treasury' s "cheap money " policy, whic h he reversed. Shortly before the outbreak of war he pursued a policy of financial appeasement towards Germany. Until the outbreak he allowed the City to over-lend to Germany. He did not exert his influence to obtain a reduction in excessive German bank debts. ...' "

As anyone wit h even an elementary knowledge of the present financia l system knows, the Ban k of England di d not send millions of pounds to Germany . These millions of pounds—created out of nothing by the Ban k of England—wer e writte n up as a credit to German y in Britain. German y could then bu y goods in Britain to thi s amount. A loan of £80,000,000 to German y woul d mea n that German y could bu y that amount of material s in Britain . Th e terribl e fact emerges that the Britis h people were workin g to re-ar m their futur e enemies because they di d not control financia l policy. The same individual s wh o wer e buildin g up German y wer e keeping Britai n weak by telling the people that there was a shortage of money. Stanley Baldwin , one of the chief puppet s of the Ban k of England, openly admitted on one occasion that he kept the fact concerning Germa n re-armament fro m the Britis h people in order to wi n the general elections.

M r . Pau l Einzi g says, i n "Worl d Finance , 1918-36," that "there can be no doubt that practically the whole of the free exchange available to Germany for purchase of raw materials was supplied, directly or indirectly, by Great Britain in giving her enemy free exchange for the purpose of raw materials. If the day of reckoning ever comes, the liberal attitude of the British Government in this matter may well be responsible for the lives of British soldiers and civilians."

These facts are widel y recognised by responsible authorities al l ove r the world . Unfortunately, the people and their government s have ver y little say concerning policy . The following i s an extract fro m a report of an intervie w whic h Mrs . Lilli e Beirne , of Sydney, had wit h Mr . Mackenzi e King , Prim e Ministe r o f Canada , whil e she was lecturing in Canada. (Reported in the "Ne w Era, " Februar y 14, 1941):

"Mrs. Beirne: 'Why on earth, Mr. Prime Minister, did you not keep these promises?' (She was referring to one of Mackenzie King's statements in 1935, when he said that he would take control of the issue of credit and currency on behalf of Canada.) Th e people would have immortalised you.'

"Mackenzie King (rather sadly and in a slow tone): 'Well, we do the best we can, Mrs. Beirne.'

"Mrs. Beirne: 'Well, it is a terrible position we are in. English and American finance gave Hitler the money and metals and chemicals to slaughter our men, women, and children, and destroy the British Empire—forgive me, Mr. Prime Minister, for speaking so hotly!'

"Mackenzie King: 'I agree with you. I never did agree with financing Hitler. ' " T he following extracts are fro m a sensational article whic h appeared in "Ken " (Chicago, U.S.A.) , Novembe r 3 , 1938. The article was reprinted in man y journal s throughout the worl d and caused a considerable stir:—

" I n the spring of 1934, a select group of city financiers gathered around Montag u Norma n in the windowles s buildin g of the Ban k of England, in Threadneedl e Street. Amon g those present wer e Sir Ala n Anderson , partne r in Anderson , Gree n & Co. ; Lor d (then Sir Josiah) Stamp, chairman o f the L.M.S . Railwa y System; Edwar d Shaw, chairman of the P. & O. Steamship Lines ; Sir Robert Kindersley , a partne r in Lazar d Bros.; Charles Hambro , partner in Hambro s Bros.; and C. T. Tiarks , head of J. Shroede r Co. . . . Bu t no w a ne w powe r was established on Europe' s politica l horizon—namely , Naz i Germany . Hitle r had disappointed his critics . Hi s regime wa s no temporary nightmare, but a system wit h a good future , and Mr . Norma n advised hi s director s to include Hitle r in their plans . Ther e wa s no opposition, and it was decided that Hitle r should get covert help fro m London' s financia l section unti l Mr . Norma n had succeeded in putting sufficient pressure on the Government to mak e it abandon its pro-French policy for a mor e promising pro-Germa n orientation.

"Immediately the director s went into action. Their firs t mov e was to sponsor

Hitler' s secret re-armament, jus t about to begin. Usin g their controlling interests in both Vicker s and Imperia l Chemica l Industries, they instructed these two huge armament concerns t o help the Germa n programme b y al l means a t their disposal. .. . In the same year Englis h armament firms placed huge advertisement s in the 'Militaerischer Wochenblatt,' offering for sale tanks and guns, prohibited by the Versaille s Treaty. A statement made by Genera l Sir Herbert Lawrence , chairman of Vickers , furnished the necessary evidence that the Britis h Government kne w about and approved these advertisements . When , at hi s company' s annua l meeting, he was asked to give the assurance that Vicker s arms and munitions wer e not being used for secret re-arming in Germany , he replied: 'I cannot give you an assurance in definite terms, but I can tell you that nothing is done without the complete sanction and approval of our Government.' "

T h e excuse has been made that, although thi s financing of Naz i German y did take place, it was for the purpos e of buildin g a rampart against Russian Communism. I quit e appreciate this viewpoint, and believe that man y sincere Britis h interests were made the victims of a carefully drawn-u p programme of propaganda. The fear of Communis m was deliberately played upon. Littl e di d man y people kno w that the rea l controller s of the Ban k of England—the Jewis h oligarchy of Wal l Street—were also ver y interested in Russia .

I believe that the opposition between Germany , Russia , Japan and Italy was for the deliberate purpos e of makin g the Britis h people acquiesce in a policy whic h was weakening the foundation of the Empire . Th e following extract fro m an article by D. E. Faulkner-Jones , in "Th e Fi g Tree " (England), June , 1937, i s almost prophetic, whe n we see the position to-day : "Secret fear makes us seize eagerly on the comfortable assumption that the three militaristic Powers (Russia, Germany and Japan) to be reckoned with are arming for internecine conflict. Common sense would suggest a very different view; the view that it would pay the three to unite, at least temporarily, for the dismemberment of the British Empire. An appearance of mutual enmity between two of the three conspirators would recommend itself as a simple and politic means of delaying British re-armament as long as possible, and should, therefore, be discounted by prudent statesmen."

Russia' s pacts wit h German y and Japan—although only of a temporary and expedient nature, as demonstrated by Hitler' s attack on Russia—confirm the above viewpoint. (Clashes between Hitle r and Stalin mus t not blin d us to the fact that Nationa l Socialism a nd Marxis t Socialism are only different sects of the one "religion." An overwhelming victor y for either sect woul d be a furthe r danger to the Britis h wa y of life.) Whil e Britain' s defences wer e being depleted—particularly he r navy—the totalitarian countries wer e being built up. Dictator Montag u Norma n kept the Britis h shipbuilding yards closed. It i s not without significance that the Government s of both Ramsay Macdonald a nd Stanley Baldwin—dominate d by Wal l Street and the Ban k of England—played a b i g part in destroying Britain' s nava l power. By no stretch of imagination could it be suggested that the Britis h Nav y was ever likel y to be used in an aggressive role. It wa s essential for the defensive purpose of keeping the trade routes of the Empir e open. Writin g in the "Fi g Tree," March , 1937, D. E. Faulkner-Jone s said:

"If America had insisted strongly and openly on the repayment of our immense debt to her, there would have been no alternative but to expose the real truth. The so-called 'investors' in America no more desired this exposure than our own rulers; but they pressed their advantage home and made Britannia give up her title of Mistress of the Seas. .. . If we are now unable to protect our coasts, let alone our food routes, future historians may well find a very potent cause in the financial control exercised by America (the writer is referring to Wall Street) over us in the first years immediately after the War, when our financial policy was watched over directly by an American adviser. This control existed not because we owed America money; it existed because our Government could not pay America the true debt we owed her—which was a debt in goods, not money—without explaining to the public the secret of credit-creation. It was quite easy to persuade the English to weaken fatally their first, and essentially unaggressive, line of defence: their Navy. The instructed press ingeniously 'smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight.' There was a shameless press exploitation of every generous emotion, every heart-throb of repentance for the four years' butchery, which a healthy instinct made us feel to be a common responsibility of all the participants, enemy and Allies alike. During the high tide of this emotion, our Navy was quietly shorn of its strength."

In vie w of the seriousness of Britain' s shipping position in this War, the following extrac t fro m an editoria l in "Socia l Credit," of September 20, 1935, a typica l attack launched by loya l Britisher s against the treacherous polic y of the Ban k of England, i s wel l wort h quoting:

"By a strange twist of irony a Bank of England concern which has probably done more in the last few years to undermine Britain's security than all the Communists and all the machinations of foreign Powers put together, is called National Shipbuilders' Security Ltd. A more suitable name would be International Bankers' Security, for this concern is engaged in making ship-owning safe for bankers who now control the 'British' mercantile marine. It is 'rationalising' the shipbuilding industry by scrapping so-called redundant yards. According to its annual report, this company has spent, in the last three years, a total of £1,153,387 to buy shipbuilding yards for the deliberate purpose of scrapping them. To replace this destruction would cost at least twenty times as much. This is but one more instance of the sabotage of real wealth in the attempt to make facts fit an archaic financial system. Those who remember the submarine blockade of the last war, which resulted in the loss of millions of tons of ships and thousands of human lives, and nearly resulted in starving this country into surrender, should ponder the dangerous activities of National Shipbuilders' Security, particularly at the present time. We trust that, if, unfortunately, war comes again, no plea of ignorance or 'sound' financial reasons will enable those responsible for this sabotage to escape the penalty of traitors, should Britain suffer for lack of these yards to build ships to replace those sunk."

A n d yet we are told that the Ban k of Englan d i s to-day mor e powerful than ever! Thi s sabotage of Britain' s shipbuilding industr y was referred to in the Britis h Hous e

of Commons on Januar y 21, 1941:

"Mr. James Griffiths (Llanelly): .. . 'I came into this House very largely because of the way industry was being neglected. We are paying the price for the last 20 years in allowing our industrial equipment to rust and to rot. For 20 years we lived in a period when coal mines, workshops and shipbuilding yards were being closed down. By whom? By the financiers of this country. .. . I cannot give way, as I have not much time, and I am entitled to make my point. I want the nation to remember that for 20 years we have pursued a policy of restricting and cutting down production, and now we are paying the price for it. I will give one example. What would this nation give to-day for a shipbuilding yard at Jarrow? Who closed down Jarrow? ... "

Jarro w wa s closed by the Ban k of England ! Lookin g back ove r past history it i s almost beyond comprehension that the Ban k of Englan d should be allowed to continue its domination of the financial policy of an Empir e fighting for its ver y existence. Al l loyal Britisher s wil l mak e every effort to make these facts as widel y know n as possible in orde r that this interna l financia l cancer can be removed and thus allo w the Britis h Empir e to develop its tremendous potential strength. Suc h a step woul d brin g us real victory withi n a remarkabl y short time.

MR. NORMAN AND DR. SCHACHT

D r. Hjalma r Schacht was the financia l adviser in Germany ; he was connected wit h the interests responsible for the financing of Soviet Russia ; wa s closely connected wit h some of the "Left" movement s in German y prio r to the rise of Hitler; helped brin g Hitle r to powe r and, if International Financ e accomplishes its objects, wil l be stil l in a position of powe r long after Hitle r has been swept fro m the worl d stage. However, we are determined to sweep them all out. That is one of our major objectives in this war.

D r. Schacht has been intimately connected wit h Mr . Montag u Norman . In July , 1925, they both wer e at a conference of international financiers in Nice . The y wer e discussing ho w "to save France " from financial collapse.

In answer to a question by the Chairma n of the Macmilla n Committee , Mr . Norma n said, in outlining the proposals to form a Centra l Worl d Bank : "But, . . . there were at that time outstanding individuals, as I believe, in the Central Banking World, who made co-operation possible in the earlier stages, and pre-eminent among them were Governor Strong and President Schacht. They were both dominant men, extremely interested from different sides—and very differently they were—in co-operation. They were the most wholehearted supporters of the idea and did, in its early stages, I believe, a great deal in trying to bring about a common policy as between the various banks."

In May , 1934, a privat e conference took place between Dr. Schacht and Mr . Norman . They met again at a "secret conclave " at Badenweiler, in the Blac k Forest, whil e on their wa y to a meeting of the Ban k of International Settlements at Basle. A loan for Nazi Germany wa s being negotiated. A furthe r meeting between the tw o banker s took place in October of the same year.

Towards the end of 1935 Mr . Norma n was again in secret discussion wit h Dr. Schacht. Already the Ban k of Englan d had pledged itself to a financial scheme for stabilising the Nazi regime!

T h e "Times " Basle correspondent reported, Apri l 5, 1936: "For the first time since the existence of the Bank of International Settlements a board meeting was held to-day in a country other than Switzerland. Dr. Schacht had invited all the Governments to meet at Badenweiler, a German health resort in the Black Forest, where Dr. Schacht has several times spent week-ends with Sir (!) Montagu Norman."

Afte r Munich , Dr. Schacht went ove r to England and was a guest of Mr . Norman. In January, 1939, Governo r Norma n was on his wa y to the monthly meeting of the B.I.S.; he called on Dr. Schacht in Berli n on the way .

W a r was declared in September, but, as questions in the Britis h House of Commons on September 17, 1940, revealed, the Ban k of International Settlements is carrying on, wit h representatives of the banker s fro m al l the belligerents . The following i s taken fro m the Britis h "Hansard":

"Mr. Parker asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that, in the report of the Bank of International Settlements, dated May 27, 1940, the names of Mr. Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, and Dr. Funk, German Economic Minister, are included together amongst the list of directors; and as it is not desirable at the present time Mr. Norman should be listed in a public document as a colleague of a German Cabinet Minister, he will take the necessary steps to terminate this country's connection with the Bank of International Settlements?

"Mr. Craven-Ellis asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is satisfied that the enemy gain no advantage from the Bank of England's association with this bank, which is now controlled by representatives of enemy countries, he will take steps to ensure that all connection with the Bank of International Settlements is revised? . . .

"Mr. Shinwell: 'Is it desirable to retain this informal association between Mr. Montagu Norman and Dr. Funk, and if the arrangement which was previously operative is now inoperative, could not this association be brought to an end?'

"Sir K. Wood: 'No, sir, I do not think so, because, as I have said, I think there are advantages to this country in retaining the connection. We have a little money there. . . .'

"Mr. Gallacher: 'Does the right hon. gentleman remember the words of the Prime Minister, that the gold sent through this bank by Montagu Norman to Germany would come back to this country in the form of bombs; and in view of the correctness of that prophecy is it not about time to put an end to this bank?'

"Sir K. Wood: 'I have already said we have some interest there.' "

THE FINANCING OF RUSSIA

It i s no w commo n knowledge in well-informe d circles that certain German-American - Jewis h financia l interests wer e directly associated wit h the financing of the Russian revolutio n and the exploitation of that country. The same interests seek to foist Internationa l Socialism on the entire world—particularl y the Britis h Empire . The same interests wer e responsible, both directly and indirectly, for Hitlerism . Hitleris m and Communis m are almos t synonymous terms—as the worl d was shocked to learn when the Russo-Germa n Pac t took place jus t prio r to the outbreak of the present war. The fact that German y has since attacked Russi a does not alter the underlying fact that International Financ e i s gaining mor e in powe r at the expense of the Britis h peoples. We can only judge wh o wins a wa r by asking "Wh o benefits? "

In 1921, a certain Krassin—wh o had been a direc t representative of the International Financier s in Russi a after the revolution—went to Londo n as leader of the Soviet Trade Delegation—the negotiations for whic h had been initiated by persons in the Cit y of Londo n wit h powerfu l international financia l groups behind them. Th e "Mornin g Post" of Decembe r 16, 1921, claimed that this delegation was for the purpose of arranging a project for the combined exploitation of Russi a by Britis h and Germa n financial interests.

Mrs . N. Webster, reviewin g these facts in "Th e Surrende r of the Empire," says: "Viewed from this angle the Trade Agreement with Great Britain and Russia in 1921 takes on a different aspect. No longer a compact with a derelict empire, but with the most formidable Power in the world, the Power of International Finance, it is seen not as an act of folly, but as a surrender to forces with which its authors were either unable or unwilling to contend."

T h e forces behind Russi a are forces whic h have consistently sought to destroy the Britis h Empire ; far too man y of our Empire' s "leaders " have been prepared to betray us to these alien forces.

In hi s book, "Th e Alie n Menace", the late Colone l A. H . Lane , one o f the most patrioti c Britisher s wh o has eve r writte n on this matter, said: "Our financial crisis in July, 1931, was largely due to the international financiers in the City of London having granted large credits to Germany, which Germany declared herself unable to repay. The newspapers described these loans or credits as being 'frozen' in Germany. Germany had passed on these loans, or a good portion of them, to Russia, and it was in Russia where they were—or are still—'frozen.' The financial collapse of Germany, or even of Great Britain, would not necessarily mean any loss to the international financiers who 'wangled' our money into Soviet Russia. . . . The following extracts from recent statements on this question of 'frozen' credits not only prove that the relations between International Finance and Bolshevism continue, but they suggest that these relations may have serious consequences for this country.

"On 18th September, 1931, Mr. James W. Gerard, American Ambassador in Berlin during the War, after returning from a visit to Europe, declared that Germany 'did not need any financial assistance and that a large percentage of the loans from the United States was lent to Russia.' He added: 'If we're going to do business with Russia, let us do it directly and not through Germany, which has arranged to give Soviet Russia millions of dollars' credit to purchase commodities in Germany' ('National Review,' January, 1932). . . . This story of Germany passing loans received from England and America to Russia has been told many times in the Socialist journal, 'Forward'; and the story is now confirmed by a paper closely associated with Soviet interests. The 'British-Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook,' December, 1931, said, in an editorial article: 'It must be ironic for them (British manufacturers) to view the forced cessation of work on the giant Cunard liner, which is attributed to this country's 'frozen' credits in Germany—credits which have been used in great part by Germany to finance orders from Russia. During 1931, orders amounting to over £45,000,000 have been placed with German firms by the Soviet buying organisations.

"Further information on these credits was given by Lord Beaverbrook in an address at Lincoln, reported in the 'Daily Express,' 16th January, 1932. Speaking on German Reparations, Lord Beaverbrook said: 'It is true that Germany owes our international financiers in the City of London £500,000,000. . . . Our international financiers in the City borrowed that money from France and America and paid 2 per cent. for the accommodation. They lent it to Germany for 8 per cent; and what did Germany do with the money? She lent it to Russia for 15 per cent. interest. That is what became of the money'. Lord Beaverbrook added that 'these buck-jumping financiers . . . have ramifications all over Europe. We need not worry ourselves about them.' "

Whil e Lor d Beaverbrook was right concerning the ramifications of the international financiers , he was wron g whe n he said that we have no need to worr y about them T he Ban k of England i s a vita l factor in the plans of the international financiers .

As we wil l see later, the Ban k of England has been deliberately introducing a form of Socialism into Britai n unde r the term, "Planne d Economy." Thi s i s simila r to the Russian idea. It i s being fostered by bankin g interests in all parts of the Empire .

THE ANGLO-GERMAN FELLOWSHIP

We have dealt with the close connection between the Bank of England and the financing of Nazi Germany. Most people have heard of the Anglo-German Fellowship Association which existed before the outbreak of war. I have no doubt that many people who belonged to this organisation were sincere in their outlook. Whether we can believe the same of other members who belonged to the financial world is another matter.

In the membership of the Anglo-Germa n Fellowship wer e three director s of the Ban k of England, three directors of the Midlan d Bank , Sir Walte r Runcima n (director of Lloyds Bank), a director of Barclay' s Bank , two director s of the Nationa l Ban k of Scotland, including the late Lor d Lothian, three director s of Schrode r and Compan y (Anglo-Germa n Bank), two director s of the Britis h Line n Bank , two director s of Ratti Brother s (Anglo-Italian Bank), Sir Sydne y Pee l (director of the Nationa l Ban k of Scotland), and Lor d Hutchinso n of Montros e (director of the Londo n board of the Nationa l Ban k of Australia).

THE ADMISSIONS OF 1924

T he year 1924 wil l always be remembered by students of economic history as the year in whic h Reginald McKenn a "ble w the gaff" on the bankin g system in hi s now famous admission to the shareholders of the Midlan d Bank , in January , 1924; "I am afraid the ordinary citizen will not like to be told that the banks can, and do, create money. The amount of money in existence varies only with the action of the banks in increasing and decreasing deposits and bank purchases. Every loan, overdraft or bank purchase creates a deposit, and every repayment of a loan, overdraft, or bank sale destroys a deposit. AN D THE Y WH O CONTRO L TH E CREDIT OF A NATION ,

DIRECT TH E POLIC Y O F GOVERNMENTS , AN D HOL D I N TH E HOLLO W O F THEIR HAND S TH E DESTIN Y O F TH E PEOPLE. "

Suc h an admission mus t have shocked Mr . Norman . Bu t there was even worse to come. Sir Drummon d Fraser, vice-president of the Institute of Bankers , said: "Th e Governor of the Bank of England must be the autocrat who dictates the terms upon which alone the Government can obtain borrowed money."

THE DESPOT OF THREADNEEDLE STREET

Writin g in the "Ne w Leader" of October 9, 1931, Lieut. Commande r Kenworth y (now Lor d Strabolgi) said: "O n one memorabl e occasion the present Governo r of the Ban k was asked the relationship of the Court of Director s to the Treasury. He replied that it was the relationship of Tweedledu m and Tweedledee."

No wonder, then, that one authority dubbed Mr . Norma n the "Despot of Threadneedle Street." Th e followin g extracts , fro m various sources, are most striking evidence of the powe r of Mr . Norman' s dictatorship:

"Mr. Montagu Collet Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, is now head and shoulders above all other British bankers. No other British banker has ever been as independent and supreme in the world of British finance as Mr. Norman is to-day. He has just been elected Governor for the eighth year in succession. Before the war, no Governor was allowed to hold office for more than two years; but Mr. Norman has broken all precedents. He runs his bank and the Treasury as well."—"Wall Street Journal," 1927.

Well , Wal l Street should know .

T h e "Wal l Street Journal," of Marc h 11, 1927, ha d quit e a lot to say concerning M r . Norman : "Montagu Collet Norman, as Governor of the Bank of England, has wide powers in determining the course of British credit. . . . He, more than any other banker, has inspired the policy of banks of issue in a dozen countries. His personal influence is such that he has variously been called 'a Crusader' and 'the Currency Dictator of Europe.' . . . When Britain returned to the gold standard, many Continental banks shifted gold balances to the Bank of England. Mr. Norman insisted that Poland, Greece, and other countries maintain gold deposits at the Bank of England, in order to get credit accommodation. He berated the Governor of the Austrian Bank a couple of years ago for Austria's failing to make administrative economies."

"Sinc e 1919 the monetary policy of the Government has been the policy of the Ban k of England, and the polic y of the Ban k of England has been the policy of M r . Montag u Norman."—Mr. Vincent Vickers , Ban k o f England director, 1910-19.

"Now , let us tur n to those we can congratulate. The Court and directors of the Ban k of Englan d have agreed to recommend to the proprietor s in Apri l next that the Righ t Hon . Montag u Colle t Norma n b e re-elected Governor. Mr . Norma n wil l then have held that post for a decade, an d he can look back on the period of his office a nd say, without fear of contradiction, that durin g hi s term of governorship America has experienced ten years of unexampled prosperity."—Viscount Castlerosse, 1928.

"I can say, wit h regard to a certain publi c appointment, Mr . Montagu Norman , Governo r of the Ban k of England, not only objected to a decision reached by a responsible Government Department and its Ministers , but insisted on the appointment of another person, and also furthe r advised the salary he was to receive. In this case, the view s of Minister s wer e overruled, and Mr . Norman' s advice accepted. The salary granted was also twice as high as that originally proposed."—Mr. E. Shinwell, ex-Ministe r of Mines , September 13, 1931.

On Ma y 13, 1925, Mr . Norma n forced Britai n back on to the gold standard. The poverty-is-good-for-yo u theory was being rigidl y enforced. The worship of a yellow meta l was mor e important than huma n values . Sir Charle s Morgan-Webb , in "Te n Year s of Currenc y Revolution," writes : "The operations of currency management con ferred upo n the Ban k of Englan d the powe r to restric t credit, to postpone ne w enterprises, to lessen the demand fo r constructional material s and other capital goods, to create unemployment, to diminis h the demand for consumable goods, to cause difficulty in renewin g loans, to confront manufacturer s wit h the prospect of falling prices, to force dealer s to press their goods on a wea k market, and to cause a decline in general prices on the home market."

Followin g the appointment o f Lor d Catto, Coli n Campbel l and Sir B. Hornsby a l l bankers—to the Britis h Treasur y in 1940 the following appeared in the London "Evenin g Standard" of Jul y 3: "The Bank of England is now taking over Whitehall. That is the true meaning of appointments to the Treasury in the past few days. The Bank of England to-day is probably more powerful than it has been for years."

It might be appropriate here if I deal briefly wit h the famous incident in the Britis h Nav y on September 15, 1931. Montag u Norma n and his friends in Wal l Street were calling upon the Britis h people to make even mor e sacrifices. Thi s was too muc h for the Nav y at Invergordon, and, as a result of certain drastic action, Macdonald, Baldwi n and Norma n had to "ease it off" a bit, so fa r as the Nav y was concerned.

T he "Dail y Express " of October 24, 1931, came out wit h a pictur e of the ex-Kaise r on the left-hand side and Montag u Norma n on the right. Thi s wa s part of Admira l Dewar' s election propaganda in Nort h Portsmouth. As a background to these two figures was a pictur e of the sea, wit h battleships and other symbol s of nava l power. The title read as follows :

"Leaders of Lost Causes"; "The British Navy at Jutland in 1916 beat the ex-Kaiser; and at Invergordon in 1931 it beat Mr. Montagu Norman."

However, Mr . Norman' s system of borrow, boom and slum p went on.

THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN GOLD EPISODE

Wha t i s now know n a s the famous "Czec h Gol d Incident" furthe r demonstrated the power of the Ban k of England and the Ban k of International Settlements. It also demonstrated the fact that the Britis h Government had no control ove r the actions of the Ban k of England.

Whe n the Naz i machine crashed into Czechoslovaki a in September, 1938, it took the assets of the Czechoslovakian Nationa l Bank . Approximatel y £5,000,000 wort h of Czech gold held by the Ban k of England was transferred to Germany , wit h the result that, whe n this fact became known , there was an uproa r in the Britis h Hous e of Commons . The following extracts fro m the "Sydne y Mornin g Herald " of Ma y 24, 1939, speak for themselves:

"The Secretary for Mines, Mr. Crookshank, said in the House of Commons that the Government had no power to restrain the movement of gold held in the Bank of International Settlements on behalf of the Czechoslovakian National Bank. . . . This means that more than £5,000,000 worth of Czech gold deposited in the Bank of England for the Bank of International Settlements will be transferred to Germany. . . . The City Editor of the 'News-Chronicle' says: . .I t now turns out that more than £5,000,000 was, in fact, released, although not by agreement with the Treasury, BECAUS E THIS WA S NO T REQUIRED.' " (M y emphasis.)

Thre e days after thi s report, the following appeared in the Sydne y "Sun" :

"The charge that Germany had 'stolen' £6,000,000 of Czech gold held in England was made in the Commons to-day. The gold, it was stated, was claimed by the Bank for International Settlements, acting on behalf of the German Reichsbank, from the Bank of England.

"Mr. B. Bracken (Cons.), who raised the subject, declared that the British delegates on the Bank for International Settlements should have informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the claim. He said that gangsters had got into Czechoslovakia and stolen the title deeds. . . . Mr. Lloyd George (Lib.) asserted that the £6,000,000 had already been transferred to the Reichsbank, which had no more right to it than a burglar. It was amazing, he said, that the Treasury could have agreed to the decision without consulting the Government."

No doubt German y utilised this gold to furthe r increase he r supplies of ra w materials for wa r purposes fro m Britis h and other countries .

A BLOW AT THE MONARCHY

I pointed out earlier, in thi s "Histor y of the Ban k of England," ho w the Mone y Powe r has been endeavouring to undermine the Britis h Monarch y since the time of Cromwell . I have also mentioned the conditions prio r to the start of the debt system, whe n the issue of the nation' s money supply was one of the Monarchy' s greatest prerogatives. Her e is an interesting table of comparison of conditions in England:

Thirteenth Century

Debt: Nil . Meat: ½d. per lb. Fat Goose: 2d. Beer: 1d. gallon. Shoes: 4d. pair. Holidays : 152 a year. Week's Work : Fou r days .

Productive Power: Ma n and horse.

Man' s Achievement: Cathedrals , Guildhalls .

Art , Literature .

Twentieth Century

Debt: £8,000,000,000. (Thi s i s considerably

mor e now.) Meat: 2/- pe r lb . F a t Goose: 8/6. Beer: 5/4 gallon. Shoes: 12/6 pair. Holidays : 56 a year. Week' s Work : 6 days.

Productiv e Power: Steam, Electricity, Petrol. (About a millio n times greater than the 13th century.)

Man' s Achievement: Slums , Crowde d Hos pitals, Distressed Areas , Publi c Assistance Committees .

Unti l 1928 in Britain , the pretence of the King' s sovereignty over the nation's money w a s maintained by keeping hi s head upo n al l Treasury notes. But, a s we know , this i s onl y a small portion of the total money supply . Th e great bul k of it i s manufactured in the for m of bank credit by the privat e trading banks .

However, the privat e financiers wanted every suggestion of the Monarchy' s sovereignty in money matter s removed. In 1928 an Ac t was passed which transferred the King's currency to the Bank of England. "I n the design of the ne w Ban k of England notes the King' s head disappeared! Th e people's paper money ceased to have any authority unde r the Crown , and was no w issued to them, ver y kindly , by the private joint stock concern called 'The Governo r and Compan y of the Ban k of England. ' "

In an article on this matter, the "Dail y Mail " said: "The new green £ 1 and brown 10/- notes have a curiously foreign aspect. They look as if they had been designed in the United States. . . . The old Treasury notes were not particularly artistic productions, but they did not produce this impression of foreign provenance. The King's head and the design of St. George killing the dragon stood out plainly on the front, and Houses of Parliament equally plainly on the back. . . ."

T he followin g pointed criticism was offered by the "Mornin g Post": "The firs t impression on the mind is that the design—perhaps in token of our debt to America —has been modelled on that of the Greenback, and that if the denomination had been expressed in dollars instead of in sterling, the effect would have been more complete."

Whethe r there was any connection between wha t was little short of a personal attack upo n Kin g George V. and his breakdow n has caused some speculation. Kin g George V . wa s ver y pointed i n hi s remark s whe n opening the Worl d Economi c Con ference in 1933: "I appeal to yo u to co-operate for the ultimat e good of the whol e world . It cannot be beyond the powe r of ma n so to use the vast resources of the worl d as to assure the materia l progress of civilisation. No diminutio n of these resources has taken place." He went on to say that it was surely not beyond the capacity of m a n to distribut e the benefits of science. He clearly indicated that it was a problem of distribution, whic h means that it i s a money problem. He also said: "Al l nations are suffering fro m a common ill . Thi s i s show n only too clearly by the use of unemployment figures . Interpreting these figures in terms of human suffering has been my constant concern in recent years." Wha t a huma n appeal! Wha t a reproach to those responsible for the maladministration of the Empire ! Kin g George V. died ver y saddened in spirit, but he left a fitting epitaph in the words I have quoted.

Speaking before the Nationa l Congres s of the Londo n Chambe r of Commerc e on Commercia l Education in 1933, hi s Roya l Highnes s the Princ e of Wales—now Duk e of Windsor—said: "The depression and economic disturbance has been largely caused by maladjustment of distribution. The potential output is far greater than ever before. If all employable labour were employed for a reasonable number of hours per week, the world would have at its disposal a volume of commodities and services which would enable the entire population to live on a higher level of comfort and well-being than has ever been contemplated in the rosiest dreams of the social reformer. Our urgent task is to bring consumption and production into a proper relationship—not a simple, but a quite possible, task."

Distributio n depends upon the money system, whic h i s largely controlled by the Ban k of England.

Othe r member s of the present Roya l famil y have shown a simila r concern for the well-bein g of their people. Perhaps thi s evoked the famous slogan in some of the slu m areas a fe w year s back: "W e ma y be lousy, but we'r e loyal."

If the Britis h experiment—as it has been so aptly called—i s to be preserved and continued, the creation of the nation' s money supply wil l have to be wrested fro m the hands of the privat e financier s and become the sole prerogative of Hi s Majesty' s Governments .

G o d save the King !

MONTAG U NORMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Montagu Norman told the Macmillan Committee that he had been devoting a great deal of his time after the war to two things: The first was "the stabilisation of foreign countries which had lost what they possessed before the war," and the second was the setting up of central banks throughout the world.

In 1922 a Conference of International Financier s took place in Genoa . Mr . Montagu Norma n wa s the leading exponent of the Centra l Reserve Ban k System. In "Montagu Norman , a Study in Financia l Statesmanship," Mr . Pau l Einzig , editor of the Londo n "Financia l Review," says that Mr . Norma n "raised central bankin g after its early haphazard growt h to a scientific system." He was "assisted by able and experienced experts such a s Sir Otto Niemeye r (Australians and Ne w Zealander s remembe r this gentleman quit e well) and Mr . Siepmann."

M r . Einzi g also says: "Another condition on which Mr. Norman and his collaborators insisted was that the central banks should be independent of their governments." Thi s policy has certainly been wel l carried out. Since the Commonwealt h Ban k in this country has become a Centra l Ban k it has been dominated by the privat e trading banks and the Ban k of England. "Politica l interference " i s rigidl y opposed.

In his biography of Mr. Norman, Mr. Einzig says: "His conception of a Central Bank is that it should be a State within a State. This implies immunity from political interference on the part of the political authorities of their respective countries, and also the observance of rules adopted in the intercourse between sovereign powers. . . . The most important step in the course of the endeavours to promote co-operation between central banks has been the establishment of the Bank of International Settlements. .. . As usual he remained entirely behind the scenes. .. . In spite of this he had more to do with it than anybody else." Mr . Einzi g also says: "It is a fact that in chronological order he devoted hi s attention in the first place to the reconstruction of the ex-enemy countries." We are told that this wa s "onl y because they wer e in urgent need of help." (The crushing of the Britis h people by Mr . Norma n was apparently a matter of very little importance. Mr . Poverty-is-good-for-you-Norma n kne w wha t was best!) The firs t countries to be "assisted" by the Ban k of Englan d were Germany, Austria , Bulgari a and the Cit y of Danzig .

T he activities of the Ban k of Englan d in connection wit h Austria , as related by M r . Bruc e Lockhart i n "Retreat fro m Glory, " published i n 1934, are wel l wort h quoting. Fro m 1919 to 1922 Mr . Lockhart was Commercia l Secretary at the Britis h Legation at Prague . He says: "Befor e the wa r there had been a large bank called the Anglo-Oesterreichsche Ban k in Vienna—a Jewis h concern wit h some Englis h capital, and wit h branches al l over Ol d Austria."

Thi s bank fell into difficulties and the Ban k of England, to whic h it owed money, decided to put it on its feet again. Mr . Spencer Smit h wa s representing the Ban k of England and, upon arrivin g a t Vienna , had some difficulty, in whic h he needed the diplomati c services o f Mr . Lockhart. Mr . Lockhart relates: "Al l the assets o f the Viennese Ban k wer e in Austria n Treasur y notes, whic h had been deposited in Prague . Whil e the Austrians claimed that the notes wer e entitled to be valued in Czec h currency, the Czechs wer e equally insistent that they wer e not." Czechoslovaki a h ad formerly used Austria n currency, but whe n this paper money became worthles s in the inflation of 1921, the Czechoslovakian Government held up the value of thi s money, and on a given date separated it fro m Austria n currency by stamping al l notes in the country wit h a Czechoslovakian brand. *

"Unfortunately," says Mr . Lockhart, "the Jew s in the A.O . Ban k had been too far-seeing. Instead of sending the bank-note s into Czechoslovaki a on the give n day, they had transferred interest-bearing Treasury notes. The Czechs ha d stamped the bank-notes . .. . Greed for interest ha d defeated its ow n ends . .. . If the 148,000,000 Treasury notes of the A.O . Ban k ha d a Czech value , they wer e wort h ove r £1,000,000. If they had an Austria n value they wer e worthless . Withou t the assets the Governo r (of the Ban k of England) could not go ahead wit h hi s scheme."

Thi s was wher e the services of Mr . Lockhart came in . He wa s to tr y and persuade the Czechoslovakian Government to make this worthles s pil e of paper (if Austrian ) into a millio n sterling (if Czech). The Government felt disinclined to do anything of the kind , but in the end gave the A.O . Ban k a loan of 148,000,000 krone n at 1 per cent. Si x months later, as a reward, the Czechs wer e allowed to float a loan of £10,000,000 in Ne w Yor k and London . In this manner, that section of Centra l Europe , represented by the parties interested in the A.O . Bank , wa s brought unde r the control of the Ban k of England.

OBTAINING CONTROL OF INDUSTRY

At the Worl d Economi c Conference of 1927, there was a suggestion of the "rationa l organisation of production and distribution" by the "bringin g of the whol e of an industry unde r intelligent direction and administration." One of the most prominent men in thi s movement in Britai n was the Jew, the late Sir Alfre d Mond , head of the powerful Imperia l Chemica l Industries combine. In 1927 he sought the support of the trade unions for his scheme of rationalisation. Th e Genera l Counci l of the Trade s Union Congress stated that "whil e rationalisation can neve r prove an alternative to nationalisation, the movement was prepared to welcome suc h changes in the organisa tion of industry durin g the period of privat e ownership as woul d lead to improvement s in the efficiency of industry and to the raising of the standards of livin g of the people." Here we had the financier s and the socialists mor e or less agreeing on basic principles .

Whe n Mr . Norma n made hi s firs t appearance before the Macmilla n Committee ,

on Marc h 26, 1930, he said that he was devoting some attention to "a n attempted study of industry, mainl y the heavy basic industrie s of the country." Hi s idea was that "the salvation of industry in this country, without whic h commerce and financ e cannot long continue, lies in the process of rationalisation . . . and that is to be achieved by the unit y or unification, or marriage, of financ e an d industry." Her e was an open admission that the Ban k of England was attempting to get control of industry and organise it for its ow n ends unde r big trusts. Small , independent firms were to be crushed out. Mr . J. W. Beaumont Pease, chairman o f Lloyd s Bank , in hi s evidence before the same committee, said: "Of course, the whole question of amalgamation affords a certain amount of ironical amusement to bankers, because as the wheel comes round what used to be considered a danger, a step in the direction of monopolies, and so on, is, in other industries, now held out very much as one of the means of salvation." Crushe d financially by the Ban k of England' s deflation policy, Britis h industr y in sheer desperation was ready to accept any solution. We see exactly the same technique in this country wher e the local agents of the Ban k of England are pursuin g the same policy. The result i s the centralisation of industry into monopolies a n d the rapi d growth of innumerabl e bureaucrati c boards to control the primar y producers .

S ir Ernes t Harvey , Deput y Governo r of the Ban k of England, admitted in hi s evidence that about October, 1929—about the beginning of the worl d depression the Ban k of Englan d had set up a Securities Management Trus t to buy up control of industria l concerns.

As we have seen, the policy of credit contraction was initiated by the Wal l Street group through their control of the Ban k of England. Mr . Loui s T. McFadden , ex-President of the Pennsylvani a Bankers ' Association, and for twelve year s Chairma n of the U.S.A . Hous e of Representatives ' Bankin g and Currenc y Committee, speaking in the U.S.A . Congres s on Decembe r 15, 1931, said, in referring to the slump: "It was not accidental. It was a carefully contrived occurrence—the International Bankers sought to bring about a condition of despair here so that they could emerge as rulers of us all."

M r . E. L. Payton, i n giving evidenc e before the Macmilla n Commission o n behalf of the Nationa l Unio n of Manufacturer s on Februar y 27, 1930, dealt wit h the increasing difficulty of small firms to obtain capital. Furthe r evidence of the elimination of small trader s was given by Sir Willia m Perring , President of the Nationa l Chambe r of Trade , an organisation representing some 360 local Chamber s of Trade . He said: "I n each provincia l tow n whic h yo u g o into to-day, if yo u wal k up the mai n street yo u wil l see five businesses out of six are multipl e shops or chain shops. Tha t is the position in the mai n street. The y have been secured at fabulous rents and premiums . The banks handl e the money of these multipl e shops. The small ma n i s being squeezed out, and I thin k ultimately it wil l be to the detriment of our people as a nation."

Australians might look around and see if they can see simila r tendencies in this country.

A FURTHER MOVE

In February , 1931, Mr . Norma n told the Committe e that hi s firs t company—Securities Management Trust—had been developed into a muc h larger concern—the Bankers ' Industria l Development Company . Its capital was provided by the Ban k of England a nd the bi g acceptance houses. Some nasty allegations wer e made that the amalgamations of Britis h industries wer e being affected by "foreign money." Sir Otto Niemeye r said on this point: "I woul d not feel the least compunction about taking every sort of money fro m whateve r source I could get it."

T h e head of the Bankers ' Industria l Development Compan y was Sir Gu y Granet, w h o also gave evidence before the Macmilla n Committee . Sir Gu y was partner in Higginso n and Company , international bankers . Apart from Sir Guy , the board controlling thi s Development Compan y consisted of Mr . Norman ; Baro n Schroeder, o f the internationa l Jewis h bankin g house o f J. H . Henr y Schroede r and Company ; M r . Peacock of Baring' s (who, in forme r years , wer e Londo n agents for the Wal l Street group, Kuhn , Loe b and Co.), and Mr . Bruc e Gardner, managing director o f the Ban k of Englan d Securities Management Trust.

Thi s fine group of "British " financiers set out to get control of Britis h industries . Tha t they wer e finding the average Britishe r rathe r har d to deal wit h was evidenced by Sir Gu y Granet' s admission that tact wa s needed. He told the Macmilla n Commission that "It would be a dreadful thing if industry thought that here was a body of bankers who were going to tell industry how they ought to be organised: that would at once get their bristles up. "

Aske d as to the position of the banks wit h respect to, say, the steel industry, S ir W. H . N . Goschen, chairman o f the Nationa l Provincia l Bank , stated: "They are

very much in the hands of the banks in this respect, that the banks are able to put them in liquidation, if necessary."

Lor d Macmilla n asked: "The power behind your advice is 'If you do not take that course we shall cut off your supplies?'"

S ir W . H . N . Goschen replied: "Yes. "

The arrogant attitude of the banker s towards industr y can be gathered by the following statement by Sir Ernes t Harvey : ". . . We clai m the right to assure ourselves that those wh o are to be in charge of the industry are qualified . . . that there are financial adviser s who can be relied upon fro m the point of vie w of finance. In that way we claim the right to a certain amount of control. . . ."

MONTAGU NORMAN "SACKS" A STEEL-"KING"

Tha t Mr . Norma n wields despotic power s and over-ride s anyone wh o gets in the wa y of hi s policy was clearly demonstrated whe n he removed Sir Willia m Firth , chairman of Richard Thomas and Co. ; the £20,000,000 steel and tinplate combine . S ir Willia m Firt h started hi s career as a 10/- a wee k office boy. It wa s entirely due to hi s initiative and driv e that the Richar d Thomas steel combine wa s recognised throughout the worl d for the quality of its work . Contro l of the company was achieved by the Ban k of England in 1938 whe n it lent the company seven millio n pounds to complete the great plant a t Ebb w Vale . Speaking on thi s matter, Sir Willia m Firt h said: "I feel like a captain who has lost his ship and is here to report to the owners . Abou t two year s ago, in ver y dirt y weather, some pirates pushed us on the rocks , and boarded us disguised as 'national interests' men. . . . Th e method of obtaining control by the appointment of a control committee is a technique ne w in thi s country ; as unjust as it i s un-English." The mai n control committee, said Sir William , consisted of three persons—the Governo r of the Ban k of England, Lor d Greenwood an d Mr . Lever. It had been estimated by the banks , said Sir William , that the company woul d need about £7,000,000 to complete its capital expenditur e programme and operate its plant. B u t time had proved the maximu m needs to be less than three and a half millions , despite heavy A.R.P . expenditure . Ther e i s not the slightest doubt that seven instead of three and a half millions was thrus t upon the company in orde r to acquir e control. Commenting on Sir William' s dismissal as a result of "irreconcilabl e difference withi n the board," the "Ne w Englis h Weekly " of Ma y 9, 1940, unde r the heading "Financ e Ove r Industry," said: "This dismissal of an industrial pioneer has taken place at the hands of a 'control committee,' instituted with a vast capital two years ago, to finance the large-scale improvements then made at Ebbw Vale, and presided over by Mr. Montagu Norman; a committee powerful enough by its joint control of finance and technique to dominate the entire steel industry and, in fact, designed to do so. . . . But the dismissal of an industrialist, who had brought British steel production up to the best world standard, and who has been shown to have the confidence of his employees, by a committee consisting partly of bankers and partly of his rivals, is an extremely bad omen for the future of British industry. . . . Whatever the need of a true national planning . . . the worst possible approach to it is a surreptitious oligarchic control in the interests of a usurping finance; and we join with Sir William Firth, and those who have contentedly worked with him, to demand an investigation of the gangsterdom which has put him on the spot."

Thi s was part of Mr . Norman' s programme of "rationalising " industry. In the English "Socia l Crediter" of Ma y 25, 1940, the followin g item appeared in connection with the above matter: "It is reported that certain sections of the huge plant, which in the present circumstances must be of national importance, were only working part time, and that the steel which had been imported to the Vale to keep the plant working to capacity was now going elsewhere." Wa r or no war, the Ban k of England' s programme marches on.

SOVIETISM BY STEALTH

Apart from attempting to obtain control of industry, there was a move to obtain control of agriculture by the establishment of Boards . I shall deal wit h this matter at some length, because the futur e of civilisation ma y wel l depend upon the attitude that the primar y producer s adopt towards thi s plot to "Sovietise " them. Ever y representative of International Financ e wh o has eve r been in thi s country—such as M r. Bruce—has urged "planning " of primar y production. It i s essential that we understand the origin and motives of this sinister plan.

Evidence given before the Macmilla n Commission revealed that the Ban k of Englan d had set up an Agricultura l Mortgage Corporation. Sir Otto Niemeye r took a leading part in this and became a director. The chairman was Sir W. H. N . Goschen, chairman of the Nationa l Provincia l Bank . Allegedl y the corporation was for the purpose of "assisting" agriculture.

In 1931, there came into existence in Englan d a movement for promoting "Planned Economy." Sir Basi l P. Blackett, director of the Ban k of England, was the firs t chairman. He was succeeded by Mr . Israel Moses Sieff, the present holder of that position. An examination of the list of people actively engaged in P.E.P . (Political and Economi c Planning ) reveals a curious mixtur e of conservatives, financiers and socialists.

M r . Sieff i s director of a chain-store enterprise in England called "Mark s and Spencer." Hi s idea is to ru n the whol e nation as one big trust. By 1934 the "P.E.P. " wa s i n action i n the following organisations: Mil k Marketin g Board, Pi g Marketin g Board, Electricity Grid , Britis h Broadcasting Corporation, Import Dutie s Advisor y Board, Tow n an d Countr y Plannin g Board, Unite d Steel Companies Ltd . T h e following extract appeared in an Englis h journa l in 1940: "The Political and Economic Planning group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sieff, is out to reduce every public and private activity in England to a compact mechanism of State-aided monopolies, combines and chain-stores, under the control of a few financiers. . . . This wonderful and genial movement for the enslavement of Great Britain is making a fair headway, and has succeeded in laying hands on pigs, bacon, milk, potatoes, turnips, 'buses.. . . The latest to join the movement is the National Birth Control Association, which has, accordingly, altered its name to Family Planning Association. It will tell when and whom to marry, how many children to bring into the world, when to divorce, when and how to die, all according to the lofty standards of a group of financiers' needs and benefits."

Speaking about this Politica l and Economi c Plannin g group and its aims, Mr . McFadde n i s reported, in the "Congressiona l Record " of June 8, 1934, as saying: "Thi s plan i s already in operation in the Britis h Government by means of the Tariff Advisor y Board, whic h in man y of its power s i s somewhat comparable to the Nationa l Recovery Administratio n in the Unite d States. Thi s group organisation has gathered al l data a nd statistics obtained by governmenta l and privat e organisation in administrative, industrial, social, educational, agricultura l an d other circles ; and Army , Nav y and airport statistics are in their hands . Thi s has been made possible fro m the fact that the Prim e Minister, Ramsa y MacDonald , being a Fabian , the 'Politica l Economi c Plan ' Fabia n group has ha d al l archives a t its disposal. Throug h the Tariff Advisor y Boar d created in February , 1933, and headed by Sir George May , the control over industr y and trade i s being firmly established. Thi s board work s in direc t connection wit h the Treasur y and wit h it devises tariff policy. It has also been granted the power s of a la w court and can exac t unde r oath that al l information concerning industry a nd trade be given it.

"Iro n and steel, as also cotton industrial s in England, have been ordered by the Tariff Advisor y Boar d to prepare and submit plans for the reorganisation of their industrie s and warned that, should they fai l to do so, a pla n for complete reconstruction woul d be imposed upo n them. Th e Tariff Advisor y Boar d has been granted default power s and can, therefore, impose its plan. . . . An interesting bit of information has come to me in thi s connection to the effect that this Fabia n group has close connections wit h the Foreig n Polic y Association i n Ne w Yor k City . Thi s Foreig n Polic y Association w a s largely sponsored by the late Pau l M. Warburg , and has received the close attention a nd support o f Bernar d M . Baruc h and Feli x M . Frankfurter.

"Man y serious people in Englan d feel that this Fabia n organisation practically control s the Britis h Government and that this Government wil l soon be know n as 'Hi s Majesty' s Soviet Government. ' It i s asserted that both Prim e Ministe r MacDonal d a nd hi s son belong to the organisation and that the movement i s wel l financed and wel l organised, and intends to practically Sovietise the English-speaking race. Abou t three months after the passage of the Nationa l Recovery Ac t of the Unite d States, whe n Israel Moses Sieff wa s urged by member s of his committee to show more activity, he said: "Le t us go slowl y for a whil e and wait and see ho w our pla n carries out in America."

FINANCE AN D SOCIALISM

Sovietism, under the title of the New Deal, is being rapidly foisted on the American public. The fundamental idea is the same as "planning" and Communism: everything run by big State trusts controlled by Finance. Production is made to fit the money system which alone creates a set of circumstances conducive to getting the people to accept these ideas.

T he financier s kno w that primar y producer s have an independent outlook and have always found them hardes t to deal with . Thi s was particularly so in Russia. Ther e should be no need for me to comment on the simila r manne r in whic h the primar y producer s are being treated in this country.

Writin g of P.E.P . in 1935, Captain Bernar d Acworth , R.N. , said: "I n the winte r of 1933-34, Mr . Harol d MacMillan , M.P. , published a book, 'Industria l Reconstruction,' in which , wit h the aim of establishing an equilibriu m between supply and demand, and so of eliminating price-cutting, proposals wer e made for amalgamating all firms in the several industries into one corporation whic h woul d control the industry . The author frankl y admitted that the proposed corporations woul d constitute monopolies and that this woul d tend to mak e prices rise to the consumer.

" I n November, 1934, Lor d Melchett (of the great Imperia l Chemica l Industries and a membe r of P.E.P.) introduced an Industria l Reorganisation (Enabling) Bil l into the Hous e of Lords . Its purpose was to promote the formation of corporations of the type proposed by Mr . MacMillan . It onl y secured a firs t reading, but an Industria l Reorganisation League , wit h Mr . MacMilla n a s chairman, came into existence to secure support in industry for its principles . .. . It should also b e noted that Mr . Walte r Elliot, Ministe r for Agriculture , i s reported to have said on Marc h 20, 1935, that 'the Unite d Kingdo m policy' for agricultur e was 'the application of the principl e of plannin g in all its phases.' 'It involves,' he said, 'the planning of supply regionally, nationally, a nd internationally, and as a consequence, the planning of consumption. . . .' "

T he planning of consumption! Ther e yo u have the financiers ' plot in a fe w words . Instead of the people havin g sufficient money to bu y wha t they produce , production wil l be planned—whic h means destroyed and restricted—in order to fit the artificial money shortage. The Appl e and Pea r scheme in this country i s a workin g example of such planning.

THE BANK OF ENGLAND AS A MODEL

M r . Sieff, chairman of P.E.P. , embodies hi s ideas on planning in a remarkabl e pamphlet entitled "Freedo m and Planning." Thi s document was kept secret for some considerable time before copies wer e obtained and given publicity . In a broad-sheet issued by the P.E.P. , dated Apri l 25, 1933, the followin g extract emphasises the secrecy and insidious policy of this group: "You may use without acknowledgment anything which appears in this broad-sheet on the understanding that the broad-sheet and group are not publicly mentioned, either in writing or otherwise. This strict condition of anonymity, upon which the broad-sheet goes to you, is essential in order that the group may prove effective as a non-partisan organisation making its contribution outside the field of personal and party polemics."

It i s interesting to note that Mr . Malcol m MacDonald , son of the late Ramsa y MacDonald, belongs to this group, and no w represents the Britis h Government in Canada. Sir Geoffrey Whiskar d spent some of hi s time advocating Politica l and Economi c Planning whil e holding the position of Trade Commissione r in this country.

A careful study of Mr . Sieff's articles on "Planning " clearly indicates the broad lines of a pla n simila r to that mentioned by Mr . Montag u Norma n before the Macmilla n Committee.

Bearing this in mind , the followin g extrac t fro m Section 24 of these articles i s revealing:

"The Bank of England has in the course of its history lost practically all of its original profit-making characteristics and become in fact, if not in form, a leading example of a Public Utility Corporation devoted to rendering public service. It has also many of the features of a self-governing institution, its relation to the Government delicately adjusted so as to combine both due subordination and administrative independence so as to offer a significant parallel to the new institutions suggested earlier in the spheres of industry and distribution. It would appear to be sufficiently flexible to enable it to adapt itself to filling its place in the new order without requiring any radical changes in its constitution."

SOME SINISTER EXTRACTS

Australia n electors might ask themselves if there i s any resemblance between the trends in thi s country and the following extracts fro m Sieff's articles . It i s stated of the farme r and manufacture r that: "He may be conceived of as remaining in full control of his farm or factory, but receiving from the duly constituted authority instructions as to the quantity and quality of his production, and as to the markets in which he will sell."

Small retailer s mus t be dealt with : "The waste involved in . . . retail shops, one shop for every twenty households, cannot be allowed to block the flow of goods from producer to consumer." I woul d mention that it is not the retail system whic h has blocked the flow of goods, but the present financial system. However, apparently the small independent retailer s are to be crushed and the great chain-stor e monopolies to be extended.

On the politica l side we learn that "big consequent changes will follow in the machinery of government."

T he followin g gem should commend itself to the farmer s wh o are no w feeling the ful l blast of plannin g unde r various boards i n this country: "Whether we like it or not—and many will dislike it intensely—the individualistic manufacturer and farmer will be forced by events to submit to far-reaching changes in outlook and methods."

Als o the following : "What is required, if with only a view to equitable treatment of individuals, is transfer of ownership of large blocks of land—not necessarily of all the land in the country, but certainly of a large proportion of it—into the hands of the proposed statutory corporations and public utility bodies and of land trusts."

BANK OF ENGLAND AN D NEW ZEALAND

The history of our sister Dominion has been one of ever-increasing financial dictatorship; ironically enough, the very Government which was elected with an overwhelming mandate from the people to break the private money monopoly has tightened the chains of bondage. I refer to the Labour Government.

T he Colon y of Ne w Zealand wa s founded in 1840, and wit h it the foundations of the debt swindl e which , at that time, had reduced the Mothe r Countr y to abject poverty as an aftermath of the Napoleoni c Wars .

A Government Colonia l Ban k of Issue was established in Ne w Zealand in 1850, but, as it was onl y empowered to issue notes in exchange for coin, it was of little use, and lasted only si x years . Privat e trading banks then started, one of the first being the Unio n Ban k of Australia , whic h i s connected wit h the International Bankin g Ring .

T h e Ban k of Ne w Zealand was established in 1861, and its connection wit h the Government was very intimate fro m the beginning. Thi s bank handled the Government' s account unti l the establishment of the Reserve Ban k in 1934. Th e establishment of the Reserve Ban k was the result of Sir Otto Niemeyer' s visit on behalf of Mr . Montagu Norman , and hi s policy of worl d dictatorship through the establishment of Centra l Reserve Bank s throughout the world—particularl y the Britis h Empire .

T h e followin g statements by prominent Ne w Zealand citizens from 1860 onwards clearly revea l the manne r in whic h bankin g interests have governed the policy of the Dominion :

S ir Willia m Fox , several times Premie r of Ne w Zealand, said in Parliament on Augus t 21, 1868: "I only wish it was possible to exclude from this House a certain power behind the Treasury, or any other corporation, which had proved so capable of making the Ministry work in a diametrically opposite direction from that in which they at first intended to work, and so manifestly opposed to the interests of the colony. I cannot blame the recognised agents of the Bank or any influence they have brought to bear upon this House or upon the Ministry. .. . I do not hesitate to say this influence which has been exercised is a most mischievous interference with the independence of this House, and if it were possible to get hold of such an impalpable element, a Bill ought to be passed to exclude it from this House."

WHAT SIR GEORGE GREY SAID

S ir George Grey , speaking in Parliament in 1875, said: "I believe, for reasons which I shall presently show, that it would be actually in the power of one wealthy establishment in New Zealand to have any person they chose sent out here as Governor who would be likely to support their interests."

As Sir George Grey had been five times Governor of different parts of the "British Empire, he knew what he was talking about.

Later, in 1883, he said: "I conscientiously believe that two or three great establishments, all really under one directorate, do exercise in the Legislature of this country an undoubted and dangerous influence. In sincerely believe that the existing Government is maintained in its place by these bodies. .. . I appeal to many honourable gentlemen sitting here whether they do not feel helpless of fighting the great phalanx opposed to us now. .. . I say that even among the voters it will be a long time before that independence can come about which ought to prevail, because I fear many of them are, in some manner, entangled with engagements which will place them at the mercy of those persons who rule those different great bodies of which I speak. I go further and say—and in saying this I know, of course, that I create, and must create, a great many enemies—I firmly believe that the same persons, by monetary influence, control a great portion of the press. . . . One great central power in New Zealand oppresses it from end to end. That central power is moved by the Premier, and the Premier is the solicitor of these great moneyed corporations. Is it just? Does it give the people of New Zealand a fair chance? Is it not hard for a man to know that if he cries for justice some debt upon his estate may be made the cause of his ruin instantly? Is it right for us to feel degraded by knowing that such is the case here? .. . As long as this continues I see no hope for ourselves or our country."

Thi s wa s strong talk fro m a Governor. Perhaps thi s representative of the Kin g had heard something about the Roya l prerogative of issuing the nation' s mone y supply. S ir Franci s Bel l said on August, 28, 1895: "The Bank (of New Zealand) is repeating what it did last year. They are holding a pistol at the head of this House and the Government, and the Government is yielding, as it yielded last year." On the followin g day, the same speaker said: "The Bank has spread its tentacles all over the colony.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE MOVES IN

. . . I am not sure that it is not more powerful than Parliament."

S ir Otto Niemeyer, representing the Ban k of Englan d and the Ban k of International Settlements, arrived in September, 1930. A balanced budget wa s demanded, and a general curtailment of the amount of money in circulation. Th e same appalling result s eventuated as in other parts of the Empir e that the agent of the Ban k of Englan d h ad visited: Poverty, unemployment, bankruptcie s and miser y everywhere .

As a result of his visit to Ne w Zealand, Sir Otto Niemeye r forwarded a report to the Government recommending the establishment of a Reserve Bank . Th e Reserve Ban k Ac t was passed in 1933, and the following year the bank was set up with the former chief cashier of the Bank of England installed as Governor. The Ne w Zealand Reserve Ban k Ac t contains provision for the bank joining the Ban k of International Settlements. Thi s was all in line wit h Mr . Montag u Norman' s polic y o f worl d hegemony through a chain of central banks in every country.

T h e next mov e was to establish a Mortgag e Corporation, whic h wa s also in line wit h a move by the Ban k of International Settlements to establish a worl d networ k of Agricultura l Mortgage Corporations .

SOCIALISM ENTERS

T he Coalition Government was defeated at the end of 1935. Th e swin g to Labou r was the result of the chaotic conditions durin g the depression and the promises made by the Labou r Part y to break the privat e bankin g monopoly. Unfortunatel y for the electors, they were not full y informed regarding the Labou r Party' s views on socialisation. Some authorities go so far as to say that Financ e deliberately manoeuvred the electors into the position wher e they had ver y little choice but to vote Labour; the Coalition h ad been discredited wit h its "sound finance " policy.

Planned Economy was affirmed by Labou r in its 1935 election manifesto. It i s interesting to note that Mr . Nash, Labour' s Ministe r of Finance , i s a great believe r in Planning . He was a guest of the Politica l and Economi c Plannin g Grou p in Britai n i n 1937.

T he Industrial Efficiency Act, whic h the Labou r Part y neve r mentioned in its 1935 election programme, was cleverly rushed through Parliament late in the firs t session. T he Ac t set Mr . Nas h up a s virtua l dictator of Ne w Zealand. It gave powe r to socialise at wil l the entire industry of the Dominio n without furthe r reference to Parliament.

I n "The Trut h Abou t Ne w Zealand," Mr . A . N . Fiel d writes : "New Zealand's Industrial Efficiency Act at the outset was modestly applied. The cement industry, in the hands of a few works, has been brought under it. Motor spirit distribution is controlled, an operation unlikely to mean much more than rubber-stamping what the big, foreign oil combines want done. The pharmacy trade was induced to submit to being roped in on a threat that the Government would otherwise allow a giant chain-store chemist's concern from England to overrun New Zealand. Rubber tyres, cement, fish export, electric ranges, and wooden heels for footwear are also in the list of controlled industries. . . . Extension, however, goes on.

"Under the Act the Minister of Industries and Commerce has power to apply systems of licensing, control, and price-fixation to any industry, under which term is included 'any trade, occupation, business, manufacture, works, or service of any kind whatsoever.' The Minister may withhold licences from individuals, close down undertakings, and order amalgamations and do many things. In fact, the powers appear to be such that the Minister may control any business brought under the Act as fully as if he were its sole owner. Administration is through a bureau, all the members of which hold office at the Minister's pleasure, and are thus merely the instruments of his will. The Minister may require an industry to appoint an industrial committee for control purposes, but, here again, he may add and remove members, dissolve committees and appoint entire committees himself. No question arises of industrial self-government; only of submission to what is imposed from above. All is at the Minister's pleasure.

"The sole right of appeal by any person injuriously affected under the Act is to the Minister himself. A man may be refused a licence, his business closed or interfered with to any conceivable extent, and all right of appeal to the courts is denied him. "

T w o other important measures wer e brought in by Labou r in its firs t session. T he firs t was a Loca l Government Refor m Bil l whic h aimed at the destruction of the 684 loca l governing bodies of one kin d or another. Thi s is also part of the Ban k of England' s policy : Remov e government furthe r fro m the people, destroy their local institutions an d centralise control. A simila r move has been fostered in this country; the campaign to abolish State Parliament s because these Parliament s are being used by the electors to brin g indirec t pressur e on the privat e financial institutions .

Fortunatel y for Ne w Zealand democracy, the local bodies strongly objected to being abolished.

RESERVE BANK AMENDMENT

T he second important measure referred to was Labour' s Reserve Ban k amendment. A lot of "blah " was uttered about thi s mov e by people wh o should have know n muc h better. Althoug h the move was good, insofar as it took powe r fro m privat e persons a nd restored it to the Government, there wer e significant features whic h were overlooked by many . Mr . Lefeaux , the forme r chief cashier of the Ban k of England, was not removed.

Apart fro m this, the currency and credit of the country are issued against reserves held by the Reserve Bank—a nd these reserves are limited by gold and/or foreign bills of exchange—on which there is no fixed limit. Thi s means that, in the last analysis, the policy of the Dominio n can be dictated by International Finance .

Anothe r feature worth y of note about Labour' s Reserve Ban k amendment was that it stated that the primar y function of the bank is to regulate currency according to Government polic y "as communicated to it fro m time to time by the Ministe r of Finance." Labou r Part y legislation not only failed to clearly state any principl e on whic h the issue of money i s to be regulated, but it authorised dictatorial Minister s to do whateve r they liked .

Thi s call s to min d a statement made in the Unite d States Senate in 1834 by M r . Joh n C. Calhoun : "Place the money power in the hands of a combination of a few individuals, and they, by expanding or contracting the currency, may rise or sink prices at pleasure, and by purchasing when at the greatest deflation, may command the whole property and industry of the community. . . . Never was an engine better calculated to place the destinies of the many in the hands of the few, or less favourable to that equality which lies at the bottom of our free institutions."

REVERSING MAGNA CHARTA

We might briefly note that our Britis h forefathers, wh o gave us our basic conception of a free society, took action against Kin g Joh n in 1215 at Runnymede , because he was doing wha t Dictator Nas h i s doing to-day: Takin g the means of livelihood from certain people. Ou r forefathers di d not demand anything ne w fro m Kin g John. The y wanted their ancient right s restored. Amon g the things enumerated in Magn a Chart a was the demand that even the lowes t in the land was entitled to his accustomed means of livelihood. Eve n if a ma n broke the la w he was to be left wit h hi s livelihood. It was stated: "A freeman shall only be amerced, for a small offence after the manner of the offence, for a great crime according to the heinousness of it, saving to him his contenement; and, after the same manner, a merchant, saving his merchandise, and a villein saving his wainage; the amercement in all cases to be assessed by the honest men of the neighbourhood."

" 'Amercement' meant a fine. 'Contenement' refers to that whic h is indispensable for a man' s support and maintenance, according to hi s ran k or social condition. . . . 'Wainage ' was the crop or tillage of the villei n or husbandman." (Taswell-Langmead' s "Englis h Constitutiona l History.")

These elementary right s have been abolished in Ne w Zealand by the "progressives." Powe r was shifted fro m one group of dictator s to another group.

Thi s legislation went further, it gave the Ministe r of Financ e absolute powe r to discriminat e between individual s desiring sterling for overseas trading.

Trades wer e at the merc y of Mr . Nash, and whe n a protest was made, the Governor-General, acting on the advice of the Attorney-General , disallowed any appeal to the court s to test the constitutionality of the measure.

DEBT AND TAXATION INCREASE

In case someone suggests that the Government could use all these dictatorial power s for the good of the people, the results belie any such implication. A "libera l credit policy " has certainly been introduced—but, credit is issued as a debt, carrying interest

charges. The result has been a drastic increase in taxation and rising prices . Thi s i s part of the Finance-Socialis t plot. Exponent s of this "ne w order" have often stated that the people mus t be kept quiet wit h sops whil e their liberties and institutions are taken fro m them. Million s of pounds of debt-money provide the sops.

"Taxation i s the chief means," says Britain' s socialist Fabia n Society in its Trac t N o . 127, adding that "to the Socialist, the best of government s is that whic h spends the most."

Thi s i s all part of a worl d programme laid dow n by the Ban k of Englan d and other international banking institutions . Ne w Zealand i s doing ver y nicely fro m their point of view . Eve n the late Mr . Savage was a great believe r in taxation—and compulsion —as witnessed by the following statement made late in 1939: "The Government believes in freedom of speech, but it is determined that that freedom must not be abused. Persons who advise others not to pay rent or taxes are enemies to the country, and will be treated accordingly."

M r . Nas h visited Londo n durin g 1939 to arrange for the conversion of a loan whic h was falling due. He was feted by the "City " in London , and di d exactly a s he wa s told.

He went back to Ne w Zealand, and the debt and interest racket went on, whil e more and more restrictive legislation wa s introduced. Wa r was declared and still mor e dictatorial power s wer e taken by the Labou r Government.

Finally , compulsory loans wer e introduced! No wonde r some Socialists believe that Ne w Zealand wil l become a second Soviet Russi a without bloodshed. Surel y Ne w Zealander s wil l assert their Britis h rights , even at this late hour, and take action to bring their representatives unde r their control. The y wil l then get the results that they desire and not wha t someone else thinks i s good for them.

SIR OTTO NIEMEYER VISITS AUSTRALIA

In 1930, Sir Otto Niemeyer arrived in this country in order to give us some "advice" on matters pertaining to finance. The result of his "advice" was the further enslavement of the people by the private bankers. Accompanying Sir Otto was Professor Theodor Emanuel Guggenheim Gregory, a member of the teaching staff of the London School of Economics, a nursery of Socialism and staffed largely by individuals of foreign extraction.

S ir Otto Niemeye r wa s an adviser to the Britis h Treasury fro m 1906 unti l 1927, holding the post of Controlle r of Financ e fro m 1922 to 1927. In 1927, he joined the staff of the Ban k of England. He was also concerned wit h the disastrous America n Debt Settlement plan.

He addressed a conference of Commonwealt h and State Minister s in Melbourn e on Augus t 21, 1930. The following extract s are fro m the Melbourn e "Argus " of the following day (significantly enough, the "Argus " had Niemeyer' s address reprinted in brochur e for m for free distribution): "There is also evidence to show that the standard of living in Australia has reached a point which is economically beyond the capacity of the country to bear without a considerable reduction of costs resulting in increased per capita output."

Ye gods! We wer e producing mor e rea l wealth than ever before, and we could have doubled the output if desired.

"I should, perhaps, add certain alleviating factors. Australia n stocks have for years enjoyed a privileged position in Londo n as trustee securities unde r the Colonia l Stock Act, and she has, to that extent, an advantage. Ther e is a general desire to assist a Dominio n and, indeed, the mer e fact of my presence here an d of the growin g co-operation between the present Commonwealt h Ban k and the Ban k of Englan d as a sister central bank may, I think, be claimed as a sign of goodwil l fro m responsible authorities."

W h o were these "responsible authorities" ? Certainl y not the million s of Australia n people who suffered cruelly as a result of Niemeyer' s instructions .

"But the fundamental question is the extent to which Australia herself will make it possible for the present picture to change. Australia must reassure the world as to the direction in which she is going, financially and economically, and no one else can do that for her."

Australi a mus t reassure the world ! Why ? We are not told. As long a s we pul l in our belts and liv e on short rations Sir Otto and his Ban k of Englan d friends wil l have confidence in us ! Di d someone say something about a self-governing country?

T h e Government representatives said that they woul d face the position and balance their budgets. Ther e was to be no mor e borrowing ; whic h meant that, apart fro m the fact that the banks wer e calling up overdraft s everywhere , the Government s woul d have little money for publi c works . The inevitable result wa s increased unemployment.

Althoug h this plan meant a ruthless attack upon the livin g standards of the Australia n people, the conference actually carried the following resolution unanimously: "Tha t the conference tender s its sincere thanks to Sir Otto Niemeye r and hi s colleagues for the valuabl e assistance given by them in the solution of the problems wit h whic h the conference has had to deal."

S ir Otto left us late in 1930 and nex t visited Ne w Zealand, giving the people of that country simila r advice, before leaving for South Americ a to tell the people of that country that they, too, ha d to pul l their belts in and "balance their budgets."

PROFESSOR COPLAND AND THE PREMIERS' PLAN

T he result of Niemeyer' s advice—or demands—to balance budgets was the famous Premiers ' Plan . Sir Herbert Gepp said on Jul y 20, 1936: "Professor Copland has done notable wor k for Australi a and the Empire . He and Professor Giblin had been leaders in mapping out the details of the Premiers' Plan, and in persuading influential sections of the community to agree to its adoption. Professor Copland had also been an inspiring force in the Universit y of Melbourne , and a leader of thought in the community."

However, in spite of the fact that he was a "leader of thought," he admitted on M a y 20, 1932, that "I can make the confession, now that the election is over" (Lyons , the bankers ' puppet, ha d been elected to power) "that the Premiers' Plan has admittedly been a disappointment up to date."

In the Brisbane "Telegraph " of Apri l 7, 1936, appeared a remarkabl e article wit h the headlines : "Premiers ' Pla n a Mistake," "Cut s Prolon g the Depression." Thi s article w as writte n b y J. L. K . Gifford, M.A. , Lecture r i n Economic s a t the Universit y o f Queensland. Th e following extrac t is worth y of careful reading: ". . . The wage reductions of the Premiers ' Pla n . . . not only contributed to a permanent lowering of the Australian pric e level, but also to a quite unnecessary temporary impoverishment of Australia . . . . Al l the earnestness and al l the Ruskinia n eloquence used to persuade poor John Smit h t o accept wage reductions , could have been put t o better use. .. . If the economists ha d agreed on a credit and exchange policy designed to maintain the leve l of mone y incomes , there woul d have been fe w harmfu l repercussions from the decline in export prices, little unemployment, and fe w hardships."

M r . Gifford was one of those responsible for enforcing the Ban k of England' s deflation policy. Apparentl y he repented.

Professor Coplan d carried on wit h hi s "expert advice." In March , 1933, he left for Europe and America . It wa s reported that he met Mr . Montagu Norma n in England, a nd other representatives of the International Bankin g Ring .

T h e following appeared in the Melbourn e "Herald " of Apri l 13, 1934:

"Professor Copland has just returned from a world tour, during which he made an intensive study of conditions overseas, and came in contact with all the leading men of affairs who are tackling the big economic problems of the day. He attended the World Economic Conference in London, the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, conferred with the Governor and economists of the Bank of International Settlements at Basle, met the members of the American Economic Association at Philadelphia, whom he addressed on the Australian policy during the depression, and lectured at Harvard, Toronto and Cornell Universities."

T h e overseas financier s certainly have a ver y good apologist in Professor Copland. Australians should neve r forget the leading part he has played in implementing the bankers ' polic y in thi s country; and he still wields considerable influence in influential circles .

LANG'S CHALLENGE TO "SOUND FINANCE"

On Marc h 11, 1927, the "Wal l Street Journal" said: "Empire borrowing, especially that of Australian States, has been closely regulated by the Bank of England. . . ."

However, there was one Australia n State and its Premie r that the Ban k of England wil l remembe r for a long time. I refer to Ne w South Wale s and Mr . J. T. Lang . Probabl y no other Premie r in any part of the Britis h Empire—wit h the exception of M r . Aberhart, of Alberta , Canada—has ever caused the financiers so muc h apprehension. Eve n in 1936, wit h Mr . Lan g no longer in office, this fear still existed. Mr . B. S . B. Stevens (now Sir Bertram), nex t Premie r of Ne w South Wales , whil e in Londo n meeting M r . Norma n and Co. , was reported by the Melbourn e "Herald " of Ma y 23, of that yea r as follows : "I find discouraging antagonism by London financiers to New South Wales, because they fear a return of the regime of Mr. J. T. Lang. I have been able to clear the atmosphere greatly. It is an uphill fight, but there is a growing recognition of the country's recovery."

To understand the financiers ' hatred of Mr . Lan g and the campaign of inspired abuse conducted against him , it i s essential that we understand wha t Mr . Lan g really stood for.

First, he opposed the disastrous Premiers ' Plan , whic h was the result of Sir Otto Niemeyer' s advice. Lang' s policy, as stated at the 1930 Ne w South Wale s State election, was comprised of the following three major points :

• 1 . That unti l Grea t Britai n (The Ban k of England) agreed to fun d Australia' s overseas debt in the same manne r as Americ a dealt wit h Grea t Britain' s debt to her, no furthe r interest upon overseas debt should be paid by Australia .
• 2. That the interest rate to Australia n bondholder s should be reduced to 3 pe r cent., and that al l interest rates on privat e finance should be correspondingly reduced.
• 3. That the existing system of currency be altered fro m that of a nomina l gold standard to a system mor e suited to moder n conditions, preferably the goods standard.

M r . Lan g believed that huma n beings wer e mor e important than financia l systems. A policy of sacrifice in a country literally stacked wit h rea l wealth di d not appeal to hi m as common sense. He refused to sacrifice the people. Th e banks saw the danger and the fight was on. The Pres s denounced Lan g as a swindle r and a thief.

THE RUN ON THE N.S.W. SAVINGS BANK

T he Government Savings Ban k of Ne w South Wales was , in 1930, the second largest bank of its kin d in the Britis h Empire . Its assets exceeded £10 4 million , an d it had a net income of approximately £400,000. Controlled by the Ne w South Wale s Government, it started to finance homes for the people, and also to assist primar y producer s by means of advances through a trading branch know n as the Rura l Bank .

Thi s policy was in direc t opposition to the deflationary policy of the privat e trading banks . An d the policy of the privat e trading banks was the policy of the Ban k of England. Eve n the Australia n Roya l Commissio n on Bankin g admitted in Paragraph 9 3 of its Report that the Australia n banks were accustomed to follo w the lead of the Ban k of England.

T h e Sydney "Evenin g News " and the country papers of October 24, 1930, stated: "Lan g wil l confiscate Savings Ban k deposits," "Lan g wil l smash the banks and seize your savings." Th e leader of the Nationa l Government stressed thi s point durin g electioneering, makin g it necessary for an official of the bank to personally appeal against such tactics, as a ru n had commenced upo n the deposits.

It has been stated that, apart from press propaganda, people wer e hire d to wal k continually in and out of the Bank' s premises as if a ru n had started. Finally , the people were stampeded, and rushed to withdra w their savings . Now , this bank was lik e every other bank: It could never pay al l the depositor s in legal tender, as the bul k of deposits wer e no mor e than figure s in its ledgers. Thi s was not know n by the people through their ignorance of bankin g practices . (They kno w a little mor e nowadays.) The y believed that they could al l obtain their money in legal tender if they demanded it.

T he private banks kne w that if they could persuade enough of the depositors of the Ne w South Wales Savings Ban k to demand their money, the Ban k woul d have to close its doors.

T he bank put up a great fight for seven months , payin g out in that time al l its liquid assets amounting to £22,000,000.

Unfortunately for the privat e banks , this campaign against the Savings Ban k in N e w South Wales had the effect of inducing depositor s in other banks to start drawin g their money. Thi s was serious. Eve n Professor Hytten , an apologist of the banks , admitted before the Tasmanian Monetar y Inquir y in 1935 that a general ru n on the banks woul d mean that "they woul d go west then."

In order to save the position, Sir Robert Gibson, forme r chairma n of the Common wealth Ban k Board, made a dramati c nationa l broadcast on Ma y 31, 1931. He said: "The Government Savings Bank of New South Wales was forced to close its doors because the people who had deposited their money in that bank were led to believe by the foolish statements of those who should have known better, and the statements of those who desired to bring about disaster, that that bank was not in a safe position. . . The Government Savings Bank of New South Wales was in a perfectly sound position. There was no good reason, on account of lack of soundness, wh y it was compelled to close its doors." He also said: ". . . the Commonwealt h Ban k had control over the note issue, and command of resources, in the form of currency, to any extent, which, in the opinion of the Ban k Board, i s deemed necessary." In other words , if the people did continue to demand their money, the printin g machines woul d be put in motion. Tha t admission i s historic .

Afte r the Ne w South Wales Savings Ban k ha d closed its doors, Sir Robert Gibso n was prepared to talk business wit h the Ne w South Wale s Government. Th e following extracts are from "Australia' s Curse," by S. C. Barnes : "Th e firs t merge r terms, whic h included a refusal to have anything to do wit h advances for homes or the taking

over of the Rura l Branch , were so scandalous that the State Government refused to accept them. In the meantime an organisation, called the Government Savings Ban k Rehabilitation Committe e of Depositor s and Citizens , had come into being. Growin g rapidl y in strength, it became embarrassing to money power, workin g through the Commonwealt h Bank , and amended merge r terms wer e offered and accepted, unwillingly , by the State. The terms appeared to include the taking ove r of the Rura l Ban k as a going concern. The State Ban k was then re-opened, and in a few days was prepared to pay depositors in full . . . . Ha d Sir Robert Gibson, a year previously, uttered half a dozen words in support of the Bank , untold misery and death woul d have been avoided. . . . Th e Rura l Bank , wit h nearly 200 branches competing wit h the private banks in every tow n in Ne w South Wales , was endangering their policy. It had to be destroyed, and the Nationa l (Commonwealth) Ban k was the instrument used to brin g about thi s destruction."

It i s interesting to note in passing that the Western Australia n Savings Ban k was absorbed by the Commonwealt h Ban k unde r simila r circumstances .

Althoug h Lan g was branded "the arch-repudiator, swindle r and thief, whose proper place was in gaol," the fact remains that, whereas previous Government s had borrowed approximately £8,000,000 fro m the Government Savings Bank , Lan g repaid £1,200,000 of thi s money durin g hi s brief term of office.

It has been asserted by some that direc t pressure to dismis s Mr . Lan g was brought to bear upo n Sir Phili p Game , Governo r of Ne w South Wale s at that time, by a representative of the financiers . Mr . Lan g was dismissed to the accompaniment of a tirade of abuse by the press. Mr . Lyon s and others joined the campaign, and it is fair to say that a deluded publi c heaved a sigh of relief whe n Lan g went.

M r . Stevens was the next Premier, and whe n he paid hi s firs t visit to England it was reported by the press that he spent two hour s wit h Montag u Norman . Ne w South Wale s ha d been "saved"! Mr . Norma n said that its "credit" was good again, a nd he was prepared to do business wit h them!

BANK OF ENGLAND AN D AUSTRALIA

Let us now devote some space to an examination of the tie-up between Australia s financial system and the Bank of England. Since 1924, the Commonwealth Bank has been under the direct domination of overseas interests. Prior to that time it was used to some extent on behalf of the Australian people.

Unti l 1923 it wa s controlled by a Governor, Sir Denison Miller. The bank' s outstanding act was to refuse to sacrifice the Australia n people in 1920 at the instigation of Montag u Norma n and hi s international bankin g friends , who had held a conference in Brussel s early that year.

Althoug h Mr . Norma n was able to mak e hi s policy felt in every other part of the Empire , he struck a "snag " in Australia . The privat e banker s in thi s country started to restric t the nation' s credit supplies and depression threatened. However, S ir Denison Mille r foiled thi s mov e by using the Commonwealt h Ban k to issue £23,000,000 between Jun e an d Decembe r of 1920. Thi s wa s a threat to the private banks , wh o then curtailed their deflation policy.

S ir Denison Mille r died in 1923. In 1924 the Bruce-Pag e administration took the firs t step in makin g the Commonwealt h Ban k a Centra l Bank , controlled by the Ban k of Englan d and the Ban k of International Settlements. Thi s was in line wit h Mr . Norman' s policy of a chain of central banks throughout the world .

In June , 1924, Dr . Earl e Page introduced a Bil l in the Federa l House to amend the Commonwealt h Ban k Ac t by taking the control of the Ban k out of the hands of a Governo r an d placing it unde r the control of a directorate, consisting of six persons "activel y engaged in agriculture , commerce, financ e and industry." In presenting the Bill, Dr. Earle Page referred to the discussions which members of Cabinet had with the private bankers! Tha t Page wa s not ignorant of the banking swindle wil l be seen by hi s remark s on June 13, 1924, whe n introducing the Commonwealth Ban k Bill : " A very great power is exercised by the banks in the creation of credit, in their control over business, and in their effect upon wages, as well as other conditions." (Parliamentar y Debates, Vol . 106, P. 1270.)

Afte r admitting this, he wa s a party to the establishment of a dictatorial Board whic h gave the banks still greater power. Th e Directorat e of the Ban k Boar d was, a nd still is, comprised of nominees of the privat e trading banks . The privat e trading banks in thi s country are owned by the three monopolies know n as the Sugar-Tobacco-Ga s Monopoly , the Meta l Monopoly , and the Overseas Group . Mr . Bruc e was personally connected wit h the Overseas Group , whos e three banks—the Australasia , the E. S. & A. , a nd the Union—hav e their headquarter s in London !

M r . R. G. Casey, a membe r of the Meta l Monopoly , whic h control s the National, the Commercia l of Australia , and the Ban k of Adelaide , was appointed liaison officer to Londo n by Mr . Bruc e in 1924; Mr . Casey maintained close contact wit h the financial interests there unti l 1931.

Afte r this training (?) he returned to Australi a and entered the Federa l Parliament, later becoming Federa l Treasurer. He faithfull y carried on the wor k of enslaving the Australia n people; then went to America , wher e he was in close contact wit h Wal l Street. Time wil l show wha t furthe r plans are being draw n up for our furthe r enslave ment to the International Financiers .

T he Ban k of Ne w South Wales , the Queensland National, and the Commercia l Bankin g Compan y of Sydney, belong to the Sugar-Tobacco-Ga s Monopol y and have a direct representative, in the person of Sir Claude Reading, as chairman of the Common wealth Ban k Board.

MR. BRUCE VISITS LONDON

Soon after the emasculation of the Commonwealt h Bank , Mr . Bruc e left for London , wher e he dined and wine d wit h his financia l friends . I have no hesitation in saying that no ma n has betrayed hi s ow n nation mor e to International Financia l interests than "Australia' s Nobles t Son"; hi s record on behalf of the financier s since 1924 should be made familia r to every loya l Australian .

Upo n his arriva l in Londo n he told a group of banker s at a dinne r that the Common wealth Ban k had been transferred by his Government to the control of "a board of directors charged wit h the duties of central banking." Th e Londo n "Times " reported h i m as follows : "The intention is that the Board shall control credit in Australia as the Bank of England regulates it in this country, and advice is now being sought from officials of the Bank of England as to the exact steps necessary to bring about a fully effective central banking system."

It was jus t about this time that the late Sir Robert Gibson, wh o was connected wit h the Meta l Monopol y and had jus t been appointed chairman of the Commonwealt h Ban k Board, made the following statement: "The Board of Directors of the Commonwealth Bank has given consideration to the advisability of conferring with the mother bank of the Empire, the Bank of England, on matters connected with central banking. In this connection, the late chairman had important discussions with Mr. Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, by whose courtesy it has been arranged that Sir Ernest Harvey shall pay a visit to Australia with a view to investigating . . . and making recommendations that. . . the central banking system of Australia may be co-ordinated with that of the Bank of England and other central banks of the Empire."

S ir Ernes t Harvey , a director of the Ban k of England, actually travelled to Australi a wit h Mr . Bruc e to furthe r our enslavement. In 1927 he gave the final directions in connection wit h the Commonwealt h Bank . The Bruce-Pag e Government was asked to pass a Bil l to deprive the bank of its Savings Ban k business. One speaker in Parliament said that this Ac t "took awa y the bank' s cash reserves, whic h had enabled it to compete wit h privat e banks , terminated its trading operations, and reduced it to a bankers ' bank—not a 'reserve' bank, because no bank was compelled to keep its reserves there—so that it became neither a trading bank nor a savings bank, nor yet a reserve bank, but a thing of shreds and patches, at the merc y of privat e institutions."

Thi s Bil l became la w in December, 1927. To mak e the Mone y Powe r supreme , M r . Bruc e got the Financia l Agreement incorporated as part of the Constitution. Thi s Agreement paved the wa y for the formation of the Loa n Counci l to control al l Govern ment borrowings .

In 1933, whe n Attorney-Genera l for Victoria , Mr . R. G. Menzie s said: "Fiv e year s ago Victori a entered into the financial agreement wit h the Commonwealt h and the other States, wit h the result that the financial policy of the State i s controlled by the Loa n Council . Mone y cannot be borrowed without the permission of that Council , which is the governing body of Australia to-day." Mr . Menzie s has changed hi s ideas considerably since entering Federa l politics .

MR. BRUCE VISITS AUSTRALIA IN 1934

M r . Bruc e paid a visit to Australi a in 1934, on behalf of the financial oligarchy in the "City " of London : hi s mission was to advise us to restrict production and introduc e "planning." (We have already examined the origin of thi s "planning " and its connection with the Ban k of England.)

By 1934 there was growin g dissatisfaction wit h the financia l system in Australia , and thousands of people wer e beginning to ask wh y we should have widespread poverty amidst plenty. Upo n hi s arrival , Mr . Bruc e told us that although our "credit" no w

stood hig h wit h our overseas creditors , We mus t not rela x our "wonderful" efforts. W h o wer e these creditor s that Mr . Bruc e spoke of? Whil e "representing" us in Londo n he has been closely connected wit h the followin g people: Sir Harr y Strakosch, Sir Feli x Schuster, Mr . Beaumont Pease, Sir Otto Niemeyer, Sir Ernes t Harvey, Sir Ala n Anderson , Lor d Craigmyle , Sir Cliv e Baillieu, the Nivisons , and Professor Guggenheim. Strakosch was at the Brussel s Conference in 1920 wit h Mr . Norman , and i s connected wit h several international bankin g firms . He was responsible for the establishment of the Centra l Ban k in South Africa . Schuster (fine British-soundin g names some of these individual s have!) was responsible for the establishment of the Centra l Ban k in India, and has always worke d in close collaboration wit h Sir Otto Niemeyer. The other individual s I have mentioned are al l connected, directly or indirectly, wit h the Ban k of England . Th e Nivison s are the people through who m all Australia n loans from "Britain " wer e negotiated.

T he rea l object of Mr . Bruce' s 1934 visit to Australi a was revealed in an editorial in the Londo n "Times " on Apri l 2, 1934. It might be as wel l to mention here that the Governo r of the Ban k of Englan d is one of the controller s of the Londo n "Times."

T h e editoria l told us that the Canadian farmer s wer e makin g great sacrifices to gain security, and that Mr . Bruce' s proposals for Australia n farmer s woul d probably be even mor e drastic. The proposals were the establishment of Boards to regulate production. Thi s was the firs t mov e by the Ban k of England and the International Financier s to introduc e plannin g into Australia .

Althoug h the finance-controlled press in Englan d was saying wha t a great ma n M r . Bruc e was, and the hig h prestige he had in Australia , the "Yorkshir e Post" criticised hi s proposals and said "it i s remarkabl e that even he dared to make such proposals."

Havin g paved the wa y for "planned production" in Australia , Mr . Bruc e left us . On the eve of hi s departure, one Melbourn e paper came out wit h headlines on the front page: "RESTRICTIO N OF PRODUCTIO N NECESSARY. " A report o f his address to the Melbourn e Chambe r of Manufacturer s also appeared in this same paper. He said that all sections of the communit y mus t co-operate to enable Australi a to enter the competitive fight for worl d markets !

Havin g given hi s instructions on behalf of Mr . Montag u Norma n & Co., Mr . Bruc e left us and di d not visit us again unti l 1939.

MR. BRUCE'S 1939 VISIT

Accompanied by a great press campaign, Mr . Bruc e left England late in 1938 to again visit Australia . Th e international situation was, by this time, becoming increasingly critical. The International Financier s in Wal l Street, together wit h the Ban k of England, a nd the Ban k of International Settlements, wer e laying their plans for the holocaust whic h wa s to burs t upon the worl d in September of 1939. As we have already seen, the financing of the totalitarian Powers , whil e Britain' s defences were neglected, was a direc t result of the financial policy pursued by the International Financiers .

It was , therefore, significant that Mr . Bruc e should call on the Wal l Street banker s in December, 1938, on hi s wa y to Australia . Why ? We can only speculate. We might remembe r that Mr . Bruc e i s a close friend of Mr . Casey, wh o has since been hob nobbing wit h these same financiers .

Whil e her e in 1939, Mr . Bruc e travelled around talking to many different people —particularl y member s of Parliament. Ther e is not the slightest doubt that the rea l object of his mission was to see ho w the Planned Economy plot wa s developing. Bac k on Apri l 3, 1934, the Londo n "Times " published an article headed, "Planned Empir e Marketing," in whic h the following appeared:

"Mr. Bruce's experience in London has convinced him that the economic salvation of the Commonwealth and, indeed, of the whole Empire, depends upon a concerted policy of trade production, in which the Governments will combine with the leaders of agriculture, industry, commerce and finance."

Well , we are being socialised rather rapidly in thi s country now. Boards are being established to control every primar y industry, small industries are being absorbed in big centralised finance-controlled monopolies, whil e the individua l i s becoming more a nd mor e a victi m of that soulless abstraction called the State.

T h e reader might wel l ponder over the following extrac t from the chief journa l of the Politica l and Economi c Planner s (issue of October 4, 1938): "We have started from the position that only in war, or under the threat of war, will a British Government embark on large-scale planning."

In other words , we are havin g a deliberate policy of socialism foisted upon us unde r cover of war. Member s of al l parties are unanimous that Government s should have mor e and mor e control over industry. Th e following extract from the Melbourne "Age " of Marc h 3, 1941, i s worth y of careful thought by those wh o believe that the

U.A.P. i s a bulwar k against socialism. Mr . Menzie s was being interviewed in Britain : "Mr. Menzies is reported to have said: 'I always tell my Opposition friends that the only difference between us is that I am theoretically non-Socialist, yet an amazingly practical Socialist, while they are theoretical Socialists. People will take things from us they wouldn't take from the Labor Party. That is outstandingly true in Australia. It is a question of speed. . . . You get two views which, in theory, are violently opposed. In practice, the extreme course of to-day is a commonplace of to-morrow.' "

In conjunction wit h this , the followin g report fro m the Melbourn e "Age " o f Marc h 12, makes sinister reading. Professor G. L. Wood, one of the gentlemen responsible for the implementation of the Premiers ' Plan , i s reported a s havin g said in an addres s to the University Committe e of Convocation, "that it was a common belief in Australia that economic freedom and individual liberty would be restored after the war; that the shackles of Governmental control would be lifted. The idea was a sample of the triumph of hope over experience. They had to realise that the pre-1939 status quo would never be restored. They were condemned to a system of Governmental control where almost every aspect of economic life would be subject to interference. That was inevitable, unless the problem of correlating the functions of primary, secondary, and tertiary workers, and of restoring a spirit of team work and co-operation to the world was tackled now."

Ther e can be no voluntary co-operation—which i s the basis of democrati c government—whil e the financia l domination by privat e monopolies unde r the control of the Bank of Englan d continues . Th e monopoly of credit mus t be broken ; otherwis e we will be one bi g trus t ru n by the privat e banks . Ther e wil l be no essential difference between our society and that whic h the Russians an d German s exis t under.

MR. REDDAWAY VISITS AUSTRALIA

In orde r to furthe r prov e that the Ban k of Englan d i s not averse to Socialism, I shall deal briefly wit h the visit of a youn g ma n by the name of Reddawa y to this country a fe w year s ago.

It i s not generally know n that Professor Coplan d (one of ou r "experts " who implemented Niemeyer' s deflation polic y back in the 1929-32 depression) set off, in March, 1933, to tour Americ a an d Europe , an d that he wa s reported to have ha d interviews wit h Mr . Montag u Norma n and other prominent financiers . It wa s soon after this that Mr . W. B. Reddaway, one of the intelligence officers of the Ban k of England , was sent out fro m England. He gave evidence before the Arbitratio n Court in 1937 and was, of course, applauded by al l the apologists of the present financial system. In addition to describing hi m a s brilliant, the Melbourn e "Argus " reminded us that M r. Reddaway was "onl y 24 year s of age." I heard Mr . Reddawa y speak on severa l occasions and questioned him . On e of hi s mos t interesting admissions in privat e conversation wa s that he was a Socialist! He ha d visited Russi a and he expressed some admiration for the system in operation there. He i s the author of a book on Russia' s financia l system. Havin g completed hi s wor k here, he returned t o Englan d late in 1937 to resume hi s wor k wit h the Ban k of England .

CONCLUSION

I think that thi s short history of the Ban k of Englan d an d it s debt-and-taxatio n system, although not as comprehensive as it might be, deals wit h al l the salient point s in its history since 1694. Th e facts whic h I hav e related should be know n by everyone interested in discovering the cause of the breakdow n of ou r civilisation. Th e mor e I study history, the mor e convinced I become that it wil l al l hav e to be drastically re-written and the influence of mone y in social development clearly revealed.

Even H. G. Well s has written : "When I wrote the 'Outline of History' I slowly gained the conviction which crystallised itself later on into a positive idea, that the great Roman Empire was ruined not only from outside by the storming barbarians; but also by the internal financial difficulties, by the indebtedness of all social classes, and by the heavy burden of taxation, until, under these financial burdens, the whole scaffolding of imperialism broke down. It is dreadful to watch how gradually the same symptoms Of decadence become visible in the great empires of the modern world. "

Do we desire the Britis h Commonwealt h of Nations to be destroyed by "the enemy within"? If not, we mus t use every endeavour to have ou r financial system altered and arrest the slide towards the abyss of destruction into whic h other civilisations have plunged in the past. Tha t we can stil l save the situation, I have no doubt.

(The End.)

HOW TO BEAT

THE ENEMY WITHIN THE EMPIRE!

READ—

"THE MONEY POWER VERSUS DEMOCRACY"

By ERIC D. BUTLER.

Every loyal Britisher desirous of preserving British culture and British democracy must read the above book. This book has been acclaimed as one of the most outstanding books on political and economic democracy to yet appear in Australia. What is real democracy? What is money? Who manufactures it? Is the party system democratic? What can I do to defeat the Money Power? All these, and many other vital questions, are answered in "The Money Power Versus Democracy." It is packed with facts which you must know. Pass it on to your friends.

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